„Halb Seherlebnis, halb ein Denken“: Wittgenstein’s Remarks on Aspect Perception in *Philosophy of Psychology – A Fragment*

Exegetical, systematic, and substantial issues

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Introduction

In the first section of this introduction, I delineate why Wittgenstein's remarks on aspect perception are still relevant and in what sense the present dissertation contributes to important ongoing debates. The general structure of the thesis and the main lines of reasoning are sketched in the second section of the introduction. The third and last section briefly deals with some methodological principles which guide my approach especially in the first part of the thesis, since this part looks rather unconventional or atypical from the standpoint of contemporary analytic philosophy.

1. Motivation and relevance of the topic

In comparison to such common mental phenomena as visual perception and ratiocination, episodes of aspect seeing and shifting occur rather infrequently in our everyday experience. For instance, when looking at a puzzle picture such as the rabbit-duck drawing, I might first see it as a duck and then, after a switch of aspects, as a rabbit (but I am barred from seeing it as both duck and rabbit at the same time). Moreover, most perceivers are familiar with cases in which the sudden recognition of a hitherto unidentified object or person transforms our visual experience, a phenomenon that Wittgenstein closely links to aspect perception. Given that such perceptual episodes have a specific phenomenology or 'feel' to them and are regularly accompanied by characteristic expressions of astonishment, wonder or confusion, they might be instances of a *sui generis* psychological phenomenon. My dissertation strives to provide a detailed, sustained and orderly analysis of Wittgenstein's remarks on aspect perception in *Philosophy of Psychology – A Fragment* that combines philological, exegetical, systematic, and substantive issues. As such, it ideally leads to a better understanding of a fascinating topic in one of the most important 20th century thinkers. Moreover, it provides a contribution to adjudicating the ongoing debates about conceptual content and cognitive penetrability.

Despite the fact that aspect perception gives rises to visual experiences that are perfectly familiar and yet deeply puzzling (or even paradoxical), Wittgenstein's remarks on the topic have received only limited attention. While there has been a surge in publications on seeing-as over the last ten years or so[1], there is still no monograph that exclusively focusses on aspect perception and offers a systematic examination of its conceptual features and its scope. The present thesis is meant to fill this gap in the literature and to serve as a starting point for further investigations on hitherto neglected facets of Wittgenstein's late philosophy of psychology.

Since the beginning of the millennium, there has been a deplorable rift among scholars concerning the nature and pertinence of Wittgenstein's manner of philosophising. Paradoxically enough, the discussions as to whether, say, his writing style has an intrinsic purpose and is thus an integral and ineliminable part of his philosophical message have not encouraged a more sustained engagement with his texts. The commentary on the first half of section xi of *Philosophy of Psychology – A Fragment* that comprises the bulk of Part I of the present thesis is meant to serve as remedy to this general tendency. Given the terse, gnomic, and sometimes outright enigmatic nature of Wittgenstein's

[1] Three collections of essays by various contributors are particularly relevant, namely Day and Krebs (2010), Kemp and Mras (2016), and Harrington, Shaw, and Beaney (2018).

remarks, the best interpretative strategy consists in liberating oneself from overly general methodological assumptions, thereby remaining alive to all exegetical possibilities.

A detailed commentary which indicates that a systematic reading of PPF is viable could serve as a warning against recent endeavours to relegate it to the status of a mere fragment.[2] Given both the prominence and the quality of the remarks on aspect perception in the writings that postdate the *Investigations*, such a demotion seems indeed unwise and unfortunate. Moreover, these remarks enable the reader to appreciate which topics captured Wittgenstein's attention shortly before his passing, and powerful positions on several controversial issues in contemporary philosophy of perception can be extracted from them.

Although Wittgenstein's views have at least indirectly influenced debates on vision in both philosophy and empirical psychology, aspect seeing has received little attention within the otherwise thriving field that is the philosophy of perception. In recent years, the question whether there are episodes of pure seeing, that is, whether there are visual experiences that do not involve concepts (reckoned to be the constituents of thoughts), has been hotly debated.[3] A negative answer to this question has important consequences, to name but one: if all seeing is indeed conceptual, and if one further submits that non-human animals do not have conceptual capacities at their disposal, then one must conclude that the visual experience possessed by humans is radically different from the capacity of (some) animals to visually re-identify items in their environment. Moreover, both philosophers of perception and cognitive scientists have investigated whether perception and cognition are fairly independent capacities. A moot question in this context is whether the initial stages of perception, which involve the detection and discrimination of colours, shapes, and movement as well as the parsing of the visual field into different areas according to Gestalt principles, already involve a deployment of cognitive abilities. The modular theory of mind pioneered by Fodor, according to which perceptual processes are impervious to cognitive influences, has come under increasing pressure by theorists who embrace a more integrationist picture of the mind, such as proponents of cognitive penetration and most participants in discussions on so-called 4E cognition.[4]

Wittgenstein's remarks on aspect perception are directly relevant to these debates. For firstly, he maintains that seeing-as is a genuinely perceptual capacity, inasmuch as it shares several crucial conceptual characteristics with ordinary seeing. Secondly, he avers that both concepts and other cognitive abilities are deployed in most instances of the phenomenon. As a consequence, specifying the range of applicability of the notion of an aspect allows us to determine Wittgenstein's stance on the abovementioned issues. If all ordinary seeing turned out to amount to aspect perception, that is, if the so-called ubiquity thesis were correct, this could serve as an easy argument for the thesis that perception *per se* involves the deployment of concepts. Similarly, if seeing-as encompassed all episodes of ordinary seeing, the latter would turn out to be cognitively penetrable (or indeed *de facto* thus penetrated), since the former is permeated by cognitive influences. It is thus evident that Wittgenstein's remarks on aspect seeing are directly relevant for these two ongoing discussions.

[2] see Hacker and Schulte (2009).

[3] see McDowell (1994), Brewer (1999, 2005) for the thesis that seeing essentially involves conceptualisation and Peacocke (1998, 2001), Heck (2000), Tye (2006), Burge (2010) for defences of nonconceptual content.

[4] For an overview of these developments, see Raftopoulos and Zeimbekis (2016) and Newen, de Bruin, and Gallagher (2018).

2. Overview of the three parts

When one sets out to read those writings of Wittgenstein's which postdate what is still commonly known as 'Part I' of the *Philosophical Investigations*, one cannot fail to be surprised by the fact that he discusses the phenomenon of aspect perception or seeing-as at such great length. In the present doctoral thesis, I want to trace the ramifications of Wittgenstein's discussion and thereby unravel the general thrust of his remarks on the topic.

In the first part of the dissertation, a set of questions regarding the status of what used to be called 'Part II' of the *Philosophical Investigations* (that is, MS 144 and the now lost TS 234) will be discussed. Before the publication of the *Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology* in 1980, this was the only text in which Wittgenstein surveys psychological concepts that was readily available. As such, it has been widely received and has – for a long time almost exclusively – stirred the interest in Wittgenstein's considerations on aspect perception.[5] MS 144 is no longer considered to be part of Wittgenstein's late *opus magnum*, mainly because it is unclear if and how he wanted to integrate these remarks into the main work. In the fourth edition of the *Investigations*, Hacker and Schulte print the text of MS 144 under the title *Philosophy of Psychology – A Fragment*, which suggests that they consider it to be not only an unfinished, but also a philosophically deficient work. For it would be somewhat implausible to attribute inner coherence and systematic argumentations to a mere fragment.

In the first chapter of Part I of the dissertation, I challenge this editorial decision. Given the nature of the subject under discussion, this first chapter is primarily philological in character. While I do not want to argue that MS 144 should be considered an integral part of the *Investigations*, I contend that it is a more polished work than the *Remarks* and the *Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology*, simply in that it results from procedures which Wittgenstein commonly made use of when elaborating and refining his thoughts. In particular, it gathers remarks from several 'first draft' manuscripts and leaves aside various remarks which Wittgenstein deemed to be misleading, impertinent or otherwise unsatisfactory. As such, *Philosophy of Psychology – A Fragment* fulfils an important criterion for counting as a work of Wittgenstein's. Furthermore, I discuss various deficiencies of the so-called genetic or contextual method of interpretation and prepare the ground for a primarily immanent reading of PPF, that is, a reading that pays close attention to textual details and which starts from the assumption that the text presents a relatively closed and coherent argumentation. I take this supposition to be justified in light of the fact that Wittgenstein drafted MS 144 in order to present his views in the philosophy of psychology to Norman Malcolm, which also suggests that he was ready to defend the theses voiced in the manuscript against potential criticisms.

In the second chapter of Part I, I offer a sustained interpretation of the first half or so of section xi of PPF, highlighting a range of exegetical difficulties. I aim to provide what may be considered the most fruitful contribution to an understanding of Wittgenstein's work: a detailed commentary. It would be beyond the remit of a dissertation to give an in-depth comment on every single remark of section xi, and the restriction to §§111-256 allows me to focus on those passages that deal most closely with aspect perception. In the commentary, it becomes evident that the text can be divided into a succession of thematic and argumentative units. As with other works of Wittgenstein's, there are two principal factors which render the interpretation of the text challenging. Firstly, his style of writing is terse and frequently elliptical, and the dialogical character of some of the remarks makes it hard to tell whether a position is endorsed by Wittgenstein or just suggested by his

[5] see e.g. Strawson (1974).

fictional interlocutor. Secondly and relatedly, even where it proves possible to attribute a view to him *propria voce*, the relevant theses are often hedged and fairly tentative. To cite just one example, it is not entirely clear whether he considered all or even most of the striking visual experiences that he discusses to be instances of one and the same phenomenon (namely aspect perception).

More substantive issues will be tackled in Part II of the dissertation. In the first chapter of that part, I will determine the place which aspect seeing occupies within the taxonomy of psychological concepts by systematically investigating its main characteristics. On the one hand, aspect perception may be readily assimilated to thought. For episodes of seeing-as are (at least to a certain degree) subject to the will. Furthermore, they serve as underpinnings for various internal relations established between the object thus seen and other objects. On the other hand, it is conspicuous that seeing-as shares certain crucial features with ordinary seeing. The perception of an aspect is a state, and as such it has a duration which may in principle be measured. Moreover, the expression of an episode of aspect perception is not an indirect or mediated way of conveying what one is seeing, and the use of the locution 'I see *that* as *such-and-such*' forces itself upon us in such cases. Also, seeing-as appears to be subject to first-person authority. Lastly, in many cases it is indicative of the actual presence of the aspects in question, such that it is not a purely projective phenomenon.

The second chapter of Part II provides an examination of what Wittgenstein calls 'secondary' meaning. On the surface, secondary senses are similar to aspects in that they disclose a complementary dimension of significance that hitherto remained inconspicuous. In this sense, they enable us to see familiar expressions in a new light. Moreover, a sentence featuring a word used in a striking secondary sense (just as the claim to have spotted a particular aspect) typically leads to a gradual and potentially abortive process of conversion in which one tries to make one's interlocutor appreciate the point of the utterance in question. The chapter also differentiates secondary meanings from metaphors and ends with the suggestion that Wittgenstein's remarks on secondary sense are meant to complement what he said about 'primary' meaning: secondary senses license the use of familiar words in novel and unexpected ways.

In the third chapter of Part II, the conceptual differences between seeing-as and treating-as are investigated. From this discussion it emerges that seeing-as cannot be identified with treating-as, although at least some cases of aspect perception can be re-described as instances of treating-as. In the chapter, I also discuss two accounts of Wittgenstein's remarks which aim to give succour to the claim that seeing-as is a fairly pervasive phenomenon with an ineliminable practical dimension. Cavell seems to maintain that those aspects which become visible only within a specific contextual setting are analogous to particular ways and practices of handling things that become unproblematic and unquestioned in the light of an underlying 'myth' (that is, an encompassing narrative which accommodates all or most salient features of a given domain of reality). While his discussion is captivating, it marks a departure from Wittgenstein's own concerns. Mulhall on the other hand intimates that seeing-as is ubiquitous, and that it essentially involves a specific way of engaging with the object that displays the aspect. I reject this claim on both exegetical and substantial grounds. From this chapter, it emerges that treating-as is a separate and largely independent notion.

Part III of the thesis is dedicated to more systematic issues. The first chapter examines the impact that the remarks on seeing-as had in the philosophy of art by focussing on two accounts of (respectively) aesthetic appreciation and pictorial representation that were profoundly influenced by Wittgenstein. Both Scruton and Wollheim noticed that the notion of seeing-as cannot be applied straightforwardly to elucidate a spectator's way of engaging with art, but that there are

important concepts in the vicinity which could do the job. More specifically, Scruton avers that the imagination, which according to him shares certain fundamental conceptual traits with aspect perception, assumes a pivotal role in aesthetic appreciation. As for Wollheim, he contends that the appreciation of pictures requires twofold simultaneous attention being directed at both the representational medium (say, the canvas of a painting) and the pictorial content. While seeing-as does not allow for such twofold attention, seeing-in puts observers in a position to shift back and forth between what Wollheim calls the 'configurational' and the 'representational' level. Wollheim's account in particular had a deep impact on contemporary philosophy of art, such that Wittgenstein's remarks on seeing-as are (at least indirectly) of abiding importance in this domain.[6]

The second chapter of Part III examines the ongoing debate about (non-)conceptual content. Wittgenstein suggests that aspect perception is profoundly shaped by the deployment of concepts, although there might be some rare instances which do not presuppose concept possession (e.g. the double cross). An argument for conceptualism could be established if visual perception *tout court* turned out to be identical to seeing-as. In the first two sections of the chapter, I retrace some of the distinctions that are instrumental in rendering the discussion more perspicuous, most notably that between content (non-)conceptualism and state (non-)conceptualism. The argument which tries to establish state conceptualism by reference to aspect perception fails precisely because that kind of perception is not ubiquitous. Whereas state conceptualism arguably applies to seeing-as, it is not *ipso facto* correct as a thesis about ordinary seeing.

The third chapter of Part III, which concludes the dissertation, deals with the contemporary discussion concerning cognitive (im-)penetrability and is analogous in structure to the preceding second chapter. I first locate the debate in its historical context and then go on to delineate some key terminological distinctions. I submit that semantic penetrability is an overly ambitious and restrictive claim that is indeed rarely if ever advocated by proponents of cognitive penetrability. Causal penetrability, that is, the thesis that the cognitive resources of an agent can have a causal impact upon her perceptual states, is more plausible, and aspect perception again seems to be a case in point. For Wittgenstein insists that such perception is permeated by 'thinking', as has been shown in the first chapter of Part II of the dissertation, which arguably means that it is cognitive penetrated. But yet again, there is a fly in the ointment, namely the fact that seeing *per se* is not identical to seeing-as. While cognitive *penetration* cannot be established by citing the case of aspect perception, cognitive *penetrability* might fare better, or so I argue. Given that ordinary perception under fairly exceptional conditions involves aspect perception (e.g. when the recognition of the object seen requires conscious effort), it *can* in principle amount to aspect perception. And since seeing-as is cognitively penetrable, ordinary seeing must also be thus penetrable.

3. Methodological considerations

Two aspects of my dissertation in particular call for methodological reflections. First of all, the approach in the first part of the thesis can be duly described as 'philological'. But what can one expect from a philological examination in philosophy, especially given the fact that we are not concerned with an ancient, but with a 20th century thinker? Regarding this question, I maintain that philological elucidations are subservient to philosophical inquiries, but that they are nonetheless a necessary preliminary. Secondly, I take a stance on two contested issues regarding

[6] see e.g. Walton (1990), Nanay (2016).

the interpretation of Wittgenstein's (late) philosophy, in that I opt for a predominantly immanentist reading of *Philosophy of Psychology – A Fragment* and detect theses and arguments in the text.

The form of Wittgenstein's corpus poses a formidable conundrum to interpreters. He has only published two works during his life, namely the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, his early masterpiece, and the short article 'Some Remarks on Logical Form', which he soon came to regard as essentially flawed and which he eventually retracted. Part I of the *Philosophical Investigations* was ready for publication at the time of his death and published posthumously in 1953. The other material in print consists of typescripts and manuscripts which were not meant to be put to press and which in some cases are nothing more than unfinished work in progress. The texts in which Wittgenstein discusses aspect perception display such a character: while some of the material consists of first draft manuscripts (such as the *Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology*), other texts have been partly refined and elaborated (such as the *Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology* and *Philosophy of Psychology – A Fragment*). Before setting out to offer a sustained interpretation of one of these texts, it is thus essential to show that it forms a relatively closed ensemble, i.e. that it displays at least some characteristics of a work.

In my commentary on *Philosophy of Psychology – A Fragment*, I strive to offer an immanent reading. This type of interpretation focusses on the close perusal of a given text without relying on evidence derived from other works of the author or from its biographical, social, and historical context. Given the nature of the text in question, the approach I want to defend cannot be dogmatically or rigidly immanent, but nonetheless such an interpretation is in general the best way not to prejudge certain issues. My motivation for adopting this approach proceeds largely *ex negativo*. In particular, the so-called genetic method, which often cites unpublished manuscripts and typescripts from Wittgenstein's *Nachlass* in order to facilitate the interpretation of the dense and sometimes cryptic *Philosophical Investigations*, is sometimes unreliable. For one thing, from the fact that a remark had a specific function in its original context, it does not follow that it preserves this function when placed into a completely new textual environment. For another, it is likely that Wittgenstein altered a remark when he deemed it to be misleading or otherwise deficient, and that preceding variants of a remark are thus to be read with a pinch of salt.

While I grant that Wittgenstein proceeds in an unsystematic, piecemeal manner that stands in contrast to the positive theory building of most contemporary analytic philosophers, my interpretation still aims at ascribing theses to him and at excavating or reconstructing the arguments behind them.[7] There are at least two reasons which justify this move. Firstly, if one contends that Wittgenstein avoids certain mistakes or spurious assumptions made by present-day thinkers, then one should be able to articulate what his achievements were and to point out in a transparent and rational way why he was right. Many writers sympathising with the 'New Wittgenstein' reading patently fail to do so: they do not show how Wittgenstein gets a grip on specific problems, and they offer no account as to how he manages to convince his readers by the elusive strategies of persuasion he allegedly employs. Moreover, an approach which shies away from attributing determinate philosophical positions to Wittgenstein isolates him from ongoing debates and, metaphorically speaking, places him into a philosophical void where his views remain both unheard and unchallenged. Secondly, as far as in-depth analyses of his work are concerned, the burden of proof is clearly on those exegetes who attribute no theses to him: those interpreters who have engaged with his philosophy in the most rigorous and sustained manner, namely those

[7] For a defence of this approach, see Glock (1991).

who have provided a comment for each remark of the *Investigations*[8], have all ascribed arguments to him.

It is a distinctive characteristic of the present thesis that it draws on the whole spectrum of philosophical enquiry. The chapters in Part II dedicated to secondary meaning and treating-as deal with topics that at best lie at the fringes of contemporary analytic philosophy, but which nonetheless are amenable to responsible investigation. The concluding chapter of Part III on the other hand engages with a philosophical debate that is thoroughly influenced by insights in empirical psychology and cognitive science. My general approach to all these issues is influenced by conceptual analysis. With Wittgenstein, I contend that debates in philosophy can only be fruitful (and solvable in principal) if the conceptual foundation on which they rest is sufficiently transparent. However, this does not mean that, say, the debate about cognitive (im-)penetrability is riddled by conceptual confusions and thereby fails to address any genuine, substantial problem. In general, I strive to engage with the relevant literature in a sympathetic and charitable way.

[8] These include Hallett (1977), Baker and Hacker (1980 onwards), and von Savigny (1988).

Part I: *Exegetical issues surrounding* Philosophy of Psychology – A Fragment

Chapter 1: Does *Philosophy of Psychology – A Fragment* justify a detailed close reading?

1. Introduction

At first glance, the question as to what counts as a work of Wittgenstein's might strike one as somewhat fancy or even irrelevant, especially when posed by philosophers. This is understandable, given that even specialists in ancient and medieval philosophy, who are – due to the way in which their primary sources have been produced – used to questions concerning the authorship, authenticity and relative chronology of the writings they examine, tend to defer such issues to trained philologists. Moreover, with the invention of the printing press and the growth of philosophy as an academic subject, the task of identifying the works of a given philosopher has become all but trivial: 'works' in the most obvious sense of the term are simply those texts which the author himself saw to press, or which at least received an *imprimatur* during his lifetime. This austere criterion leaves only little room for disagreement: for instance, one might quibble whether the first two editions of the *Critique of Pure Reason* might be considered two different works, given the relatively substantial revisions made by Kant in the second edition.

In the case of Wittgenstein, however, the main problem is that he published only one longer text during his lifetime, namely the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. And although he submitted the succinct paper 'Some Remarks on Logical Form' for publication in the 1929 volume of the *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, he quickly felt dissatisfied with that text and actually gave a talk on a different subject at the Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society and the Mind Association. That paper is thus a text which fulfils a seemingly plausible criterion for counting as a work, while nonetheless failing to provide a reliable account of his views at the time of publication. Apart from this issue, the second component of the proposed criterion – the presence of an unwavering *imprimatur* – is arguably of little use when applied to Wittgenstein's *Nachlass*. For he has been very imprecise and overly liberal as to what should be put to press after his death: in his testament, he advises his literary executors to 'publish as many of [his] unpublished writings as they think fit […]'[9], and indeed none of the extant manuscripts and typescripts contains a clear indication that it should be published posthumously. Moreover, in those cases where one finds a preface and possible mottoes in his notes, which may arguably be taken as indications that he considered a given text to be relatively complete, it is often difficult to establish precisely *which* text is meant to be preceded by the preface in question.[10]

[9] see Rhees (1996), p. 56 f. In general, Wittgenstein's attitude concerning the publication of writings from the *Nachlass* was one of almost flippant nonchalance, as is evinced by the fact that he reportedly advised his literary executors to 'toss a coin' in order to choose among alternative phrasings; see Luckhardt and Aue (2013), p. ixe (also quoted by Knott (2017), p. 337).

[10] In his early reflections on the topic, Schulte mentions *en passant* that it is a relatively distinctive characteristic of 'final' typescripts that Wittgenstein wrote one or several prefaces for them; see Schulte (1989), p. 48. Taking up this point, Pichler (2004), p. 49 suggests that it is not obvious that the draft of a preface found in MS 109 (which Rush Rhees used in his edition as the preface to the *Philosophical Remarks*) is indeed related to TS 209 (i.e. the typescript on which the published text of the *Remarks* is based). Moreover, there is a famous mismatch between the preface of the *Philosophical Investigations* and the main text: listed as one of the main subjects discussed, Wittgenstein does not examine the 'foundations of mathematics' in the book.

These philological quandaries have gained further prominence in the wake of the publication of the fourth edition of the *Philosophical Investigations*, edited by Peter Hacker and Joachim Schulte (2009). Their edition features a sometimes heavily amended version of Anscombe's original translation and demotes what was formerly known as 'Part II' to the status of an almost entirely unrelated 'fragment'. This latter editorial choice has two important aspects that are not carefully distinguished by the editors. On the one hand, they argue that the putative second part of the work does in fact not belong to the *Philosophical Investigations*, on both philological and substantial grounds. From a philological point of view, it is unclear what Wittgenstein wanted to do with the manuscript MS 144 and the closely related typescript TS 234 (which served as the basis for the printed text of the first edition, but is now lost). Although it might have been the case that he wanted to incorporate this material into the final text of the *Investigations*, he never made any actual attempts to do so, such that the editors (and the readers) are simply left to conjectures as to what the final or authorised text would have looked like.[11] And from a substantial or philosophical perspective, Hacker has argued that what was previously known as 'Part II' marks a departure into new directions, in that it focusses on topics and problems that are only remotely connected to the main argumentative threads of the *Investigations* properly speaking.[12] On the other hand, however, the editors of the fourth edition do not motivate their decision to refer to the text as a 'fragment', although that designation is evidently evaluative (and mildly deprecatory). That way of characterising the text is highly problematic, not least because an author typically cannot be held fully accountable for views he expressed in a mere fragment, i.e. in a text that is not even nearing completion and contains important argumentative gaps. Lastly, the editors can be criticised for not sticking to their choice: demoting what was labelled 'Part II' in previous editions to the status of a fragment and yet including it in a volume entitled *Philosophical Investigations* (without any further specifications) – thus ennobling it by printing it alongside an authoritative text – appears to be an inconsequent and half-hearted decision.[13]

In the light of these editorial difficulties, I set out to first discuss some criteria for counting as a work of Wittgenstein's that have been discussed in the literature. After that, I further illustrate that the question is not a completely idle one, in that the term 'work' has an important evaluative dimension and thereby influences the way in which readers engage with Wittgenstein's writings. With regards to what was previously known as 'Part II' of the *Philosophical Investigations*, the aim of the present section is to show that said text, while arguably not an integral part of the *Investigations*[14], nevertheless deserves close scrutiny and is amenable to a sustained, predominantly immanent reading. This section thus prepares the ground for the detailed commentary of the text provided in the second chapter of the present part, which in turn substantiates the claim that *Philosophy of Psychology – A Fragment* has indeed been miscalled and is a work of prime philosophical importance.

[11] see Hacker and Schulte (2009), p. xxii.

[12] see Hacker (1996), p. xvi f. See also von Wright (1982), p. 136, who (with some qualifications) concurs with this judgement.

[13] One could counter that this somewhat infelicitous choice is just a concession to tradition, and that it reflects the fact that readers still want to be able to have ready access to what used to be known as 'Part II' of the *Investigations*. But this is hardly a convincing riposte, since the text would not fall into oblivion simply by being excluded from editions of the *Investigations*.

[14] Knott (2017) offers a rather convincing defence of Anscombe and Rhees, the original editors of the *Investigations*, against Hacker and Schulte's charge that the former 'decided' (Hacker and Schulte (2009), p. xxi), arguably more or less out of whim and without any substantive reasons, to consider 'Part II' an integral component of the work; see Knott (2017), pp. 333-9. However, for my own purposes, it is enough to show that the text in question is much more polished and philosophically insightful than the label 'fragment' suggests.

2. The criteria for counting as a work of Wittgenstein's

As a preliminary, it is expedient to notice that the question as to what counts as a work of Wittgenstein's allows for two different readings. On the one hand, one could take it to be concerned with authorship, that is, with the question who penned a particular work (it should thus be read with the following intonation: 'What is a work of *Wittgenstein's*?'). In the case of ancient and medieval philosophy, answering this kind of question is a predilection of philologists, and sifting out spurious works often has important repercussions as to which views one ascribes to a particular author. As far as Wittgenstein scholarship is concerned, this specific question is not a pressing one, though it is not completely idle either: keeping in mind that lecture notes and certain typescripts cannot directly be ascribed to Wittgenstein as an author favours exegetical caution. In particular, lecture notes that are not verbatim are to be interpreted with a pinch of salt, since they inevitably reflect the possibly limited degree of understanding of the note taker, and often contain only those points which the latter deemed to be important or salient. As a consequence, when it comes to assessing what Wittgenstein's views on a particular topic were, lecture notes are one of the least reliable types of source.[15] On the other hand, and perhaps more importantly, the question could be interpreted as asking for a definition of what a work is (i.e. with the following emphasis: 'What is *a work* of Wittgenstein's?'). In the light of what has been said in the introduction, this is the more salient query, for the demotion of the putative second part of the *Investigations* implies that that text is not a work, or perhaps less dramatically, that it is not a work of first rank, in stark contrast to the *Investigations* themselves (i.e. what used to be known as 'Part I').

Given the appended qualification 'of first rank', it is worth noting that the term 'work' in itself is not necessarily used to connote either completion or achievement. In a somewhat liberal sense, fragments and possibly even preparatory sketches and drafts may be called 'works', and it is not in itself contradictory to call something an 'unfinished work', or indeed to characterise a text as 'work in progress'. Moreover, given that 'work' is not a term which necessarily expresses appraisal, a text may be considered a work even if it presents a deeply flawed or abortive project. These points about the ordinary usage of the term 'work' notwithstanding, in debates about the status of various texts from Wittgenstein's *Nachlass* it is fairly obvious (though mostly left implicit) that the characterisation as a work confers a badge of honour on the text in question. This is arguably due to the fact that a work properly speaking can bear a considerable exegetical weight, since it is licit, among other things, to subject it to a systematic and rigorous interpretation and to take it to express the definitive views of the author, or at least views that he was ready to defend at length and with force against criticisms. In this sense, a 'work' is to be distinguished from more explorative and tentative 'work in progress', and it is certainly different from a fragment, which typically fails to display inner coherence and argumentative stringency.[16] Moreover, having firmly established works as points of reference allows for a periodisation of an author's writings, which in turn makes them more readily accessible to the reader, and marks a first step in adjudicating the moot question

[15] see Glock (2013), p. 50.

[16] One could retort that this way of interpreting the crucial term 'fragment' is uncharitable, since a fragment is in some cases a self-standing and fairly coherent piece of writing that has been detached from its immediate textual environment (or where said environment has been lost). On this reading, removing, say, the discussion about privacy (i.e. PI §§243-315) from the *Investigations* would result in the production of a less informative, and yet cogent 'fragment'. I take this perhaps more charitable reading to be implausible, given that the incorporation of the material from *Philosophy of Psychology – A Fragment* would, according to Hacker and Schulte, require 'radical rewriting' rather than the introduction of just a few transitory remarks; compare Hacker and Schulte (2009), p. xxii. Given that the ground for some of the discussions in PPF xi has been prepared in the *Investigations*, especially §§527-39, this view is not uncontroversial; in his commentary on the relevant remarks, Hacker even acknowledges these connections; see e.g. Hacker (1996), p. 326 f.

whether there are any definite rather than just tentative thematic and/or methodological ruptures in his oeuvre.

Wittgenstein's peculiar style of composing and rearranging his writings renders the task of assessing what counts as a work even more challenging. For the most basic, underlying textual unit is the *Bemerkung* or remark, which may comprise several paragraphs but rarely exceeds the length of a page in print. A single remark often survives a number of important changes: it may, for instance, be transferred from one manuscript to another manuscript or typescript and thus find its way into a completely new context, while remaining relatively unchanged. And if Wittgenstein felt dissatisfied with a particular manuscript or typescript, this does not lead him to reject all or even most of the remarks comprising that text. Nonetheless, it would be absurd to count each single remark as a work on its own. For one thing, a remark by Wittgenstein is not to be equated with an aphorism: while remarks are always succinct and often become very condensed (especially when Wittgenstein, after several steps of reworking, has pruned them of everything he deemed inessential), they are never entirely self-contained.[17] Although specific remarks may fit strikingly well into different contexts, they are rarely intelligible when deprived of any context. For another, considering each remark as a work would lead to an unwanted proliferation of 'works', which as such is utterly uninformative. These points notwithstanding, it is important to keep in mind that remarks play a crucial role in Wittgenstein's practice of composing (or rather assembling) works, and that remarks which have survived several steps of rearrangement typically convey important insights.

Another approach which pays heed to the apparent truism that a 'work' by Wittgenstein is simply anything he has written is the view according to which the bulk of Wittgenstein's *Nachlass* forms an enormous, continuous work or 'hypertext'. This account is, however, extremely unhelpful for potential readers, in that it does not provide any distinctive points of reference: instead of reading only some particularly representative writings, one would have to read the entire *Nachlass*, including first-draft manuscripts, in order to gain an insight into Wittgenstein's philosophy. Moreover, it is implausible that a view seemingly expressed *propria voce* in a first-draft manuscript can be ascribed to Wittgenstein with the same degree of plausibility as a proposal advanced in a polished text such as the *Investigations*. Thanks to the process of constant re-elaboration, a remark that is legitimately taken to express Wittgenstein's (rather than the fictional interlocutor's) view becomes less explorative and more affirmative in character, a characteristic which cannot be readily explained by the hypertext view. Relatedly, the approach does not provide any guidance as to which text is more authoritative or reliable in cases where one encounters a contradiction between, say, a *Nachlass* source and one of the works published in print.[18]

Most crucially, the hypertext hypothesis seems to be based on some sort of category mistake. For while it is arguably true that a given text stands in important and often illuminating relations to other texts and that the reader thus needs to examine cross-references, this does not imply that these references are constitutive of the text itself. I submit thus that the contention that all of Wittgenstein's writings comprise an extensive 'hypertext' is best understood in a deflationary manner, namely as a claim as to how one should read those texts, and as such it tilts the balance

[17] see Schulte (2005), p. 360.

[18] The point here only concerns the question which view should be attributed to Wittgenstein. Of course, the philosophical plausibility of the respective views needs to be assessed on independent grounds, and it might well turn out that a thesis voiced in the *Nachlass* is less authoritative from a philological or exegetical perspective but more attractive from a philosophical or substantive point of view.

in favour of what has been labelled a 'genetic' interpretation.[19] As such, however, it does not dispense us of the need to find some reliable starting point for our exegesis. Moreover, advocates of the hypertext proposal tend to be oblivious of the fact that there is a considerable stratification in Wittgenstein's *Nachlass*, which in all likelihood reflects the relative hierarchy between different texts. To note but the most obvious point, it is clear that the advance from a manuscript to the composition of a typescript represents an important (if often very tentative) step towards a more elaborate and refined ensemble of remarks. While this certainly does not amount to a kind of linear progress – typescripts can and often are rejected or reworked at later stages – a typescript nonetheless fulfils an important expository and clarificatory function, in that it contains a condensation of Wittgenstein's thought at a given moment in time.

The most explicit criteria for counting as a 'work' of Wittgenstein's have been proposed by Joachim Schulte. In what follows, I will investigate his three main suggestions and argue that they are all illuminating, but also contentious and not individually necessary. As a consequence of these deficiencies, I will put forward a further potential criterion.

The first of the criteria defended by Schulte is the following: if Wittgenstein himself thought that a text 'formed a more or less organic whole displaying a satisfactory relation between form and content'[20], then it should be considered a work. As such, this proposal is hardly controversial, in that it emphasises the role of the author in acknowledging a work and thus reflects some of the ideas that have been voiced in the introductory section. Indeed, given Wittgenstein's almost obsessive concern about the form and style of his writings, this criterion seems to enshrine a sufficient condition for counting as a work. Alas, on account of his perfectionist inclinations, even the *Philosophical Investigations* might fail to be a work according to this criterion, since he expresses his dissatisfaction with certain stylistic and formal features of that text in its preface. The only text that undoubtedly fulfilled this demanding criterion at some point is the *Tractatus* – a text that Wittgenstein himself saw to press. When it comes to assessing which texts from the *Nachlass* deserve to be qualified as works, the proposed criterion is thus too restrictive to be helpful.

In contrast to the first criterion, Schulte's second proposal strongly emphasises the role of the reader in constituting a 'work'. It runs as follows: a given text has a legitimate claim to being a work if its readers 'can detect a line of argument with theses, supporting reasons, objections, examples, etc.'[21]. This criterion, which Schulte himself reckons to be the most important one, is subject to at least two relatively strong objections. First of all, a substantive number of interpreters – in particular those associated with or sympathetic to the so-called 'New Wittgenstein' camp – might insist that it is either biased or simply inapplicable. It may be biased in that it clearly favours a particular way of reading Wittgenstein's writings, namely the interpretation which they are prone to call 'orthodox' and which typically attributes both claims and coherent lines of reasoning to him. And if we grant, for the sake of argument, that their interpretative approach is on the right track, then it is simply trivial that the proposed criterion is void or inapplicable, since there is no text by Wittgenstein which aims to advance theses, objections, or general argumentations. Secondly, one might wonder whether Schulte's second proposal does not give too much weight to the judgement of the reader, and he seems to be aware of this difficulty. For he contends that his criteria are only of use when applied by a competent interpreter, though he does not think that this difficulty with

[19] Note, however, that such an interpretation typically relies upon the tacit assumption that either the texts comprising the *Werkausgabe* or at least the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* and the *Philosophical Investigations* are evident examples of works by Wittgenstein.
[20] Schulte (2005), p. 361; see also Schulte (1989), p. 52.
[21] Schulte (2005), p. 361.

his second proposal is a decisive disadvantage.[22] Nevertheless, it is arguable that this criterion's exclusive focus on the judgement of the reader leads to its being vacuous. For instance, strongly charitable readers may come to the conclusion that even fairly inchoate texts from the *Nachlass* present cogent lines of argument, and that there are more 'works' of Wittgenstein's than commonly assumed.

The third and last criterion advanced by Schulte insists on the stylistic and formal differences between, say, a first-draft manuscript and a more elaborate typescript. More specifically, he contends that establishing 'whether [a] text has undergone a certain amount of stylistic polishing and rearranging of individual remarks' will help us in evaluating a text's maturity and degree of completion.[23] As was the case regarding the second criterion, Schulte again places considerable emphasis on the judgement of the reader. The mere revision and rearrangement of a series of remarks, for instance, is not taken to be indicative of a step towards completion. Rather, the features which disclose an advancement are 'enhanced readability and intelligibility'. Given this specification, however, the last criterion seems to be a corollary of the second one – at least if one grants that the higher degree of intelligibility is primarily due to the presence of a clear and cogent line of reasoning. Moreover, a general objection against a criterion liable to overstressing stylistic features is in order. For some of the most accomplished works of philosophy have been written in cumbersome or at least relatively unattractive prose. Lastly, from the point of view of the reader, the more refined remarks are often harder to understand[24], and this is mainly due to Wittgenstein's tendency to shorten them quite radically. It is thus conceivable that his own judgement as to whether a higher level of intelligibility has been attained does not chime well with the reader's opinion on that matter. A potential riposte might draw on the insight that authors themselves are not necessarily the best judges when it comes to assessing what is intelligible. In many cases, especially when it comes to expressing a firmly established thesis or conclusion reached on independent theoretical grounds, this is undoubtedly true: a paraphrase of an author's view can be clearer and more readily intelligible than her own way of putting the matter. However, style in Wittgenstein might not primarily be a means of couching views and theses into elegant and pellucid prose. Rather, the style itself might be part of the message, in that its austerity and terseness effects a transformation in the reader and forces her to think for herself.[25]

The general problem with the three criteria advanced by Schulte is their overly strong emphasis on the judgement of the reader, and in fact different competent interpreters of Wittgenstein come to different conclusions when applying the same set of conditions. To illustrate this point, one might contrast Schulte's own early opinion[26] (and Glock's concurrent judgement[27]) with his later, somewhat more hesitant conclusions[28]. His first proposed criterion, which is the only one insisting

[22] compare ibid., pp. 361 and 363.
[23] see ibid., p. 361 and Schulte (1989), p. 52.
[24] compare Glock (2013), p. 52.
[25] While this so-called internalism about style can evidently have unwanted mystifying consequences, it is not patently absurd (for the distinction between 'externalism' and 'internalism about style', see Stern (2017), pp. 41-4). For one thing, Wittgenstein almost systematically pruned his remarks of all that he deemed unnecessary (references to authors in whose texts he found the objectionable views discussed, further clarifications, and so on), thereby deliberately rendering them more compressed and less accessible. For another, in the *Investigations* and other late writings, he uses multiple voices without explicitly flagging them, thus rendering the task of interpreting the remarks in question much more demanding. Both these factors support the view that he intended his remarks to be deliberately placed stumbling blocks that encourage independent thinking, and some of the challenges posed will become evident in my commentary on the first half of *Philosophy of Psychology – A Fragment*, section xi.
[26] see Schulte (1989), pp. 50 f. and 54.
[27] see Glock (2013), p. 51 f.
[28] see Schulte (2005), p. 362 f.

on the importance of objective factors, is relatively toothless, given that there are no sources documenting Wittgenstein's definitive (positive or affirmative) conclusions as to the value of a particular manuscript of typescript.[29] Nevertheless, I submit that there are other more formal and objective characteristics which indicate that a text is approaching its completion or at least positively evolving and thus ought to count as a work. Before presenting a further criterion, however, two important provisos are in order. Firstly, I do not wish to contend that the problem first discussed at length by Schulte can be settled under recourse to purely formal considerations. Whether a given text should be considered a work also partially depends upon our attitude towards and interpretation of that text. But there is nonetheless some need to find a plausible answer to this question *before* setting out to defend a particular interpretative strategy. Secondly, as has been mentioned above, the term 'work' does not necessarily connote achievement and completion. Accordingly, even a text leading into a dead end might be considered a work, at least if it has been composed with a specific purpose in mind, such that the author can by and large be held accountable for the views expressed in it. Consider the case of the typescript that has served as the basis for the publication of *Philosophical Remarks* (TS 209), which in turn consists in a rearrangement of remarks found in an earlier typescript (TS 208). The fact that Wittgenstein handed over a copy of TS 209 to Russell is significant: it indicates that he considered that typescript a faithful reflection of his views at the time. However, given the fact that he never started to rework that particular typescript, it may be concluded that he reckoned it to be flawed in some other important respect, barring the possibility of emendation.

In the light of this last consideration, I contend that a 'work' by Wittgenstein is in many cases a typescript or manuscript that discusses (often loosely) interconnected topics in an orderly manner and stands at the end of a comparatively long series of revisions and rearrangements.[30] Moreover, a text constituting a work must not have been explicitly rejected, nor superseded by later manuscripts or typescripts. This last clause is meant to account for the fact that there exist e.g. several typescripts which contain what one might call different versions of the *Philosophical Investigations*. While fulfilment of the proposed criterion might be sufficient for counting as a work, I do not want to claim that a text must satisfy this criterion in order to be a work. This is mainly due to the fact that the whole process of distillation from a first-draft manuscript to an elaborate, refined manuscript or typescript took Wittgenstein a long time, so that many of his last writings (those dating from 1949 onwards) exclusively consist of first-draft manuscripts. While arguably none of these texts would have been published by Wittgenstein in the form in which they are currently available, it is still very likely that many of the remarks comprising them would have survived several processes of rearrangement.

In conclusion, I want to suggest that the criterion which I propose here has two main benefits. Firstly, it helps us get as close as possible to something analogous to an authorised text. If one follows the trail leading from a first-draft manuscript to a relatively polished typescript or manuscript, and if there is also reason to suppose that Wittgenstein was not completely dissatisfied with the 'final' text, then this seems to be the closest one can get to a genuine work. Secondly, in

[29] Wittgenstein clearly expresses his opinion about the value of *Eine philosophische Betrachtung* (MS 115, pp. 118-292), the manuscript reworking of the so-called *Brown Book*, namely that it is 'worth nothing' (see Rhees's preface to the fifth volume of the *Werkausgabe*, p. 10). This has the important negative consequence that the text in question cannot plausibly be considered a 'work' of Wittgenstein's.

[30] In his early reflections on the topic, Schulte maintains that such a rigidly chronological criterion is simply inadequate; see Schulte (1989), p. 55. But the condition for counting as a work that I want to defend here does not simply imply that whatever comes later must be better, since it also reflects the fact that we find a kind of hierarchical order between different strata in the *Nachlass*.

being a more objective, less reader-dependent version of Schulte's third criterion, my proposal squares better with our ordinary notion of a (literary or philosophical) work. For standardly it is not up to the reader to decide whether or not a given text counts as a 'work' of the author in question, although she evidently has a say in determining which texts are worth attention and close exegetical scrutiny.

Let us briefly take stock and classify the proposed criteria for counting as a work of Wittgenstein's according to four parameters, since this allows us to get an overview of the options and also enables us to complement (for the sake of completion) them with further, somewhat irrelevant options:

	external criteria	*internal criteria*
point of view of the author	The text in question has been put to press by the author, or received an *imprimatur* for posthumous publication. The text features a re-elaboration of several manuscript or typescript sources and has neither been superseded by or amended in later manuscripts or typescripts, nor explicitly disowned.	The text gives voice to views (a) that he considered to be representative of his thought at a specific time (see *PR*/TS 209 for Russell, *PPF*/MS 144 for Malcolm) and (b) that he was ready to defend against possible criticisms, for which he thus took full responsibility.[31]
reader's perspective	The text has been published as part of a reliable and readily available edition, which is accessible even in the absence of a critical apparatus and/or lengthy introductory remarks by the editors.[32]	The text, though sometimes exploratory in nature, displays a certain stylistic, argumentative, and thematic unity; it is legitimate to assume that the author holds and is ready to defend specific views and lines of argument. Moreover, the text provides an original contribution to ongoing philosophical debates.[33]

3. Works as inevitable basis for two different kinds of exegetical approach

In the preceding section, I have discussed the three criteria advocated by Schulte and provided a further condition which separates texts that are at least nearing completion (and thus might be called 'works') from texts that are sketchier in nature. In many cases, one has to scrutinise the trajectory of the remarks from a first-draft manuscript to later typescripts or manuscripts in order to determine whether the latter really constitute a more readily comprehensible and refined text. Moreover, one has to analyse whether the texts which fulfil the abovementioned conditions are

[31] In order to know whether he prepared a manuscript or typescript for a special occasion and thus considered it to be representative of his thought at a given moment in time, one needs to examine and evaluate biographical evidence. Even in this case, one thus has to rely to a certain degree on external evidence. I take the fact that he was ready to defend the views exposed in such a text to be a correlate of the fact that he presented it to other people without distancing himself from the arguments to be found in it.

[32] Given the flurry of post-2000 publications from the *Nachlass*, this criterion is overly permissive. Moreover, it relies too heavily on sometimes dubious editorial choices: the text known as *Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle* does not even count as a work of *Wittgenstein's*, since it is based on selective notes taken by Friedrich Waismann.

[33] compare Moyal-Sharrock (2013), p. 358.

actually separate works, or just structurally and thematically related versions of a single work. Nevertheless, one is thus in a position to 'separate the wheat from the chaff'[34], that is, to select those texts from the *Nachlass* which are worth close scrutiny and detailed analysis. Accordingly, a satisfying answer to the question as to what counts as a 'work' of Wittgenstein's is of twofold significance. Firstly, it allows scholars to evaluate the merits and flaws of the texts edited by Wittgenstein's literary executors and to produce, where necessary, critical editions of the typescripts and manuscripts from which these texts originate.[35] As such, one is in a position to decide which texts from the *Nachlass* ought to be edited and published in print. Secondly, and more importantly, an answer to the question enables interpreters to base their readings on a sound philological and hermeneutical fundament, and to thus avoid somewhat superficial and sterile disagreements about interpretative principles.

Exegetes relying on what is commonly called a 'genetic' method[36] rarely discuss the problem explicitly, although most of them would contend that *Philosophical Investigations* is Wittgenstein's late *opus magnum*, and as such a text which is more refined and elaborate than all the other texts from the extensive *Nachlass*. Now that claim in itself is hardly controversial. However, these interpreters do not hesitate to cite other texts from the *Nachlass* which they consider to be more explicit, if a passage from the *Investigations* is deemed to be opaque. Most crucially, they fail to show how this alternative source can be reliable and authoritative, although there is reason to conjecture that it has been rejected by the author himself. For instance, in his magisterial commentary on the *Investigations*, Peter Hacker often cites passages from the *Philosophical Grammar* (and the related *Big Typescript*) when he is looking for a pellucid and more concise formulation of Wittgenstein's views on, say, grammar. If one knows that the text of the *Investigations* can be partially traced back to the *Big Typescript*, this exegetical move appears to be problematic: for it is hardly legitimate to recur upon passages which Wittgenstein did not want to include in his later text, and which he arguably deemed to be either misleading or misguided[37], when trying to illuminate that text. As such, this approach seems to prejudge important issues, in that it rests, for instance, on the contentious assumption that there is continuity between Wittgenstein's writings from the so-called middle period and his later works. Moreover, it leads to the unwelcome phenomenon of 'passage hunting', where interpreters try to defend a controversial exegesis of the *Investigations* by citing relatively obscure passages from the *Nachlass*.[38]

On the other hand, for interpreters favouring an immanent interpretation the issue is even more pressing, since their methodological austerity is only justified once it is established that the text under scrutiny is a finished work aiming at a high level of coherence. Such exegetes are wont to argue that inasmuch as the interpretation of a specific text or passage is concerned, the author's intentions are hardly a decisive factor, unless they are clearly stated in the work itself.[39] Nonetheless, when it comes to the preliminary task of assessing which text is worth a detailed examination (that

[34] Wittgenstein used this phrase as he set out to reread and rearrange the *Big Typescript*; see MS 119, p. 79v and Pichler (2004), pp. 46 f.
[35] This exercise would be particularly fruitful in the case of the *Philosophical Grammar* and the *Remarks on the Philosophy of Mathematics*, since these texts are compilations from various *Nachlass* sources.
[36] see Glock (2013), pp. 46-52 for the distinction between genetic and immanent approaches to exegesis.
[37] This does not *ipso facto* mean that he has changed his views on the topics in question, but it clearly indicates that he took his formulations to be prone to important misunderstandings. For it is unlikely that Wittgenstein rejected entire passages just for stylistic reasons.
[38] see ibid., p. 47. The genetic method is ideally based upon a principle of hermeneutical charity: it tries to excavate a view that is as clear and as plausible as possible. But notice that this is not a distinguishing mark, since the immanent method pays heed to the same principle.
[39] compare von Savigny (1996), pp. 11-7.

is, which text to characterise as a work), his intentions are at least as important as the judgement of the reader.[40] In fact, an approach to the *Nachlass* which focusses exclusively upon the reader's engagement with a text without resting on a sound philological basis risks inviting unwanted consequences, since any text that strikes the reader as coherent, fascinating or pleasant would have to count as a 'work'. Luckily enough, the author's intentions concerning the destiny of a given text are readily detectable in his editorial practices, that is, in his decision on which texts to retain for constant revision and, eventually, publication. Once one has established – tentatively, but based on sound methodological principles – which texts count as works, the immanent method of interpretation becomes viable, and there is room for genuine exegetical disagreements.

The label 'immanent interpretation', when used to express opposition to so-called genetic interpretations, gives rise to several misconceptions. Firstly, even genetic analyses of the *Philosophical Investigations* do not overstress the importance of the context in which that work has been created: as a matter of fact, they hardly ever mention the economical, sociological, psychological or biographical circumstances under which the text has been created. What separates them from immanent interpretations is their readiness to rely extensively upon texts from the *Nachlass*, even if Wittgenstein might have judged these texts to be unsuccessful attempts at conspicuously presenting his views. Moreover, while exegetes favouring an immanent approach emphasise the significance of the reader's engagement with the text, they do not eschew the recourse upon external sources, as long as they are explicitly mentioned in the text that is examined. For instance, even these interpreters will try to determine which passage Wittgenstein could have had in mind when referring e.g. to Frege in §71 of the *Investigations*. In his polemical comments on the immanent approach, David G. Stern fails to appreciate precisely these points and arrives at the conclusion that strictly speaking '[t]he immanent reader […] is an entirely fictional character'[41]. Given his austere construal of the term 'immanent interpretation', it is indeed nothing more than a *contradictio in adiecto*, since it is as a matter of fact impossible for human beings to 'bracket out everything they know or take for granted'[42]. Nevertheless, as I have argued above, an interpreter favouring such a methodology does not maintain that a work is necessarily a completely self-contained, hermetic piece, and her interpretative practice is clearly incompatible with such a wildly general contention. And neither is she committed to a denial of the truism that various items of background knowledge – knowledge about other works cited, about how the author tends to use a specific term, and about the state of debate that the work addresses – may play a role in understanding the work at hand. While she places special emphasis on the importance of the immediate vicinity of a given remark and grants pride of place to parallel passages in the same work, she does not refrain from e.g. citing other works of the author in cases in which a passage is overly obscure even after the consultation of all the evidence found in the text itself. The kernel of truth that is to be gathered from Stern's conclusion is that the interpretative practice of an advocate of the immanent approach is, after all, not *toto caelo* different from that of readers favouring a more source-oriented methodology.

Given the fact that an immanent interpretation or, to use a less polemically loaded term, a close reading of a particular text is less prone to prejudgements regarding important issues, it is the

[40] Accordingly, von Savigny is deliberately exaggerating when he describes the ideal reader of the *Investigations* as someone who is equipped with a knowledge of German and quick philosophical wits, but who does not know anything about Wittgenstein or the circumstances of his life and times; compare ibid., p. 13. Indeed, his decision not to provide a detailed commentary on what was then known as 'Part II' is primarily based upon external evidence about the source material.

[41] Stern (2004), p. 61.

[42] ibid., p. 62.

methodological approach which I favour in principle. When it comes to Wittgenstein's late writings on the philosophy of psychology, however, this interpretative strategy is arguably confronted with a conundrum: the texts in question have not been reworked extensively (that is, if they have been revised at all), and there is thus simply no definitive 'work' which would justify an immanent approach. Nevertheless, I contend that when it comes to the writings dating from approximately 1947 to 1949, there is at least one level of stratification to be recognised. In the subsequent section, I will examine whether the text previously known as 'Part II' of the *Philosophical Investigations* could be something more than a 'fragment' (i.e. an arbitrary selection of often unrelated remarks), namely a text which gives us a faithful overview of Wittgenstein's views and interests in the philosophy of psychology.

4. Preparing the ground for a close reading of *Philosophy of Psychology – A Fragment*

In order to assess whether *Philosophy of Psychology – A Fragment* is indeed a text that offers itself to a sustained and rigorous interpretation, it is useful to check whether it fulfils some of the criteria (perspicuously presented in the chart above) for counting as a work. Indeed, there are arguably at least three important criteria that are met, and each of these will be discussed in turn. Firstly, the text now published as *PPF* is based on a typescript that consisted of a selection of remarks from much more voluminous writings, and can thus be interpreted as a first step in a gradual process of condensation. Secondly, it clearly fulfilled an expository purpose, in that Wittgenstein seems to have composed it in order to present an overview of his ongoing work to Norman Malcolm. Thirdly and most importantly, section xi in particular presents a thoroughgoing discussion of interlocking problems and displays important thematic and structural connections to the main body of the *Investigations*.

The text published as 'Part II' of the *Investigations* in the first three editions and renamed *Philosophy of Psychology – A Fragment* in the fourth edition is based on a typescript (TS 234) that went missing after the text was first set to print. That typescript itself appears to be based on a loose-leaf manuscript volume (MS 144)[43], which virtually contains the same set of remarks, though their order is in a very few cases different.[44] The manuscript does not contain any section numberings, but it is evident that Wittgenstein divided the material into subsets: the sequences of remarks that are now known as sections all start on a fresh page. The remarks in the manuscript are also labelled (though not consecutively numbered) and followed by a blank, such that it is easy to determine which and how many paragraphs are meant to belong to a specific remark.

It is fairly evident that MS 144 and the related TS 234 were not meant to be published as they stand, that is, as independent texts. While it is likely that Wittgenstein wanted to incorporate (some of) the material into the final text of the *Investigations*, it is entirely unclear what the end result of this process of emendation would have looked like.[45] As such, both the suggestion that MS 144

[43] A transcription of that manuscript has been published as part of Schulte's *Kritisch-genetische Edition* of the *Philosophical Investigations* (Schulte (2001)).

[44] Most of these changes in the ordering of remarks have been undone in the fourth edition; compare Hacker and Schulte (2009), pp. 261 ff.

[45] The fourth edition of the *Investigations* makes it look as though TS 227 marked a definite end point and the cumulation of Wittgenstein's philosophical development after his return to the subject in 1929 (for an indirect criticism of this claim, see Nyíri (2013), p. 53). From this point of view, the writings on philosophical psychology from roughly 1946 onwards, interesting as they may be, mark a conspicuous shift in his thought. In the light of what Wittgenstein reportedly told his literary executors about his work in the philosophy of psychology, this view is more contentious than it appears at first glance; compare Knott (2017), pp. 333-9.

constitutes the second part of a polished work and the contention that it is an unconnected 'fragment' easily give rise to misunderstandings. In fact, the bulk of MS 144 consists of material selected from two manuscripts, MS 137 and MS 138, which served as the basis for the text now in print as *Last Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology*. It is safe to say that Wittgenstein composed the manuscript (and the corresponding typescript) in order to bring into relief some of the main topics he was working on at that time (ca. 1949) and to crystallise some lines of argument. While not meant for publication, the text was still intended to serve as a representative overview of his work in progress, as he showed it in all likelihood to Norman Malcolm in order to familiarise him with his ongoing research.[46]

While the selection of remarks is thus not haphazard, it is difficult to see the connections that link the individual sections of the text. Moreover, from a purely formal point of view, there is an extreme unbalance between the various parts: section xi alone is longer than the remaining thirteen sections taken together. As it stands, the text could thus not have been simply grafted onto (Part I of) the *Investigations* without disrupting the relative formal and argumentative unity of the latter text. These negative points notwithstanding, section xi in particular is worth close scrutiny. For firstly, the text elaborates on points that were adumbrated in the *Investigations* properly speaking, such as the differentiation between two separate though kindred kinds of understanding (most concisely in PI §531), or the contention that meaning amounts to use only in a majority of cases, but not in each and every instance (cp. PI §43). Moreover, section xi shares several stylistic features with the *Investigations*. For instance, while the individual remarks strike the reader as interconnected and part of a more comprehensive discourse, it is difficult to pin down the exact links, just as it is sometimes impossible to ascribe a precise view to the author rather than to his interlocutor.[47] Given this dialogical structure, the text is primarily explorative and often tentative in nature, features that are shared especially with the latter half of the *Investigations*. Furthermore, the text is punctuated by very short reminders and admonishments about the nature of philosophy and methodology, e.g. concerning the unreliability of the introspective method. While these asides disrupt the argumentative flow of the discussion, they are not a new element in Wittgenstein's writings, but were present even in his most elaborate and polished works (cp. *PI* §§255, 309).

Before setting out to comment in detail on *Philosophy of Psychology – A Fragment*, section xi, a few preliminary remarks are in order. Firstly, while the transitions between various topics in the text are often seamless, it is easy to demarcate three main areas of discussion. In §§111-256, Wittgenstein discusses seeing-as, e.g. phenomena of aspect perception that are primarily restricted to the visual dimension. The fictional scenario of meaning blindness serves as transition to a discussion of secondary meaning (cp. §261), and further phenomena related to language – most notably, *Meinen*, having a word on the tip of one's tongue, and inner speech – are discussed up until §308. Section xi closes with an examination of various kinds of certainty and a set of fairly general remarks about our relationship to other human beings (§§309-64). Secondly, a detailed commentary about all the remarks comprising section xi would, for obvious reasons of space, be beyond the remit of the present thesis, and I did not want to trade off on the level of detail with which I discuss the individual remarks, since a brief gloss on each remark would have been hardly illuminating. The following commentary thus focuses exclusively on §§111-256, but the phenomena of secondary meaning and our relationship and attitude towards other people will be

[46] see Hacker (2013), p. 80 and Nyíri (2013), p. 53.
[47] This problem will be highlighted and discussed at several junctions in my commentary.

dealt with in the second chapter of the thesis, since they are evidently connected to aspect perception *sensu stricto*.

Chapter 2: Detailed commentary on *PPF*, section xi, §§111-256

I. (§§111-6) *Stage setting: two kinds of seeing, the 'paradox' of aspect perception, and methodological preliminaries*

In the first passage of *PPF*, section xi (**§111**), Wittgenstein draws a distinction between two uses of the verb 'to see', each requiring a different 'object' of sight. In a grammatical sense, the two relevant locutions seem to ask for the same 'object', namely a noun phrase in the accusative. For this reason, the differentiation is unlikely to amount to that between objectual seeing and seeing-that[48], seeing-plus-AcI, and so on.[49] Given that the difference does not line up with these standard grammatical distinctions, what Wittgenstein has in mind might rather be located on a logical or, in his idiosyncratic terminology, 'grammatical' level. There are four options that seem to be pertinent in this respect. Firstly, what Wittgenstein could have had in mind is a distinction between transitive and intransitive instances of seeing.[50] In the former cases, the task of providing a verbal or pictorial representation of what is seen is easily performed. Instances of the latter kind, on the other hand, are much harder to express and typically involve subtle changes e.g. in the tone in which one describes the visual scene or in the manner in which one draws a copy of it. Secondly, the dichotomy to which he wants to draw attention could simply be that between instances of ordinary seeing and cases of seeing-as.[51] Thirdly, Wittgenstein could hint at a distinction between the external object of sight, that is, the thing as it is in the world and impinges upon the perceiver's retina, with properties that can be investigated by science, and the internal or intentional object of sight, which is by definition exclusively accessible to the perceiver herself.[52] Fourthly and lastly, the relevant distinction could be that between a purely optic kind of seeing, stripped bare of all conceptual influences, and synoptic seeing, which is permeated by thinking.[53]

The next remark (**§112**) further specifies the difference: the capacity to draw an exact copy of e.g. a face, which is a plausible candidate for being a criterion of seeing in the first, straightforward sense, is not by itself sufficient for the ability to spot similarities (and differences) between e.g. faces. In this sense, both abilities can in principle come apart (notice Wittgenstein's use of the conjunctive 'könnte', which suggests that they rarely if ever come apart) and are subject to diverse preconditions and criteria.

The notion of 'noticing an aspect' and, more generally, the topic of aspect seeing is only introduced in the subsequent paragraph (**§113**), where Wittgenstein adumbrates what has commonly been called 'the paradox of aspect perception'.[54] The putative paradox consists in the circumstance that

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[48] This is a suggestion mentioned though not endorsed in Glock (2016), p. 97 f.
[49] For the relevant distinctions, see Künne (1995), p. 103.
[50] The distinction between a transitive and an intransitive notion of meaning, understanding, and expressivity is discussed *inter alia* in *Eine philosophische Betrachtung*, pp. 237-73 and arguably lies in the background of the differentiation between two kinds of understanding effected in PI §§531-2.
[51] This option, which is rendered pertinent by the fact that Wittgenstein indeed starts to investigate seeing-as from §113 onwards, has been embraced by Tilghman, among others; see Tilghman (1984), pp. 126 f., who avers that the likeness between the two faces spotted by the perceiver is an aspect.
[52] see Glock (2016), p. 83.
[53] see ibid., p. 85 ff. and Ahmed (2017), pp. 527 ff.
[54] see e.g. ibid., pp. 520 f.

perceivers see a change and yet also see that nothing has changed. The most striking instances of the phenomenon are arguably those cases where the perceiver first becomes cognisant of an aspect that hitherto passed unnoticed. While it is indeed true that spectators can express or describe an episode of aspect dawning by resorting to paradoxical formulations, the alleged paradox can be easily defused if one adopts either the third or the fourth interpretation of the distinction drawn in §111. While there is a characteristic and striking change in the intentional object *or* in what one sees synoptically, there is no alteration in the corresponding external object *or* in what is seen optically. Wittgenstein himself suggests that the relevant verb 'to see' is here used in two different senses by first using italics ('I *see* that it has not changed') and then plain script ('I see it differently').[55]

Paragraphs **§§114** and **115** determine the methodological assumptions that guide the ensuing discussion. While psychologists empirically investigate the causal origins of the phenomena described by the term 'noticing an aspect' (and other varieties of aspect seeing), the philosopher strives to determine what the phenomenon consists in by elucidating the 'grammar' or inherent logic of the relevant term(s). The term itself, however, cannot be analysed in isolation, but must be elucidated as part of a more complex network of 'Erfahrungsbegriffe'. This passage remains silent on whether Wittgenstein is interested in (a) a systematic classification of the 'concepts of experience', (b) providing a 'perspicuous overview' of part of the territory covered by these concepts, or (c) offering an antidote to certain philosophical confusions that arise when one focusses too narrowly on one single concept (e.g. 'aspect seeing', without noticing the manifold connections with, say, experiences of meaning).

II. (§§116-9) *Further stage setting: examples of seeing-as and terminological distinctions*

In the first paragraph of the next remark (**§116**), Wittgenstein introduces the first concrete example of aspect seeing. The topic seems to slightly shift here: from abruptly and unexpectedly noticing an aspect, the text moves to the phenomenon of seeing a schematic drawing as an illustration of a specific part of the accompanying text. This already serves as an indication of the relevance that contextual cues bear on the seeing of aspects. The second paragraph of the remark is particularly interesting because Wittgenstein appears to be speaking *propria voce* and without any marks of hesitation: the example is taken to illustrate the point that one can see a drawing according to an interpretation or, more properly speaking, that seeing is in some (or all?) cases of aspect perception preceded by 'deuten'. The use of the verb 'deuten' in this passage is striking, since it calls to mind Wittgenstein's earlier discussions in the *Investigations* about supposed mental acts such as 'meaning', 'intending', and so on. And there might indeed exist an analogous temptation to think that every act of seeing-as, in the same way as every act of speaking meaningfully, must be preceded by a specific mental act which accompanies and breathes life into the outward activity of engaging with a picture in such and such a manner.

Paragraph **§117** contains an empiricist riposte to Wittgenstein's suggestion: in cases where one sees, say, the schematic drawing as a box, one should be able to provide a direct description of one's visual experience (for instance, in a purely phenomenological language) that does not feature any reference to an interpretation. The correlation between (a) having this particular 'Seherlebnis' and (b) the relevant act or activity of 'Deuten' is a contingent one, and it is in principle licit to keep both of them apart. Relatedly, the suggestion that one can only describe the 'Seherlebnis' via a characterisation of the relevant 'Deuten' is erroneous. Wittgenstein retorts that this conception is

[55] Baker duly notices that italics (or *Sperrdruck* in Wittgenstein's original typescripts) are sometimes used to highlight a particular contrast; see Baker (2004), p. 227.

misguided, since (a) what we mean when using a perception verb is transparent to us as speakers (we do not refer to any occult perceptibilia or mental processes) and (b) there is no more direct description of the 'Erlebnis' available in common, ordinary language. Saying that one sees the drawing as a box is not an indirect way of referring to one's experience, given that it is the most readily intelligible way to give voice to said experience.

The following two remarks (**§§118 f.**) introduce two further illustrations (the 'rabbit-duck' and the 'picture-face') and a set of technical terminology (that is, in what follows, not always put to systematic use). Firstly, Wittgenstein distinguishes between the 'stetiges Sehen' and the 'Aufleuchten' of an aspect, the first term being defined *ex negativo*, as the negative correlate of episodes of aspect change: a perceiver continuously sees an aspect in an ambiguous drawing if she is cognisant of only one of its aspects, that is, as long as she fails to become aware of the image's ambiguity. The term 'Aufleuchten' seems to refer to any kind of aspect shift, independently of whether the agent was previously aware of the aspect to be spotted or not. ('Aufleuchten' in this sense merely suggests that one of the aspects gains greater prominence or salience. Accordingly, 'lighting up' is a more accurate and definitely more neutral translation than 'dawning'.) Secondly, he introduces the notion of a 'Bildgegenstand', which could refer (a) to the figure itself or (b) to one of the several ways of reading or interpreting a given image. The term 'Bildgegenstand' rather suggests the second option, since 'Gegenstand' is commonly use to designate a picture's content or subject matter. Nevertheless, the subsequent discussion strongly suggests that the figure or image itself is the 'Bildgegenstand', since human agents engage with the spatio-temporally located picture itself in specific ways, and not with its content (or with one of its interpretations). The concluding paragraph of §119 is methodologically important, since Wittgenstein notes that 'in some respects' we engage with pictorial representations (e.g. a 'picture-face') in the same manner in which we would engage with what is represented (e.g. an actual human face). This way of interacting with an object is indicative of the attitude (taking-as, seeing-as) one has towards the representation, although Wittgenstein does not yet raise this point at this juncture.

III. (§§120-4) *Remarks on the scope of seeing-as*

The subsequent remark (**§120**) falls into two parts: in the first one, Wittgenstein seems to further examine the continuous seeing of an aspect, whereas the second part sketches the criteria for aspect perception more generally speaking. In those cases where the perceiver unambiguously takes the rabbit-duck drawing to represent a rabbit (or a hare), she can give voice to her experience by saying that she sees a picture-rabbit. (It is arguably also permissible for her to say that she sees a rabbit.) Most crucially, she does not feel any need to use an 'as'-location, precisely because she remains unaware of the drawing's ambiguity (see §121). The criteria for seeing a specific picture-object consist in pointing to picture-objects of the same kind, in indicating what is represented by the picture featuring the picture-object, in providing a narrative or story about what is represented, and so on.

The ideas adumbrated in the first two sentences (i.e. in the first part) of §120 are reinforced and elaborated in the next remark (**§121**). When there is no aspect ambiguity, all that the perceiver does is 'describe' (sic) her perception, which can either mean that she verbally characterises the experience of perceiving *or* what presents itself to her in said experience (i.e. what is seen). Given that the rabbit-duck is, objectively speaking, an ambiguous puzzle picture, it is correct from a third-person perspective (from a neutral point of view) to report her experience with the help of an 'as'-locution, although she would not have used that locution herself.

The following remark (**§122**) further buttresses this point. Again, Wittgenstein here surveys the manner in which we talk about these experiences in order to shed light on them or on the concepts putatively denoting them (cp. §115). In cases where there is no ambiguity (a) with regards to what is represented by an image or (b) concerning the function of a given object, it makes no sense (or is unintelligible) to use notions which are indicative of (1) aspect perception, (2) taking-as (i.e. a particular way of engaging with an object), or (3) doubts concerning the identity or function of the object in question. **§123** is a seamless continuation of the discussion: just as moving one's mouth in eating does not imply that one tries to move one's mouth, recognising cutlery as cutlery (or knowing it to be cutlery) does not presuppose any attitude or mental act of taking-as.

Playing a language-game featuring locutions such as 'Now it's an *x* for me' (e.g. expressions indicative of a change of aspects) presupposes that there has indeed been a thoroughgoing change (or even a transformation or metamorphosis, for Wittgenstein uses 'Verwandlung' instead of 'Veränderung') that can become the subject of further queries (**§124**).

IV. (§§125-31) *What are locutions featuring the verb 'to see' expressive of?*

§125 presents a scenario in which the rabbit-duck drawing is embedded into two strikingly different settings: in the first case, it is surrounded by other representations of hares, while in the second scenario it is imagined to be part of an image that exclusively features ducks. It is suggested (or even stipulated) that the perceiver does not notice that the rabbit-duck drawing is present in both settings. Wittgenstein does not say that this is due to the fact that the drawing has been embedded into two entirely different contexts, although this is a plausible assumption. In assessing the scenario, Wittgenstein seems to shy away from affirming that the subject in question is indeed seeing different things (in the area where the rabbit-duck drawing is placed) depending on the scenario. Alternatively, he could be rejecting the way of phrasing the question *materialiter*, as a question about the objects of seeing and perception rather than a query about perceptual concepts. In the imagined scenario, it is legitimate to say that the perceiver indeed sees radically different things. This does not imply that she must be undergoing radically different experiences, but only that she provides two orthogonal descriptions.

The subsequent remark (**§126**) further elaborates on the aforementioned scenario, suggesting that the perceiver would have used an exclamation ('Ausruf') to give voice to her experience and surprise. Such an 'Ausruf' is typically an avowal that discloses one's inner experiences and sensations, though arguably not all avowals take the form of exclamations (cp. PI §244). Wittgenstein contends that the use of the particular exclamation can be defended or justified should the need to do so arise within the language-game. 'Er (*scil.* der Ausruf) hat auch eine Rechtfertigung' could be read in two ways: on a deflationary reading, it could just simply mean that the exclamation in question is not arbitrary and was not uncalled for. On a more substantive interpretation, it is legitimate to demand from the perceiver a justification for her way of speaking, and such a justification or legitimisation is readily available to her. If the second way of reading the remark is correct, this might indicate that the exclamation in question has a particular character, for usually it is difficult (or even pointless) to justify one's use of a given expression to avow one's experiences.

§127, which introduces a parallel between a specific way of seeing something and a mode of comparison is somewhat reminiscent of the *Tractatus*, if one puts an intellectualist (rather than a practical) gloss on 'Vergleichsweise'. A given experience of seeing is dependent upon which comparison we deem to be salient and on how the picture in front of us is to be projected. Specific

ways of seeing something are not reducible to purely geometrical characteristics such as congruence.

In the succeeding remark (**§128**), Wittgenstein further examines the grammar of those locutions which speakers use to either report or express their perceptual experiences. From a methodological point of view, the speech act which is performed in using these locutions is deemed to be indicative of the nature or status of the experience in question. When asked to say what one sees, locutions of the form 'This is an *x*' serve as reports ('Mitteilungen') or, perhaps, descriptions (cp. §121) of the relevant perception, whereas utterances of the form 'Now it is an *x*' assume a different function (or even different functions) that is still left unspecified by Wittgenstein. Using a locution of either form is not a mediated act, but a spontaneous reaction to the question what one sees, or so Wittgenstein's use of the verb 'reagieren' in the fifth sentence suggests. When one uses a locution such as 'This is an *x*' when confronted with an ambiguous drawing, this is indicative of the fact that one failed to notice the ambiguity ('Doppeldeutigkeit') of the image in question.

§129 is a further elaboration of the preceding remarks on methodology. When a shift of aspect occurs, one almost inevitably looks out for something that has changed, whether it be the visual impression, the attitude, or (merely) the report. ('Attitude' is actually a disambiguating translation of 'Stellungnahme', since a 'Stellungnahme' could also be a purely linguistic entity, e.g. a statement or report on a given subject or issue.) Wittgenstein suggests that it is difficult and virtually impossible to precisely pin down what has changed, although his answer does not imply that the question itself is inane. Instead of scrutinising fleeting visual impressions and experiences, one should focus exclusively on the way one describes the change of aspects, arguably because such descriptions (in contrast to visual impressions) lie open to view.

A slight shift occurs in **§130**: while Wittgenstein insisted that an utterance of the form 'Now it is an *x*' does not serve as report of one's perception, he now suggests that locutions of the form 'Now I see *this*' have a mixed nature, in that they are reports ('Meldung') of new perceptions while at the same time serving as expression ('Ausdruck') of an unchanged perception. This is somewhat puzzling, given Wittgenstein's insistence on the fact that one's experiences of the shift in an ambiguous picture are typically not expressed by means of reports. However, it might be that the locution examined here is used only some time after the change of aspects has occurred, when the initial surprise has waned. This might explain why Wittgenstein inserted the affirmative or confirmative 'ja' ('indeed, in fact' or 'after all'), which indicates that the characteristic shift in experience lies in the past. It is noteworthy that the two ways of verbally registering a change of aspects mentioned in this remark, i.e. the 'Meldung' and the 'Ausdruck', are not mutually exclusive. However, the 'Ausdruck' is arguably more immediately forthcoming and in a sense forces itself upon the perceiver, whereas the 'Meldung' features a more thoroughly considered choice of words. But this amounts only to a difference in degree and not one in kind: for example, both the 'Meldung' and the 'Ausdruck' are subject to first-person authority.

V. (§§131-8) *Criticism of the idea that visual impressions display a specific 'organisation'*

§131 starts an exploration of Köhler's idea that the 'organisation' of the perceiver's visual impression is subject to change when she experiences a shift of aspects. This discussion follows organically from §129, where it was suggested (by Wittgenstein's adversary, or perhaps by his alter ego) that an aspect change is explicable in terms of, and perhaps even reducible to, a change in the relevant visual impression. (This is not entirely undebatable, since 'Eindruck' in §129 could also be used as an ordinary term, denoting the way in which something strikes someone, rather than as a piece of philosophical jargon.) Wittgenstein rejects this apparent solution for primarily

methodological reasons. For it is not clear how one can systematically investigate visual impressions, since introspection quite generally is unreliable. (This again connects the discussion to 'Part I' of *Philosophical Investigations*.) And if one relies on an externalisation of the visual impression, i.e. on a material representation that shares all of its salient features (its shape, dimensions, proportions, etc.), it is unclear (a) what is meant by the term 'organisation' and (b) no change whatsoever seems to occur. Even after the change of aspects, the perceiver if asked would produce (or acknowledge as faithful) the same copy of her visual impression. (What Wittgenstein does not yet mention here is that her manner of producing the copy might change in subtle ways, indicating that the reported change was indeed very real.[56])

§132 quickly rejects a counterargument by Wittgenstein's opponent. Since a visual impression is not a drawing, copy, or any other material vehicle of representation, the fact that the perceiver produces an identical copy even after the shift of aspects has occurred is simply irrelevant. Wittgenstein's riposte relies either (a) on the fact that, in the philosophical and psychological literature, visual impressions are commonly deemed to be analogous to drawings or images except for their immateriality or (b) on the assumption that the only way to employ visual impressions in a methodologically responsible manner is to assume a thoroughgoing analogy (a sameness of 'category') between them and material images. The remark seems to imply that 'visual impressions' and 'visual images' are one and the same thing (cp. §133).

The following remark (**§133**) examines how the concept of an 'inner picture' tends to lead philosophers and psychologists astray. The exact structure of the argument is unclear, since the first half of the first sentence suggests that the concept (or even the term) 'inner picture' is misleading and ought to be eschewed (or even discarded), while the part after the hyphen presupposes that there are (supposedly legitimate) 'Verwendungen' of the 'Begriffswort'. According to this second suggestion, what is misleading is the erroneously assumed parallel between the uses of 'inner picture' and 'outer picture'. The mistake then seems to consist in supposing that 'inner pictures' are idealised or sublimated versions of ordinary pictures with somewhat elusive and ethereal properties. The parenthetical reference to a mathematical analogy is not entirely clear, since both inner and outer pictures are supposed to be discrete entities that display analogous features, while numerals *qua* arbitrary designators of numbers do not share any substantive properties with them. The comparison might be motivated by the fact that both numbers and inner pictures have no spatial location, which is a salient difference that distinguishes them from the counterparts which supposedly represent them, namely numerals and outer pictures.

§134 suggests that visual impressions, due to the fact that they have certain properties (most notably colours and shapes) in common with ordinary objects, are deemed to be strictly analogous to external objects. But it is unclear what the 'organisation' of a visual impression might consist in, given that the organisation that such an impression allegedly displays is no longer deemed to be an inherent and stable property of it. Moreover, since the 'organisation' or *Gestalt* of an image is one of its global features, in that it is attributed to the image as a whole rather than to one of its components, it is difficult to see how a single picture could possibly display more than one 'organisation'. Once the analogy between 'inner' and 'outer' objects (and the parallelism between 'inner' and 'outer' pictures that it insinuated) breaks down, it becomes hard to fathom what kind of entities visual impressions and inner pictures might be, especially since introspection is not sufficient for providing firm criteria of identity. (In the last sentence, 'die Ähnlichkeit mit dem Bild'

[56] compare Ahmed (2017), p. 529.

arguably does not refer to a specific, individual image, but rather to 'inner pictures' as a general category; cp. the beginning of §133.)

The precise import of **§135** is somewhat unclear. When someone fails to realise that a given drawing (e.g. the schematic cube) can be seen under several aspects, it is permissible and unproblematic to ask her to produce two representations and/or externalisations of what she sees. In the case of a change of aspects, this is not possible: there is only one perspicuous 'Erlebnisausdruck', suggesting that the criteria of individuation for the relevant experience have been narrowed down and become more fine-grained. Without any further qualifications, this claim is hardly plausible, since there often are several equally legitimate ways of giving voice to an experience of aspect dawning, e.g. exclamations, drawing a copy of what is seen in a specific manner, and so on.

In the case where someone fails to realise that a given image can be seen under various aspects, it is permissible to ask her for several separate descriptions or externalisations of what she sees, or so Wittgenstein contends in §135. In the case where one only sees a single aspect and is unaware of the fact that there are further aspects to be spotted in the picture, the verb 'I see' governs a purely extensional context. This seems to correspond to the first use of the verb 'to see' sketched in §111: a description, a drawing, and a copy serve equally well as representations of what the agent sees. After a change of aspect has occurred, however, there is only one single way left to give voice to one's experience (i.e. only one 'Erlebnisausdruck'). As it stands, it is unclear what Wittgenstein had exactly in mind: obviously, even after a hitherto unnoticed aspect has dawned upon the perceiver, she can provide various expressions of her experience, as she can e.g. draw a copy (perhaps in a specific, expressive way), offer a vivid description, point to instances of things that bear analogies to the aspect she has just spotted, and so on. Perhaps the idea is that given a specific 'medium' (e.g. language, drawing) only one very determinate 'Erlebnisausdruck' is available to her. In language, for instance, she would have to use a precisely determined description, and even the slightest alterations or modifications would be impermissible. But again, in the case of relatively coarsely defined aspects such as the duck aspect in Jastrow's drawing, such an interpretation is simply implausible.

In **§136** Wittgenstein reiterates the point that the putative 'organisation' of the visual impression cannot be on a par with its colour and shape, arguably since the latter are inherent and inalterable properties of it. Even in a change of aspects, the colours and shapes present in one's impression remain unchanged.[57] Again, this is not entirely convincing, though it is obviously connected to §134, where Wittgenstein averred that a visual impression, if it is to have a specific 'organisation', becomes a 'seltsam schwankendes Gebilde'. The criteria of identity for an image, whether it be material (external) or mental (internal), are fixed right from the start and cannot change depending on our experiences.

§137 is a further difficult and terse remark, and the link between the two paragraphs comprising it is not evident. When an aspect is spotted, the shapes and colours seen can be reproduced faithfully and in detail by the perceiver. The 'organisation', on the other hand, can only be vaguely intimated, by pointing to a variety of, say, pictures of rabbits (in the case of the rabbit aspect). The first paragraph thus seems to further buttress the point raised in the preceding remark. The concepts whose difference has been unravelled are thus 'colour' and 'shape' on the one hand and 'organisation' on the other. The second paragraph, however, insinuates that the difference in question also obtains (*mutatis mutandis* or as a straightforward parallel?) between 'Sehen als' and

[57] This is a reconstruction of Wittgenstein's train of thought based essentially on Hallett (1977), p. 677.

'Sehen' *simpliciter*. ('Sehen als' might be put between scare quotes because (a) Wittgenstein is talking about the concept and not the experience or (b) it is an overly technical and unnatural term.) The conclusion is quite radical: 'Sehen als' does not itself belong, pertain, or form part of the perception, arguably because its contribution to the final impression cannot be pinned down (extensionally) in a reproduction of what is seen. The concluding sentence is only partially supported by the preceding argumentation: since seeing-as does not pertain to perception, and since ordinary seeing is an obvious instance of perception (or of something that pertains, 'gehört', to perception?), it follows that seeing-as is 'nicht wie ein Sehen'. In the approximate vicinity of this remark, Wittgenstein does not cite any reasons for contending that seeing-as is like (a sort of) seeing ('wie ein Sehen'), though the fact that speakers use the same verb to describe both is certainly relevant here. Nonetheless, the use of the expression 'therefore' seems to be unmotivated at best.

VI. (§§138-45) *The distinction between 'Meldung' and 'Ausruf' and the connection between recognition and seeing-as*

§138 presents two scenarios in which one and the same form of words is used to very different effects, though both serve, speaking in the abstract, as 'expressions of perception and of visual experience'. When looking intently at an animal and asked to say what one sees, the expression 'a rabbit' serves as a report ('Meldung') or, arguably, as a description. However, when one is engrossed on a landscape and spots a rabbit all of a sudden, 'a rabbit' becomes an exclamation ('Ausruf'), in this specific case an expression of e.g. one's surprise, delight, or annoyance. In the case of an 'Ausruf', the speaker in question does not have to carefully consider his choice of words and the expression is immediately forthcoming (in fact, it forces itself upon the perceiver), which is not typically the case for 'Meldungen'. More importantly, 'Meldungen' and 'Ausrufe' seem to have different purposes or points: whereas a 'Meldung' or report purports to faithfully represent the visual scene or one's experience thereof, an 'Ausruf' or exclamation primarily conveys how the scene struck the observer. In this sense, the relation between the 'Ausruf' and the 'Seherlebnis' parallels that between a cry and a pain: the exclamation is an immediate reaction to the visual experience that is largely beyond the perceiver's control.

The next remark **(§139**) presents an interesting disanalogy between ordinary seeing (or looking at something) and suddenly noticing an item in one's visual field (which encompasses the 'Aufleuchten' of an aspect, cp. §140). When one looks at an object, say, a rabbit, one is not *eo ipso* thinking about the rabbit in question or rabbits more generally. Seeing and looking, although they can arguably be influenced by cognitive factors such as attention and concentration, are thus not intellectual capacities. Seeing might also be a classificatory and recognitional ability that does not necessarily draw on any resources essential to thinking (those might include concepts), though as a matter of fact it might sometimes do ('muss nicht' implies that it is not necessary or binding, but still possible and permissible). In cases where the perceiver expresses her experience using an 'Ausruf', on the other hand, she is automatically and perhaps willy-nilly cognisant of and thinking about what she sees.

The conclusion drawn in **§140** follows immediately from §139. Since the lighting up of an aspect is a visual experience in which a certain thought forces itself upon the perceiver, it can be described with equal right as both a 'Seherlebnis' and a 'Denken'. The formulation here is *prima facie* still slightly hedging: it seems ('erscheint') as if the episode of aspect seeing in question were 'half visual experience, half thought', and indeed there are good reasons to believe this (given in §139), but the evidence is not compelling. Nonetheless, there is a further, factive use of the verb 'erscheinen' that has (at least in the manner it is used here) virtually fallen into disuse in contemporary German,

but which is more salient here, especially given that the verb is not complemented by a phrase in the dative (as in e.g. 'erscheint *mir*' or 'erscheint *uns*'). 'Erscheinen' in this sense corresponds to 'sich zeigen', i.e. 'to show itself' or, more liberally, 'to come to the fore', 'to emerge'. It is thus fairly safe to ascribe the present claim to Wittgenstein *propria voce*.

§141 introduces a new phenomenon that might be connected to aspect seeing, namely (visual) recognition. When confronted with exceptional circumstances (e.g. non-standard lighting conditions), perceivers may fail to recognise an object (or a property, etc.) that they are otherwise perfectly familiar with. With some effort and after some time, they often still manage to recognise the object in question. The act of recognition may well be described as leading to a new visual experience, since (a) it permeates and even transforms the previously had experience and (b) in such cases, one uses language which one would employ to describe a change of aspects (e.g. 'Now I see that this is my armchair').

The discussion on recognition continues seamlessly in the next remark **(§142**). Here Wittgenstein's opponent (or his alter ego) offers a quick solution by providing two largely rhetorical questions. Since someone who is confronted with an unfamiliar scene or object can putatively describe it with the same level of precision and granularity as someone who has recognised or managed to identify it, both perceivers seem to have identical visual experiences. Here the crucial methodological assumption is that an identity of descriptions amounts to an identity of experiences, and Wittgenstein does not seem to challenge this presupposition. Instead, he retorts (*propria voce*) that it is very rare, though not impossible, for both descriptions to perfectly align. In the case of descriptions by means of language, the perceiver who did not recognise the object or scene in question will provide a more abstract characterisation, e.g. in primarily geometrical terms, since she cannot identify the shapes as instances of more familiar and concrete things.

§143 offers an exemplification and further elaboration of the preceding argument by means of a thought experiment. In the case of a description by non-linguistic means (e.g. a drawing), a person who first failed to recognise an old acquaintance but then all of a sudden realises who she is would not just draw her in a different manner (e.g. with greater ease and almost without hesitating), but also draw a different portrait. Accordingly, there is not just a difference in the way one produces the drawing, but also in the content of the image. This is certainly a contentious claim, but it might go some way to alleviate the worry that Wittgenstein's talk about 'fine shades of behaviour' in later passages (§§192, 210) is just too vague.

§144 further analyses the case of suddenly recognising an old acquaintance and focuses upon the language one tends to use in such cases. The remark is interesting because it is the first one in section xi to move from (a) what one would ordinarily say to (b) what one would want to or feels inclined to say. It is not entirely clear whether this transition is as important as certain interpreters[58] seem to make it: although the move to (b) might insinuate that the temptation or inclination is ill-founded, and that our choice of expressions is thus ultimately unmotivated, the question appended at the end of the paragraph suggests that there are precise and potentially sound reasons for wanting to say certain things. As such, wanting to say something in a particular manner and using specific expressions does not amount to an unfounded and potentially harmful inclination. Rather, the contention here is that aspect perception and visual recognition are intimately connected phenomena: recognition is also to be differentiated from ordinary seeing (for it might be a 'besonderes Sehen') in that it involves a fusion ('Verschmelzung') of seeing and thinking. This claim concerning recognition could be read in at least three perhaps complementary ways. Firstly,

[58] e.g. Baz (2010), p. 242.

just as seeing-as, visual recognition could constitute a *sui generis* perceptual phenomenon. Secondly, Wittgenstein's proposal could allude to the circumstance that recognition typically involves seeing and thinking in close temporal succession. Thirdly and lastly, it could serve as a reminder of the fact that visual recognition underpins and instates perceptual judgements, which themselves require a 'fusion' of seeing and thinking.

§145 is a succinct addendum to the previous remark and further reinforces the idea that aspect seeing and visual recognition are linked: in the case of recognition, the same expression can serve as a 'Meldung des Gesehenen', i.e. a description of what is seen, and as an 'Ausruf des Erkennens', i.e. an avowal of one's experience. This sits uneasily with §142, since Wittgenstein there suggests that e.g. a person who has finally managed to recognise her old acquaintance would in all likelihood use an entirely different form of words. The remark could also refer back to §138, which dealt with aspect perception rather than recognition, thereby further buttressing the point that, at least inasmuch as the utterances expressing experiences of the relevant kind are concerned, there is an important parallel between aspect seeing and 'Erkennen'.

VII. (§§146-51) *General remarks on 'Darstellung' and an examination of its impact on recognition*

A methodological principle guiding the discussion up to this point is rendered explicit and enshrined in **§146**: a representation ('Darstellung') of 'what is seen' is *the* criterion (notice the singular) of the visual experience (cp. PI §367). At first blush, it might seem odd that Wittgenstein himself puts 'what is seen' between parentheses. However, this becomes less surprising if one recalls that he is talking about the intentional rather than the external object of seeing, namely the visual impression, which strikingly speaking is not an object that can be seen.

Given that the concept of a representation ('Darstellung') of what is seen is highly malleable, and given its close link to the concept of what is seen, it seems to follow that the latter concept is also very elastic (**§147**). This close connection notwithstanding, it does not follow that both concepts are similar, possibly because they serve very different functions. Against Wittgenstein, one could here retort that the representation depends on what is seen but not *vice versa*, inasmuch as it is implausible that what is seen is partially constituted by how it is represented. The remark between parentheses could perhaps also be read *materialiter*, although 'die beiden' refers back to the 'Begriffe' themselves rather than to what these concepts designate. On this liberal reading, what is seen and a representation of what is seen are not alike, because a representation is in many cases a spatio-temporal object that can be literally seen, e.g. an external object of vision, whereas what is seen *qua* intentional object of sight is not seen in the ordinary sense of the term.

§148 offers a somewhat indirect defence of the methodological principle which guides the whole discussion and was rendered explicit in §146. When asked to describe the lie of the land ('Terrain') that one sees, it is perfectly natural to resort to descriptions which already presuppose that one sees the territory in question three-dimensionally, e.g. gestures, which by their very nature involve three dimensions. A realistic or faithful two-dimensional ('ebene') representation is much harder to draw and requires the adoption of certain conventions and specialised techniques. Moreover (and perhaps most crucially), the form of representation does not stand in need of justification and does not, strictly speaking, involve a 'Vermutung' or conjecture, e.g. that what we see is indeed three-dimensional (or that three-dimensionality is something that one sees). When evaluating whether a given 'Darstellung' is faithful or accurate, we do not assess it *qua* medium, but examine its content: its legitimacy as a means of representing what we see lies, as an unassailable presupposition, in the background of the whole conversation.

§149 offers a further illustration of the point already made in §143: recognising a given visual item makes a difference to what one actually sees, since it makes a difference to how one represents (in this case mimics) what is seen. The remark introduces the new idea that *understanding* something as something also makes a difference to the visual experience (and possibly to experience more generally, though this is a topic only investigated in later sections). Wittgenstein here effects a crucial link between (visual) recognition and understanding.

In the next remark (**§150**), Wittgenstein suggests that representing ('darstellen') works differently from recognising, although the two might be connected. In order to recognise e.g. whether a depicted face is smiling or not, for instance, the orientation of the image is of prime importance: it is difficult to understand or recognise the facial expression (and the precise 'value' of said expression) of a face that is turned upside down. Representation is a more abstract property of the image, inasmuch as an image that has been turned around still represents a face with such-and-such an expression. The precise import of the remark is difficult to assess. One suggestion is that the expressive value of a picture is a response-dependent property. While what an image represents belongs to its inherent characteristics, the evaluative recognition of its properties seems to depend on external factors, such as e.g. a specific cultural setting.

§151 seems to continue the discussion about the importance of the orientation of an image (or any other means of representation). Figure (a) can perhaps be seen as a hand-held mirror, while (b) might represent a vase. Importantly, however, neither (a) nor (b) are images that readers are particularly familiar with. The case of (c) and (d) is strikingly different: while (c) can, perhaps with some effort, be recognised as the reverse image of the hand-written word 'Freude' (or 'pleasure'), (d) is effortlessly recognised as a meaningful word that one is perfectly familiar with: one might, for instance, simply read it out without even noticing its quasi-pictorial status in the text. The fact that (d) is perfectly familiar while (c) strikes most readers as somewhat alien amounts to a difference in how (c) and (d) look and, relatedly, in how perceivers react to them, in what they see them as. The difference in looks is evinced by the fact that it is harder to copy (c).

VIII. (§§152-59) *What are the criteria of sameness for aspects, and what serves as adequate description of what is seen?*

§152 puts an abrupt end to the previous discussion by introducing a further thought experiment (or imaginary case). Wittgenstein affirms that there is, strictly speaking, no difference in the aspects of an image depending on whether they have been perceived in immediate succession or not: someone who spots two different aspects on different, independent occasions just sees the same aspects as someone who experiences the aspect shift. Nonetheless, their reactions are different: while the one who perceives the instantaneous change is surprised or even amazed, the person who merely recognises the different aspects on independent occasions arguably displays a more detached attitude towards the image. The passage is relevant because it explicitly confirms that the reaction *in toto* is not sufficient for determining what someone has seen, i.e. what the intentional content of her experience is. Against crude behaviourist theories of perceptual content, whether someone is surprised or not by what he sees does not make a difference to the content of his perception. For it is a conceptual truism that the same content can surprise a person on one occasion but not on another. But the remark is hard to interpret: the fact that the aspects are not seen 'ganz anders' still allows for the possibility that they are seen somewhat differently.

The case where someone spots a hitherto unnoticed aspect is different, as Wittgenstein avers in **§153**: when one finally manages to see the aspect in question, one cannot just produce a new description of the image (*qua* purely causal consequence), but also has a new experience which,

somewhat uninformatively, is here taken to consist in the 'noticing' ('Bemerken') of the figure or aspect. In such a case, however, the perceiver need not be able to self-ascribe an entirely new perception, or so Wittgenstein contends in the following remark (**§154**). This suggests that the production of the new sort of representation is in itself sufficient for ascribing a new visual experience to her.

§155 is a programmatic remark that emphasises the difficulty of the investigation, which resides in the fact that the phenomena examined are varied and hard to survey. The sentence also suggests that Wittgenstein's enterprise is at least partially constructive and not purely descriptive: the circumstance that there are various *possible* concepts for the description of the phenomena suggests that the philosopher has to either (a) choose between different options provided and thus licensed by ordinary language or (b) even has some leeway to create new, technical concepts in order to specifically capture said phenomena. This second option may explain why Wittgenstein introduced a host of technical vocabulary at the beginning of section xi.

§156 rejects the idea that there are firmly established conditions for the completeness of descriptions of what is seen, as might perhaps be suggested by the criterial account. Whether a given description of a visual impression is complete or not essentially depends on the uptake of the interlocutor(s): when there is no misunderstanding or open question as to what the perceiver sees, the description she provided – though it might have been rather succinct – is 'complete' in the relevant sense. As a consequence, completeness is not an intrinsic property of descriptions, but rather context- and purpose-relative, in that it depends e.g. on the nature of the relevant speech situation.

The next remark (**§157**) provides a distinction between (a) the various categories under which an image can be subsumed in the abstract and (b) the different impressions one can have of the same picture. While it is perfectly possible to classify a given drawing in two radically different ways at the same time, it is (as an empirical matter of fact or as a 'grammatical' truth?) impossible to simultaneously have two entirely different visual impressions of one and the same image.

§158 examines (with some sympathy) an empiricist suggestion made by the opponent (or Wittgenstein's alter ego): what is seen *sensu proprio* is some kind of image or copy ('Abbild') that is the causal effect of the object's impingement ('Einwirkung') on my eyes. The 'Abbild' is not to be identified with the intentional content of the perception, since – in accordance with empiricist tradition – it is reckoned to be a quasi-material object that can itself be looked at. The object in this sense must be amenable to a description in purely spatial (what Wittgenstein used to call 'geometrical') terms that is stripped bare of any evaluative content. Smiling, for instance, is a purely spatial property of a face if it is reducible to the fact that the lips of the person or face in question simply point upwards. Characterising the smile described in this purely spatial manner as e.g. friendly (or by means of other evaluative terms) is extraneous to this method of representation, which implies that friendliness is not a property that can be seen strictly speaking.

§159 serves as a criticism of theories that tightly link what is seen to experimentally assessable data. When asked to specify what someone sees, she is typically able to draw a rough sketch, but she might not be able to recall the precise trajectory of her gaze. The import of the remark is thus primarily negative: the movement of a person's eyes (the sequence of her eye movements) is not a criterion, i.e. is neither sufficient nor necessary, for telling what she sees. Nonetheless, observing someone's gaze direction is in some cases necessary (and perhaps even sufficient) for ascribing a given visual experience to her from a third-person perspective.

IX. (§§160-1) *Further remarks on methodology in philosophy of psychology*

§160 is another passage that focuses on methodology and complements §156, where Wittgenstein argued that there is no set of pre-established criteria for the completeness of a description of what is seen. In this remark, he concedes that the concept 'seeing' or 'to see' is tangled, that is, fairly complex and hard to survey, as is evinced by the fact that visual impressions can be clear and striking, but also blurred and dim, while nonetheless qualifying as impressions in the same sense. The complexity and 'tangled' nature of the concept is mirrored by the fact that there are varied and manifold things which one characterises as 'descriptions of what is seen'. The last sentence precisely rejects the idea, which also lay in the background of §156, that the philosopher must find a single, privileged, and arguably highly precise, almost pointillistic way of capturing what is seen. The quest for a phenomenological language which partially motivated Wittgenstein to return to philosophy was arguably inspired by this *desideratum*.

The examination of methodology is seamlessly continued in **§161**, where Wittgenstein first criticises two related philosophical enterprises and then offers a more constructive presentation of his own way of proceeding. Given that the concept of seeing is complex and 'tangled', there is an almost irresistible temptation for the philosopher to untwine it, e.g. by replacing or supplementing it with more fine-grained notions (that might be related as species to the genus 'seeing'). The criticism is arguably aimed at ideal language philosophy, since the 'fine distinctions' in question are made or drawn rather than just described – ordinary language in this area is a fairly rough ground, as is evinced by the relative coarseness of the criteria for what is seen (cp. §156, 160). A related though separate philosophical inclination is to, as it were, rid the concept of seeing of its impurities and introduce (or 'discover') the concept of 'what is *really* seen' ('das wirklich Gesehene', emphasis added). This temptation lies at the bone of sense-data theories and, as is more explicit in Wittgenstein's text, theories which try to reduce ordinary language (which is deemed to be essentially physicalistic, since it talks about medium-sized dry goods rather than sense impressions) to a phenomenological idiom.

The remainder of §161 describes Wittgenstein's own method of examining the concept 'seeing' (and other concepts in philosophical psychology). The points that are most strongly emphasised are primarily negative in nature: false accounts or characterisations ('Darstellungen') of the relevant concept(s) are to be earmarked as such, and attempts to justify 'the primitive language-game' ought to be rejected, since no such justification is needed. The corollaries of these negative points are rather straightforward: 'the ordinary language-game' is to be described as such, most probably in a piecemeal manner, without any modifications, and it is itself to be accepted as autonomous, i.e. not grounded in any justificatory practice, but rather rooted in training and drill. The main exegetical difficulty concerns the shift from 'ordinary' or 'everyday' ('alltäglich') to 'primitive language-game', since the linguistic practice pertaining to the word 'to see' (and related expressions) that a child is first immersed in might be significantly different from the one that adults engage in, especially if the latter is deemed to incorporate certain rather technical uses. The use of the adjective 'primitive' in the German text certainly suggests that the language-game in question is basic or fundamental, but it is hard to read it as non-evaluative: in certain respects, the practice that the child engages in is limited. This is an instance of a more general problem with the notion of a language-game: while it designates basic, somewhat idealised linguistic practices in some contexts, e.g. when the Augustinian picture of language is examined at the beginning of *Philosophical Investigations*, Wittgenstein also uses it to describe perfectly ordinary speech situations with all the accompanying social conventions.

X. (§§162-166) *What does it mean to see something according to a 'Deutung'?*

§162 introduces the example of the triangle that, depending on the context, can be seen under a wealth of aspects – the figure is in this respect crucially different from dual-aspect drawings such as the rabbit-duck (§118) and more akin to the figures (a) and (b) introduced in §151, though these were not discussed at length. The remark marks the abrupt end of the section that focussed primarily on philosophical methodology and sets off a more detailed investigation.

The relationship between seeing and thinking is further examined in **§163**, which echoes §139. There Wittgenstein argued that looking at an object (and consequently seeing it) need not be accompanied by thinking, whereas being struck by an aspect presupposes some involvement of thought. The suggestion here – it is not clear whether it is uttered by the interlocutor (opponent) or *propria voce* – is that thinking about something is sufficient for seeing a given object in a specific manner, as is evident in the use of 'dann', which has both a temporal and a causal use. The riposte to this proposal is fairly obscure: there is no way of further determining ('bestimmen') the manner in which what is seen is indeed seen, that is, the 'so' in '*so* sehen' (notice the italics in the original text), but it remains unclear why this should pose a problem to the opponent. One might take the passage to suggest that aspect seeing can be analysed *adverbially* – an aspect is not strictly speaking an object of sight, perhaps *pace* §111, or even some other kind of hypostasised *res*, such as the 'organisation' of the visual impression, but rather a manner in which something is seen. Given the embryonic nature of the proposal and Wittgenstein's unsympathetic treatment of it, it is not clear which repercussions such a reading would have on the rest of PPF, section xi.

Although formulated *ex negativo*, as the rejection of a misguided suggestion by the interlocutor, **§164** offers an important conclusion. In order to be meaningful, the initial question presupposes that it is indeed 'possible to see an object according to an *interpretation*' (emphasis in the original). The mistake made by the opponent is twofold: firstly, she asks for a justification, e.g. the transcendental preconditions, of the truism and secondly, she presents it as 'a strange fact' ('ein seltsames Faktum'), though it is at best a grammatical truth that one needs to be reminded of. In certain specific circumstances, the verb 'to see' (and 'to interpret') is used in such a manner that it is trivially possible to see something according to an interpretation, and §162 served as an illustration of this feature. By rendering 'Form' as 'mould', Hacker and Schulte have made the metaphorical nature of the last two sentences more evident, but they bar an important exegetical possibility: given its (supposedly) sentential structure, it is natural to conceive of a 'Deutung' as displaying a specific 'logical form' (in the *Tractatus* sense of the term), while the same does not hold with equal plausibility for visual impressions, though the *Tractatus* seems to affirm the contrary.[59]

Reading 'Form' in §164 as both a metaphor and a tempting philosophical suggestion has the advantage of allowing for a seamless transition to **§165**, though this latter remark is extremely difficult to interpret. The extensive comparison, in the second paragraph, with the differences between the concepts of imaginary and real numbers suggests that Wittgenstein – somewhat implausibly – is sympathetic to the idea that the (logical?) 'form' of (an episode of) seeing must be located 'in another dimension', e.g. perhaps on a pre-linguistic, purely discriminatory level. The phrasing insinuates that there is a regress argument to be made against suggestions of this kind: if the relevant logical form is not found in a given dimension, one can always move to another, allegedly more primitive level loaded with fewer presuppositions, and so on *ad infinitum*. The upshot

[59] compare TLP 5.5423 *inter alia*.

of the discussion would be that it is not just unnecessary and futile to provide explanations as to *why* the truism presented in §164 obtains, but also impossible to do so.

Somewhat puzzlingly, the subsequent remark (**§166**) seems to propose a further justification or explanation ('Erklärung') of the truism: given that a 'Deutung' is reducible or at least essentially involves a picture, and given that the aspects spotted in a drawing are typically pictorial in nature, the match between seeing and interpreting becomes unsurprising.

XI. (§§167-169) *Focus on reactions to what one sees*

After the short sequence of more general remarks (§163-6), Wittgenstein returns in **§167** to the example of the triangle first introduced in §162 and further elaborates on it: a triangle can represent ('darstellen') different things depending, among other things, on the pictorial environment into which it is embedded. The beholder of a painting that features, say, a triangle that has fallen over does not emit a conjecture as to what the image represents, but reacts to it as a representation of something fallen over. The reaction in question is arguably spontaneous and natural, and does not involve any concrete act of thinking. Given this gloss on 'reagieren' – which is not explicit in the text – the remark serves as a reminder that seeing *per se* does not necessarily involve a 'Deutung', although there are striking cases of seeing in which interpreting assumes a key role. This casts some doubt on the exegetical assumption that the example of the triangle in §162 is meant to describe cases of aspect perception that are permeated by thinking or interpreting.

The next remark (**§168**) examines whether the causes that call forth such an arguably unhesitant reaction can be analysed *in abstracto*. Wittgenstein denies this by noting that specific manners or styles of painting ('Malweisen') may cause different reactions in different people. He writes that ideally, e.g. in cases such as the one described in §167, the 'Malweise' directly or in an immediate way ('in dieser unmittelbaren Weise') communicates ('mitteilen') something to the beholder, which buttresses the reading of 'reagieren' provided above. It would be a mistake to think that the reactions in question, though immediate, are primitive in the sense of being predetermined by human nature. Rather, they were acquired through processes of enculturation, training (both these aspects seem to be encapsulated by the term 'Erziehung'), and habit.

§169 seems to continue the discussion about the immediate reactions of a beholder to a 'Malweise', though in a somewhat oblique manner. More precisely, Wittgenstein examines what it means to say of a sphere in a picture that it is floating. (The question is formulated explicitly in the first paragraph.) The answer is not – as §167 might have suggested – that describing the sphere as floating is simply the obvious and most intuitive ('nächstliegend') description of the painting, the plausibility of which is taken for granted ('selbstverständlich'). Wittgenstein contends that this is not sufficient (though arguably necessary) for seeing the sphere as floating and that it does not, taken on its own, license the beholder's use of the aforementioned locution. The reason he cites for this is that the description in question could be suggestive or intuitive merely because of its conventionality – it forces itself upon the perceiver, and yet she does not *see* the image in the way suggested by the description. This counterargument poses a threat to Wittgenstein's enterprise: if one can drive a wedge between certain putative criterial manifestations of seeing something in a given manner and actually seeing it in that way, his project of examining seeing-as (and other locutions featuring the verb 'to see' and its derivations) via the criteria for expressing (in the first person) or attributing (in the third person) episodes of seeing to a perceiver is at risk. The third paragraph of §169 seeks to defuse this worry: there are certain locutions whose use univocally discloses that the beholder sees the picture in a specific manner. The fourth paragraph then mentions a further complication: the locutions in question can also serve as 'expression(s) for

taking something to be so', where the taking-as ('Dafürhalten') in question must be a primarily intellectual, non-perceptual operation. However, it is unclear how these different uses of the 'Ausdruck des Dafürhaltens' – the straightforward one to express a taking-as, and the more derivative one to give voice to how one sees a picture – are disambiguated, and the only candidate explanation provided by Wittgenstein in this remark is the 'special tone of voice' ('der besondere Tonfall') with which one utters the words in question. This might be an anticipation of the talk about 'fine shades of behaviour' in later sections, but it is in itself unsatisfactory. Perhaps the suggestion underlying all these restrictions and qualifications is that the understanding, or the knowledge how, that puts us in a position to distinguish genuine expressions of seeing from mere manifestations of taking-as is necessarily implicit and, in Wittgenstein's earlier terminology, intransitive.

XII. (§§170-5) *Criticisms concerning introspection and the notion of a 'visual impression'*

The next remark (**§170**) reiterates the point, already made at the outset of the discussion on aspect seeing (§114), that the causes of our impression that the sphere is floating are not under investigation, arguably because such an examination sheds no light upon conceptual problems (cp. §169, where the initial question is formulated as being concerned with meaning rather than causes).

§171 seemingly purports to tackle the empirical question of whether the impression in question is a special or particular one ('besonders'). However, insisting that the impression one has (one's visual experience) is different and quite specific when one sees the sphere as floating rather than lying boils down to emphasising that the use of a different expression is justified in this case. At least in this case, seeing something different thus simply amounts to using different expressions for what one sees, although a generalisation of the principle seems absurd. The second paragraph of the remark again harks back to the more direct, phenomenological method of investigation suggested by the initial question: the case where one sees a sphere that is actually floating distinguishes itself from cases where one sees a representation of a floating sphere, and even these latter cases might involve finer distinctions. The point is important because (a) it seems to grant that what one sees can be investigated, within certain limits, by means of introspection and phenomenology and (b) yet insists that the phenomena legitimately described as 'what one (actually) sees' are manifold and varied, such that phenomenology is indeed not an epistemically privileged method.

On a superficial reading, **§172** appears to doubt the very possibility and legitimacy of introspection. However, the point is arguably subtler: introspection does not yield any criteria of *identity* that would put the perceiver in a position to tell whether she still has the same impression or not (cp. §146), a claim which is obviously connected to and motivated by the so-called private language argument. Even in the first-person case, the only way to decide whether impressions are distinct or identical is by examining the manner in which one describes what one sees. It might still be possible to access a single visual impression by means of introspection, and to e.g. try to describe it as faithfully as possible, though this controversially presupposes that introspection provides firm criteria of *individuation* for impressions. At least in the case of seeing a sphere floating, but arguably also in some cases of aspect perception, the expression of what one sees is not an avowal, for otherwise it would not make sense to form the opinion, and convince or ascertain ('überzeugen', §172) oneself that what one sees is indeed such-and-such.

The next two paragraphs (**§§173-4**) further deepen the criticism of the introspective or phenomenological method and, more specifically, cast doubt on the usefulness of the expression 'visual impression' ('Gesichtseindruck'). There is a relatively great variety concerning the way in

which beholders describe the spatial look of drawings: for example, while it is hard to describe certain paintings in purely 'geometrical' or two-dimensional terms, such a description is naturally forthcoming in the case of others (e.g. abstract paintings such as Kandinsky's). Since a difference in the description of what is seen entails (or is sufficient for) a difference in the visual impression, depending on the specific case at hand a visual impression is either two- or three-dimensional. The rhetorical question at the end of §174 insinuates that this is a damaging criticism, in that it threatens to lead to an infinite regress. As it stands, this suggestion is hardly plausible: a visual impression is either two- or three-dimensional (just as e.g. a model could be plane or three-dimensional), and *tertium non datur*. Analogously, it is not evidently a deep problem that certain visual impressions are vividly colourful, while other are black and white, as there is no infinite regress of colour attributions looming. Nonetheless, Wittgenstein is right in insisting that it is 'curious' or even 'strange' ('merkwürdig') that visual impressions are deemed to share at least the main characteristics of medium-sized dry goods (e.g. spatial extension, colour).

§175 features a further (and arguably more pertinent) attempt to reduce the notion of a visual impression to absurdity. The example provided here – a picture featuring a galloping horse – is strictly analogous to that of the floating sphere, though it is perhaps more striking. Since the description of a visual impression is parasitic on the description of what is seen, and since it is perfectly natural to describe what one sees in a painting as a galloping horse, it should also be in order to characterise the visual impression as featuring galloping movements. The reason for this is perhaps that there is no plausible way to differentiate, in a visual impression, between the representing vehicle or medium and what is represented, i.e. the respective content. The precise dialectic of the passage is unclear, though one plausible suggestion is this: a beholder can see a horse galloping in a painting (just as she can see a sphere floating, cp. §169), but an account of vision that makes essential use of the notion of an impression cannot accommodate this innocuous fact and deems it to run counter to reason (cp. the striking use of 'Aberglaube').

XIII. (§§176-80) *The role of aspect perception in our lives*

The next remark (**§176**) puts an end to the discussion (in §§170-5) on visual impressions and presents an isolated methodological statement. When somebody states that she has experienced a change of aspects, her utterance has important repercussions (e.g. specific consequences upon her behaviour) that are partially constitutive of what she said or, perhaps more mildly and plausibly, embody the point or purpose of what she said. This is one of the passages where Wittgenstein seems to run together what is said *sensu stricto* by an utterance, that is, its content or meaning as a matter of convention, and its illocutionary and perlocutionary effects.

The precise import of **§177** is difficult to unravel. Wittgenstein here imagines the case of a person who has what one would like to call unsystematic synaesthesia: a single sound, e.g. the vowel 'o', is not linked to a specific colour, but is described as changing its colour randomly. There could be a parallel case for aspect seeing: a beholder describes a given image by constantly using the 'as'-locution with varying qualifiers. Alternatively, one could imagine a scenario in which the profession that one has undergone a change of aspects is of as little importance as declaring that one has a red colour impression when hearing the vowel 'a'. (On this second reading, the introduction of the exceptional variant of synaesthesia in the first paragraph looks completely unmotivated.) The last paragraph, referring back to the first one, suggests that if one discovers a sufficient degree of physiological correlations and systematicity, even the seemingly random changes as to which colour one attributes to a given vowel could turn out to be relevant. The phrasing 'uns wichtig werden' mildly suggests that the discovery of these connections does not just satisfy our scientific

curiosity, but also plays an important practical role in our lives. 'Gekuppelt', in contrast to the much more common 'gekoppelt' ('linked, combined'), appears to be a technical term used primarily in architecture: elements in a construction are 'gekuppelt' if they structurally support each other or if they share a structural component that connects them.

In **§178**, Wittgenstein discerns an area in which aspect seeing plays a key role, namely art. The link to the previous remark resides in the fact that the second paragraph of §177 counterfactually assumed that expressions of aspect change could be unimportant to us. The passage is also the first one to note that aspect perception is not limited to seeing, but also encompasses (at least) hearing. The examples of hearing-as cited by Wittgenstein bear striking analogies to the phenomena related to 'musical understanding' that he discussed in Part I of the *Investigations* (e.g. §535).

§179 further deepens the discussion about the importance of aspect perception (in the background of §177 and explicit in §178) and highlights the practical repercussions that it has even from a third-person point of view (cp. §176): if someone professes to see the figure as a convex step, one is justified in presupposing that she will be able to follow the demonstration, granted that she possesses enough knowledge of geometry. On the other hand, if she says that she sees it as a concave step, one ought to provide another illustration of the geometrical principle in question (that is, unless she can be brought to also see the other aspect of the figure). From a first-person point of view, at least in the case at hand, the practical consequences are even more pervasive: a learner who is unable to see the figure as a convex step might be seriously impaired, in that she is either completely unable to grasp the geometrical principle or, perhaps more plausibly, in that grasping the underlying principle becomes more time-consuming.

The next remark (**§180**) continues the discussion started in the previous paragraph: while Wittgenstein there analysed the *consequences* that seeing something in a given way has upon a perceiver's interaction with a drawing, he now focuses on the *preconditions* for seeing something in such-and-such a manner (and relatedly, on the *criteria* for attributing such a seeing to a perceiver). The passage is also important because it introduces a distinction between (a) knowing that a drawing in geometry is meant to represent a given thing (what Mulhall often refers to as 'mere knowing') and (b) the ability to actually see the drawing in the intended way. There are two interrelated factors which enable a perceiver to see a representational artefact in a specific manner: firstly, she needs to be accustomed to operating with the drawing and have gained facility in that practice (both these aspects are encompassed by the German term 'Geläufigkeit') and secondly, she has to 'know her way about' in the drawing. Note that these preconditions arguably run parallel to those that underpin proficient, native-like language use (cp. PI §203) and that the middle Wittgenstein was fond of employing the term 'to operate' in order to characterise our linguistic practice.

Whether or not these preconditions are fulfilled is indicated by a syndrome of criteria that Wittgenstein does not elucidate at length, but which he characterises (with notorious brevity) as 'fine shades of behaviour'. Here again, he notes the importance of certain gestures (cp. §148), which are also of fundamental importance in musical (and more generally aesthetic) understanding, though perhaps less so in linguistic understanding. The second (and penultimate) paragraph of the remark encourages the reader to consider the example of a fairly schematic drawing (it is just a 'silhouette') representing an animal transfixed by an arrow: depending, among other things, upon our degree of familiarity with such representations one might either see the arrow as such (in its concreteness as a single object) or only two separate sections of a line which one infers (or merely

knows) to represent an arrow. The question at the end is arguably not purely rhetorical, but highlights the difficulty and context-dependency of assessing whether someone actually sees something in a specific manner. Wittgenstein hesitates to make the general claim that the verb 'to see' is vague, precisely because competent speakers know, in a majority of cases, whether it is applicable or not. The appended reference to Köhler's interpenetrating hexagons is probably meant to further illustrate the points made in the first paragraph of the remark: how someone operates with a drawing is a criterion or way of telling whether she sees the figure as a conjunction of two separate hexagons or as one single geometrical body.

XIV. (§§181-91) *Conditions for the application of the verbs 'to see' and 'to see as'*

The three short remarks (§§181-3) that follow are closely interrelated. **§181** suggests that the cases discussed in §180, and arguably all other instances of seeing, can be either characterised as seeing or not. Since it is not clear which of the characterisations is correct, either use stands in need of conceptual justification, which arguably refers to what degree or in what sense ('inwiefern', **§182**) it is legitimately called 'seeing'. The fact that certain moves within a given language-game can be defended or harnessed against criticism is already evident in §126, and it stands only in apparent contradiction to what Wittgenstein said in §161. There he seemed to argue that the criteria for what is actually seen are pre-given by the 'everyday' or 'primitive' language-game and can only be accepted as such. However, that remark could also be read differently, namely as a more general rejection of the idea that certain linguistic practices, e.g. the use of the verb 'to see', stand in need of reform. The claim that the language-game *generaliter* is in order and does not require any amendments can be reconciled with the contention that some steps within it need to be justified *post hoc*, in case terminological disagreements arise.

The 'Erscheinung' mentioned in **§183** could either be aspect perception as a *sui generis* phenomenon or the circumstance that seeing-as seems to combine an experiential and an intellectual dimension. On the first interpretation, the remark restates a point made at the outset of the discussion, namely that Wittgenstein is interested in the concept rather than the causes of the phenomenon (see §§114-5). If the second reading is adopted, the remark complements the immediately preceding one: the question as to how the two constitutive dimensions of aspect perception interact is not a causal or empirical one, but a conceptual one.

§184 re-examines the examples presented in the last two paragraphs of §180. Even if a perceiver merely briefly glimpses at the drawings in question, her descriptions of what she saw – whether linguistic or pictorial – would be (by and large) accurate if somewhat clumsy representations of what she saw, or so Wittgenstein avers. The last sentence of the passage, which purports to present its main point in a nutshell (cp. 'D.h.'), is enigmatic: there are certain mistakes which are barred *ab ovo*, perhaps in virtue of the language-game being what it is, but it is not clear what kinds of mistake he has in mind.

The example of the interlocking hexagons is further discussed in **§185**: Wittgenstein here presents a scenario in which a perceiver discriminates two hexagons in the figure and continuously sees them as such (that is, she does not undergo a change of aspects). He contends *propria voce* that the perceiver in question does not really see the interpenetrating bodies as hexagons, since she is not continuously thinking about them as hexagons, arguably because their pictorial identity remains unquestioned while she is looking at the drawing. The criterion for determining whether the use of the verb 'to see *as*' is appropriate that Wittgenstein employs here is the one delineated in §139: when an aspect forces itself upon a perceiver and surprises her, she *ipso facto* inadvertently and willy-nilly thinks about the object under that description. In the case of seeing the interlocking

hexagons as hexagons (or not), the precise nature of the thought in question is left unclear by Wittgenstein's phrasing: it might either be (a) the thought that what I see are hexagons or (b) forming a separate thought about these geometrical bodies *qua* hexagons.

§186 describes the case where a perceiver professes to see the interpenetrating hexagons straightaway as hexagons, without being cognisant of any alternative 'readings' and without doubting their pictorial identity. As such, her response to the drawing was immediately forthcoming. The remark presents this as a plausible possibility, just as it is quite common to straightforwardly describe the schematic drawing of a face as a face *tout court*, but no further analysis of the scenario is provided.

The next paragraph (**§187**) again examines how a perceiver would describe an image that she has only been shown very briefly. Wittgenstein here suggests that the description in question can be highly specific ('ganz bestimmt'), in spite of the short exposition time of the drawing – a fact that might insinuate that the impression has been embellished after the fact. However, the question whether the description actually reflects what the perceiver saw – whether it indeed captures a seeing, rather than just a thought that accompanied it – remains open. On an alternative reading, the final question after the hyphen is voiced by Wittgenstein's opponent, who asks for a clear-cut answer to a question that does not allow for such a precise reply and which might indeed be futile.

§188 is an addendum: if you feel inclined to answer the potentially misguided question at the end of the previous remark, then do not rely on the introspective method. In the specific case at hand, introspection would be even harder since the impression would have to be scrutinised after the fact, when it might already have died away.

§189 presents a case that contrasts with §185: in the latter remark, the perceiver was imagined to perceive *ab initio* two hexagons in Köhler's figure, while she is now taken to first see the image as something else, say, as an unspecified elongated geometrical shape, and to only then notice the presence of the two hexagons. The fact that the two hexagons can be subject to an aspect change, and in particular the circumstance that they can be visually experienced to alter, might indicate that the drawing was indeed seen as representing two hexagons (rather than just thought to be so).

In **§190**, the opponent tries to introduce a distinction between experiences that are properly called 'visual' and undergoings that are only derivatively qualified as 'visual'. Wittgenstein seems to reject this attempt at drawing a sharp boundary: one must examine with due care in what sense ('inwiefern', cp. also §182) the perceiver genuinely experiences the image as (representing) two hexagons. Note that 'inwiefern' arguably cuts both ways: if there is a sense or a respect in which the experience in question is genuinely visual, there is also one in which it is not.

§191 is an important methodological remark that can be read in at least two different manners. On the one hand, it might reiterate the point that the investigation in question is conceptual rather than empirical. It is hard to see or accept that the question as to whether some experience is properly qualified as visual or not (or, more generally, whether something counts as seeing or not) is solved or at least untangled by providing 'Begriffsbestimmungen', which in this case amount to a reminder or survey of how the relevant concepts are used in everyday parlance. On the other hand, the second paragraph of the remark suggests and arguably favours another reading. A certain concept, namely the concept of seeing, forces itself upon speakers when asked to characterise certain experiences or phenomena that lie in the vicinity of ordinary, common-and-garden seeing. However, this is an inclination or temptation that is, in and of itself, unlicensed and negotiable and thus stands in need of justification (cp. §181) – it is not an obvious move in the language-game,

though said language-game on the whole remains unproblematic (cp. §161). On this reading, the relevant 'Begriffsbestimmungen' might be partially stipulative or at least explanatory: they acknowledge that one could qualify the experience in question either as visual or as non-visual (e.g. intellectual) but go on to argue that one of these characterisations is preferable and then provide specific reasons for this choice (that is, they spell out the 'inwiefern'). At least on the surface, this second reading of the passage runs counter to standard Wittgensteinian lore. Since the concept that forces itself on the speakers is in this case a perfectly ordinary rather than a metaphysical one, the need for conceptual reform and stipulation should not arise. This putative tension is alleviated if one recalls that, on Wittgenstein's interpretation, psychology is riddled by conceptual confusions and misuses of ordinary notions.

XV. (§§192-202) *The importance of attitudes and ways of treating ('behandeln') and regarding ('betrachten')*

§192 is a corollary to §180, in that it investigates the criteria for merely knowing that a given image represents some specific thing. If someone treats a schematic drawing in the manner in which she treats a working drawing or a blueprint, if she e.g. scrutinises its details with utmost care and concentration, she might justly be taken not to see the image in the required or desired way. This has important consequences which were adumbrated in §179: when it comes to relying on the picture in order to e.g. demonstrate some geometrical principle, she might be unable to carry out the task or experience great difficulty in doing so. From a methodological point of view, the link between the 'fine shades of behaviour' that serve as subtle and often elusive criteria for seeing (or not seeing) something as something and these more evident and concrete consequences in behaviour is crucial. In order to determine whether a perceiver sees a given aspect, one has to examine the way in which she treats it (e.g. with great facility and unhesitancy, clumsily, etc.) but most importantly, one needs to consider what she can actually do with the picture, how she puts it to use and operates with it.

§193 argues that one reason to qualify an experience as 'seeing' is to highlight the fact that it is indicative of a specific attitude ('Einstellung') towards, and of a way of treating ('behandeln'), the figure in question. This applies with particular salience to cases in which the image in question elicits an emotional or moral response in the broadest sense, such as that of the transfixed animal, but also applies *mutatis mutandis* to the interlocking hexagons (see **§194**). What links these two instances is arguably the fact that there is a syndrome of *potentially diverse* behavioural characteristics which licenses the use of the formulation 'es ist/sind für mich'. As such, the remark does not present any new insights, but reformulates the upshot of the debate on the criteria for and consequences of seeing-as.

§195 offers a striking comparison between two kinds of representational vehicles or mediums. In the case of pictures, just as in that of linguistic representations, there is a variety of ways of engaging with them, revealing (at the extreme ends) intimateness and utmost familiarity on the one side of the spectrum and detachment on the other. 'Linguistic representation' is here conceived very broadly, so as to include most forms of non-pictorial representation, e.g. also mathematical formulae employed in physics. Nonetheless, the role assumed by images in our lives is far from uniform[60], and paintings, especially portraits, are analogous to proverbs ('Sprüche') hung on the wall in that we bear an unmediated emotional relationship to them.

§196 is a brief recapitulation of the main point examined in §179. The fact that someone professes to see the animal in the image as transfixed licenses her interlocutor to expect certain things from

[60] *Pace* Mulhall (2001), pp. 161 f. *inter alia.*

her (and to e.g. anticipate her reactions). For instance, if the drawing in question is sufficiently realistic and detailed, the beholder might sympathise with the animal.

The next remark (**§197**) offers a slight terminological amendment of §193: instead of saying that beholders *treat* ('behandeln') a picture in a given way and bear a specific attitude towards it, it might be preferable to describe them as regarding or viewing ('betrachten') the image in a particular manner, most notably as embodiments of what they represent. It is not entirely clear whether there is any profound reason for this proposed change of terminology. Indeed, 'betrachten' might just be more accurate because it captures the fact that the relationship between a picture and its beholder essentially involves vision, whereas 'behandeln' puts more emphasis on the overall process of interacting with images. The salient difference becomes more perspicuous in the case of an admittedly unrelated example: when looking at Magritte's notorious *Ceci n'est pas une pipe*, one cannot refrain from viewing ('betrachten') the painting as (the depiction of) a pipe, whereas the beholder has a free choice on how to treat ('behandeln') the picture.

§198 insists that it is not a universal fact about humankind that beholders treat pictures in the aforementioned way: indeed, there could be people who consider e.g. portraits to be dehumanising and only feel alienation and horror when confronted with them, and who yet are rightly characterised as humans. This does not mean that a society comprising such human beings would simply refrain from producing and using images, though they would assume a completely different role, since they would essentially be a means to scare and shock people. Depending on how encompassing the 'wir' in §197 is taken to be, it could still be that as a matter of empirical fact there are no human societies which treat images in this quaint manner, such that the remark merely presents a thought experiment.

The 'grammar' of the regarding or viewing ('betrachten') characteristic of our attitude towards portraits and other kinds of images is elucidated in **§199**. There are at least two different options hinted at in the first paragraph: either 'betrachten' denotes a concrete process with a more or less specific duration or it is a dispositional attitude. The first sentence of the second paragraph suggests that the 'grammar' of the term (Wittgenstein himself does not use this term in the passage) is not pre-given and thus cannot be simply described. Rather, the concept needs to be determined ('bestimmen'), which in this case involves at least partial stipulation. Alternatively, one could take him to claim that the concept 'betrachten' just has fuzzy boundaries, such that one needs to look from case to case whether it is enacted (a) whenever one looks at a picture or (b) only if one focuses on and scrutinises the image. Wittgenstein declares that the sense of 'betrachten' which interests him is the second one and indeed considers it to be an instance of 'so-Sehen', that is, of aspect seeing. The distinction between these two kinds of 'betrachten' (or these two meanings of the word 'betrachten') is paralleled by the distinction between a kind of visual perception unaccompanied by thoughts about the perceived object and a sort of seeing which essentially involves thinking about said object (see §139).

§200 insists that 'betrachten' in the relevant sense (specified in the second paragraph of the previous remark) is not an automatic accompaniment of looking at or seeing an image and thus renders interpretation (a) implausible. Indeed, the example that Wittgenstein cites – seeing a portrait as smiling down on one – describes a fairly rare phenomenon which arguably either requires previous and thoroughgoing familiarity with the painting in question or at least an attitude marked by great receptivity and openness.

The insights concerning 'betrachten' are applied to the case of the rabbit-duck drawing in **§201**. In this specific example, it is possible to see a mere dot (namely the rabbit-duck's eye) as embodying

a particular gaze. However, one does not always look at the drawing in this manner – after a certain time, the vividness of the impression might just fade away, such that the beholder would no longer feel inclined to use the expression 'Sieh, wie er blickt'. At the end of the remark, Wittgenstein notes that it is difficult to pinpoint what this specific form of words is an expression of, as it is hard to tell whether it is rightly qualified as 'the expression of a sensation'. (There is no good reason to translate 'Empfindung' in the present context as 'feeling', given that what Wittgenstein wants to describe with the term might be a separate, highly idiosyncratic impression or some other visual experience.)

§202 is a fairly isolated methodological remark, as the parentheses also indicate. Wittgenstein here characterises the aim of his enterprise: the concepts of seeing and 'betrachten' (etc.) are examined neither (a) in order to present an exhaustive registry of all the terms used in (philosophical) psychology nor (b) to provide a thorough classification and categorisation of all the relevant concepts. Rather, the purpose of the remarks is therapeutic or, perhaps less controversially, clarificatory: they are meant to warn against and eventually eliminate certain conceptual confusions and unclarities ('Unklarheiten') which have hitherto marred e.g. empirical psychology. Given that Wittgenstein here seems to proceed on a case-to-case basis, this indicates that he abandoned or at least questioned his supposed ideal of providing 'perspicuous overviews' (cp. PI §122), at least if these kinds of surveys are deemed to be fairly comprehensive, rigorous and purpose-neutral.

XVI. (§§203-17) *Tentative categorisation: conventionalised vs. projective instances of seeing-as*

§203 marks an abrupt change of topic and a return to the investigation of the expressions used to give voice to an aspect shift. The claim that one instantaneously noticed an aspect, expressed by the sentence 'Now I see it as an *x*', is only legitimate in a language-game which also features expressions of inability to see an aspect and utterances which convey one's attempts or efforts to spot a given aspect. A corollary of this insight is that highly conventionalised images and signs, e.g. depictions of lions as used in heraldry or the letters of an alphabet one is thoroughly familiar with, are not subject to seeing-as. This passage seems to bar the possibility of seeing a depicted lion as, say, a symbol of valour and bravery and thereby risks driving a wedge between seeing-as in this most basic sense – seeing-as *simpliciter* or *sensu stricto* – and 'betrachten' (cp. §§197ff.) or 'behandeln' (cp. §193).

A further admonishment against the introspective method (cp. §188, among other passages) is given in **§204**: rather than examining what is going on inside one's own mind (or perhaps, more generally, what happens in the first-person case), the philosopher in search of conceptual clarity should focus on the third-person case, that is, on our criteria for ascribing an episode of seeing-as to a perceiver.

§205 seems to complement §203, in that it discusses a further expression, namely 'It could also be *this*', whose pertinence licenses the use of the expression 'I now see it as an *x*'. When doubts or conjectures concerning the identity of what is depicted are precluded, as is the case e.g. with conventionalised images of lions, the perceiver has no claim to using this latter kind of expression. The two sentences between parentheses are best read as an aside that recapitulates insights from (Part I of) the *Investigations*. Just as e.g. one's understanding of a given sentence is not to be identified with a further, more precise and allegedly unambiguous sentence, one's reading of a drawing, that is, a particular way of seeing-as, cannot be captured by a further image with idealised, 'sublimated' and thus dubious properties. The second paragraph indicates that the expression 'It could also be *this*', though related to forms of words giving voice to seeing-as, has a wider use and might thereby be more akin to 'betrachten' and 'behandeln'. Indeed, the paragraph cites children's

pretence play or make-believe as a case where the use of the abovementioned expression is pertinent and legitimate. The verb 'ausdeuten' suggests that the children project an elaborate interpretation onto an object that is otherwise fairly mundane and unimpressive. The projective nature of the process is further emphasised by the striking last sentence which, with its insistence on the role of 'fancy' ('Erfindung'), clearly sets apart this case from those instances of aspect seeing where imagination is of little importance. It is left unclear whether this case of make-believe is indeed a further, somewhat remote example of seeing-as or a separate though perhaps kindred phenomenon.

§206 tackles this last point: since episodes of seeing-as are attributed on a criterial basis (cp. §180 and the use of 'Anzeichen' here), which encompasses 'fine shades of behaviour' and the impact they have on subsequent actions, there is an important respect in which one is licensed to say that the children indeed *see* the chest as a house. Nonetheless, the fact that the remark closes with a question which might not be purely rhetorical is still relevant: though it qualifies as an episode of seeing-as, it lies at the extreme end where projection has almost free reign.

The closely related next remark (**§207**) even further stresses the point that instances of make-believe are aptly characterised as seeing-as *if* certain criteria are fulfilled, e.g. if certain characteristic exclamations are used by the children. Wittgenstein here uses the conjunctive ('wäre') to either highlight the fact that he is talking about a hypothetical situation or to emphasise that the question is a genuinely open one. Depending on which criteria have been met, a child might or might not be described as experiencing an aspect shift when first becoming fully immersed into the 'fancy' woven around the box.

§208 is connected to the immediately preceding remark and, more remotely, to §201, where Wittgenstein already examined one of the expressions that beholders of the rabbit-duck use in order to capture or convey their experience. Someone who, while looking at the drawing, suddenly starts to describe the gaze or look on the face ('Ausdruck') in a particular manner ('in gewisser Weise') can be justly described as experiencing, say, the rabbit aspect. The present remark thus seems to give an affirmative answer to the question at the end of §201: since the description of the experience provided by the beholder is indicative of the lighting up of an aspect (cp. §207), it is correctly qualified as an 'Ausdruck einer Empfindung'.

§209 continues the examination of the expressions giving voice to experiences of aspect dawning, focussing (in the second paragraph) on contexts where aesthetic evaluation plays a pivotal role. In this remark, Wittgenstein further stresses the subtlety of the criteria at play: it is not the use of a particular expression or phrase that is, taken on its own, indicative of an episode of aspect dawning, but that particular expression or phrase uttered in a highly specific manner, with a distinctive tone of voice.

§210 brings the discussion to an end and notes that the criteria are not set in stone, but rather consist in 'fine shades of behaviour'. In the case of a musical theme (cp. §209, second paragraph), the manner in which one whistles the theme may be indicative of understanding. In order to manifest musical understanding (and such understanding might presuppose the capacity to experience aspect shifts) it is not enough to whistle the theme 'correctly', that is, to merely produce the right succession of correctly pitched notes.

In the next remark (**§211**) Wittgenstein returns to the example of the triangle first presented in §162, which is arguably (though somewhat remotely) connected to the children's game of make-believe: in the former case, it seems as though (note that Wittgenstein refrains from affirming this

propria voce) there was a match between the visual impression ('Gesichtseindruck') and a concrete idea as embodied by a specific mental image or piece of imagination ('Vorstellung' is notoriously hard to translate). This might serve either as a complement to or as a rectification of the suggestion that 'behandeln' (cp. §192) or 'betrachten' (§197) assumes a key role in aspect seeing. The phrasing here is suggestive: the term 'Berührung' might imply that the impression and the 'Vorstellung' match or overlap, that the one is superimposed upon the other.

At first blush, **§212** seems to commit Wittgenstein to the view sketched in the previous remark, namely that there are episodes of aspect seeing which involve a 'Vorstellung', and that these need to be carefully distinguished from episodes which do not. Despite his explicit avowal to the contrary (see §202), he thus seems to offer a rudimentary classification. However, there is an alternative reading: while one is, in the case of the aspects of the triangle, under the impression that a 'Vorstellung' is involved and plays a key role, such an impression does not force itself upon the beholder in the case of the aspects of the concave or convex step (§179), nor in that of the double cross. If the alleged classification thus categorises anything at all, it is not episodes of seeing-as, but ways in which a perceiver, philosopher, or psychologist feels inclined to analyse them. **§213** casts doubt on the plausibility of this second, perhaps overly cautious reading: since the descriptions of the aspects are of a different kind ('von andrer Art') in these respective cases, and given that these descriptions (in conjunction with the 'Ausdruck' that characterises them) form a sufficient criterial basis for attributing an experience to the perceiver, the distinction between these kinds of seeing-as runs deeper than the second reading suggests. (It is deplorable that Wittgenstein does not investigate the differences between those descriptions in any detail, for they are less than obvious.)

§214 is a further reminder that the introspective or phenomenological method, despite its initial plausibility, is essentially flawed and misleading. The remark presents a brief argument against the method, which is meant to dispel its appeal: since introspection, and private ostensive definition in particular, does not yield any firm criteria of identity for, say, visual impressions (cp. PI §258), one is licensed to suppose that the putatively private objects constantly change. While the remark presents this as essentially a sceptical argument concerning memory, there are deeper reasons (primarily elaborated in PI §§243-315) for refraining from talk about private objects.

§215 can be read as an elaboration of §213: in the case of the double cross, the perceiver resorts to 'descriptions' which are very basic, in that they do not necessarily feature language, let alone subtle nuances of tone. Indeed, if she wants to give voice to her experience, it is sufficient for her to indicate a specific area of the figure, say, one of the black triangles, in order to express that the black cross is currently salient. Given that the criterial basis for attributing such an experience is thus very undemanding, third-person observers might even be licensed to say that pre-linguistic children, and perhaps some higher non-human animals, are in a position to discriminate the two aspects of the double cross, and to alternatively experience them visually. In the case of the rabbit-duck drawing, and arguably even more so in that of the triangle, it is difficult or outright impossible to point out the relevant aspects in this manner.

§216 draws an important conclusion from the distinction between these different kinds of 'descriptions' of what is seen: in the case of the rabbit-duck, the perceiver needs to be familiar or conversant with ('innehaben') the shapes and looks ('Gestalten') of the animals in question, while the same does not hold in the case of the double cross. Against this, one could argue that even in the latter case, she has to be acquainted with the look or 'Gestalt' of a cross, just as she needs to be able to discriminate (directly, by means of sight rather than mere inference) between black and

white. The passage does not mention conceptual capacities, but only the perhaps less demanding ability to discriminate visually, which is here supposed to be based upon previous experience of and acquaintance with the relevant shapes and looks. Though 'innehaben' suggests a thorough familiarisation with the looks in question, it arguably boils down to the capacity to reliably tell apart triangles from other geometrical shapes.

A further differentiation is provided in **§217**: while it is possible to take, say, the rabbit-duck drawing for a depiction or representation of a rabbit, right off the bat and without any conscious cognitive or intellectual effort, the same is not possible when it comes to the aspects of the triangle. Rather, these latter cases, as Wittgenstein avers *propria voce*, require either the mere possession or even an active employment of imagination ('Vorstellungskraft'). This explains the metaphor used in §211, for imagination (and even more so 'Vorstellungskraft') is typically taken to involve the mediation of mental images (the relevant 'Vorstellungen' in question *could* be primarily visual, but they might also be more abstract and conceptual).

XVII. (§§218-20) *The nature of the underlying image as a factor in aspect seeing*

In **§218**, Wittgenstein relies on an implicit distinction between aspects that are essentially spatial – the examples he cites in the second paragraph are the aspects of the cube (§116) and those of the step (§179) – and those that are not, which thus do not occupy three-dimensional space but are located on a plane. Given that the aspects of the double cross are merely two-dimensional, certain possibilities of error or illusion ('Täuschung') are precluded, or so Wittgenstein suggests. The talk about 'Täuschung' here suggests that a perceiver might claim to spot aspects in the cube or the step that are not actually present in the drawings. However, it is unclear what the relevant 'possible illusion' might consist in; perhaps the contention is simply that the perception of spatial depth in these cases is illusory, or that it favours certain illusory impressions.

§219 distinguishes between schematic drawings such as the cube in §116 and more elaborate images, arguably with the aim of showing that an onlooker, when assessing whether a perceiver indeed experiences an episode of aspect seeing, must take two parameters into consideration. While the discussion has up until this moment almost exclusively focussed on the behavioural responses of the beholder, Wittgenstein here insinuates that the nature of the image in question (as well as the context into which it is embedded) might also be a crucial assessment factor. When someone sincerely professes to see the schematic cube as a tin box, and even to experience a shift of aspects with regards to its material constitution, an onlooker might nevertheless be hesitant to attribute the relevant experiences to her. Though the cube can be seen as a box, it cannot be seen as a box with highly specific characteristics, since the drawing is not just underdetermined, but completely unspecific in this respect: the drawing, if it is to represent a box, does not provide any further information or clues as to how the box looks like *in concreto*. Wittgenstein's methodological reminder that he 'can draw a conceptual boundary ('Begriffsgrenze') here' again allows for two readings (cp. §191). On the one hand, he could simply stipulate that in the case of, say, the box, aspects are not individuated in this extremely fine-grained manner. On the other hand, the 'Begriffsgrenze' might be implicit in the way the verb 'to see' and related perceptual notions are ordinarily used. While this second option is arguably favoured by the remainder of the remark, the mere phrasing suggests otherwise: a border can only be traced ('ziehen') rather than, say, retraced ('nachzeichnen') if there previously was no firmly established boundary. The second paragraph suggests that it is legitimate, in the case of elaborate images, to claim that one experiences ('empfinden', 'fühlen') fairly subtle differences in the texture of what is depicted, just as it is licit to ascribe knowledge to someone in a dream if the surrounding narrative about the dream is

sufficiently complex. (Since these uses of the terms 'empfinden', 'fühlen' and 'wissen' are obviously derivative and in some respects devious – 'knowledge in a dream', for instance, is not factive, and if it happens to overlap with facts, this is largely due to coincidence –, they might amount to secondary uses of the respective expressions.)

§220 offers a partial and mainly terminological concession to those psychologists and philosophers (most notably Köhler) who claim that a shift of aspects can be explained in terms of a change in the organisation of the perceiver's visual impression. (This idea has been criticised with vehemence in §§131, 134-6.) There is a type of aspect that could be called with some justice 'aspect of organisation', namely an aspect whose look is mainly a function of grouping together certain areas of or objects in the drawing. It is not entirely clear whether Wittgenstein's text features any example of an 'aspect of organisation', although the interpenetrating hexagons (first mentioned in §180) and the double cross (§212) are likely candidates.

XVIII. (§§221-24) *The pivotal role assumed by techniques of operating with images*

In **§221**, Wittgenstein suggests that the original home of the expressions 'zusammennehmen' ('taking or grouping together') and 'zusammengehören' ('belonging together') is not visual perception. The point here is primarily negative, and Wittgenstein does not tell the reader what the original meaning of the terms is. The example he provides suggests that a mastery of 'calculating' – what he seems to have in mind are simple operations of counting, though he does use the expression 'Rechnen' rather than 'Zählen' – is founded upon the practical ability to assemble objects into groups. The last sentence specifies that the remark is not (or not primarily) about the order of acquisition, that is, about the contingent fact that children first learn how to group things together, e.g. by moving them into the same spot, and then become capable of somehow seeing them as a unit. Rather, the use of 'zusammennehmen' in the sense of 'putting together' or 'moving things next to each other' is the primary one, and the employment of the term to characterise certain feats of (visual, but arguably also auditory) perception is derivative.

The example of the triangle is further discussed in **§222**, and it arguably serves as a representative instance of cases where the 'Vorstellungskraft' of the perceiver (§217) plays a pivotal role, though this does not involve the parading of images before the mind's eye (cp. §211). However, the focus on the practical ability to operate with the figure shows that the conclusion which Wittgenstein's attempts to draw here is more general in nature, for the capacity to operationalise the drawing was discussed most explicitly in connection with the concave and convex step (§§179-80, the term 'Geläufigkeit' appears twice in the second of these remarks). The expression 'imstande sein' (emphasised in the text), just as 'innehaben' in §216, might insinuate that the acquisition of the relevant ability requires a gradual process of immersion and repetition, though this is a fairly subtle nuance. As in the previous remark, Wittgenstein insists that he is not making any empirical observations, but rather delineating the conceptual features of the notions employed by the perceiver to express her experience. In the last paragraph, he gets close to offering a general and systematic conclusion, by insisting that the 'substratum', i.e. the conceptual basis or precondition, for (certain types of) aspect seeing resides in 'the mastery of a technique', where such mastery is essentially a practical rather than a theoretical virtue. The main exegetical difficulty consists in determining the precise scope of the genitive phrase 'dieses Erlebnisses' – does it refer back to a particular experience, i.e. that of seeing the aspect in the triangle shift (discussed in the first paragraph of §222), or is it employed as a *singulare tantum* in order to denote seeing-as more generally? Note that the conclusion with its insistence on higher-level abilities contrasts with what Wittgenstein said about the double cross in §215.

§223 indicates that this insistence on 'the mastery of a technique' as a logical or grammatical (i.e. conceptual) precondition for having certain experiences is puzzling. For the capacity to experience our environs seems to be pre-given or innate – if agents did not possess this kind of receptivity, they would be unable to form beliefs and acquire knowledge about the world. Wittgenstein concedes that there is a different 'concept of experience' ('Erlebnisbegriff') at play here, which nonetheless bears family resemblances to the ordinary one. (Again, this point might foreshadow the discussion about secondary meaning, if one can make the case that the sense discussed here by Wittgenstein is derivative and based upon the primary one.) From a more substantial philosophical point of view, the remark offers an important suggestion: while 'Erlebnisse' have hitherto been considered to be purely receptive and passive experiences, some of them presuppose both prior knowledge and an active engagement with the world.

§224 essentially offers a recapitulation of these points: in the discussion about aspect perception (note though that 'hier' is again ambiguous in scope), the 'concept of seeing' ('der Begriff des Sehens') is employed in a modified sense. The last paragraph suggests that Wittgenstein, who can be taken as a representative of competent speakers more generally, does not consciously modify the relevant notions, but rather does so by using them in a manner that feels utterly natural and intuitive to him. In this sense, the relevant modifications are *prima facie* different from those effected by mathematicians, who tend to engage in active stipulation. The amendments in question consist in slightly technical uses of terms that do not *ipso facto* deviate from ordinary parlance, and as such they provide elaborations of certain patterns implicit in everyday usage. The first sentence of the paragraph, with its insistence on what it makes sense to say, presents the conclusion drawn at the end of §222 as a consequence of the criterial approach to aspect seeing.

XIX. (§§225-33) *Attributing emotions and attitudes to people and artefacts*

The beginning of **§225** marks a break in the discussion. Wittgenstein here examines whether the characterisation of someone's posture as 'hesitant' ('zaghaft') requires specific knowledge as to that person's usual posture (among other things) as well as a more encompassing context in which such a description starts to make sense. The main question emerges to be whether emotionally charged or evaluative terms come, as it were, in pairs, one of them being purely visual and the other being more context-sensitive (in fairly subtle ways) and dependent on the fulfilment of certain preconditions.

§226 cites an important case of an adjective used to describe one's experience which operates, so to speak, along these two dimensions: in their application to music, the terms 'major' and 'minor' have an obvious 'emotive value' ('Gefühlswert') – music in a major key tends to sound elated and forward moving, while pieces in a minor key are typically perceived to be sad or at least more restrained. In music theory, however, the applicability of these notions is a function of precise formal or 'structural' properties of the composition in question. (The emphasis in 'wahrgenommene Struktur' should clearly be on 'Struktur' rather than 'wahrgenommen', said structure being an objective feature of the music on the sheet.) While striking, the analogy to the term 'hesitant' as applied to a face is somewhat awry: in the case of music, the 'Gefühlswert' associated with the terms 'major' and 'minor' is essentially and unilaterally dependent on the sophistication of one's musical knowledge. While laypeople may use the impression a piece makes upon them as a rule of thumb for determining whether it is in a major or minor key, their judgements are sometimes wrong, and trained musicians will indeed associate a different 'Gefühlswert' with the piece in question. In the case of the adjective 'hesitant', there is no potential for such a mismatch, at least if one grants that there are no experts in detecting and attributing

hesitancy. More importantly, the order of precedence is different: even if there is or were a purely visual concept of hesitancy or timidity, a grasp of it would not allow us to make more accurate judgements (and to sometimes revise old ones) as to whether, say, someone's face looks timid.

§227 offers a more plausible suggestion. An adjective such as 'sad' can be applied with equal justice to a picture-face (cp. §119) and to a human being, but in each case the attribution of sadness amounts to something different. In the latter kind of case, it is based upon a syndrome of criteria, including but not limited to the person's facial expression, her overall demeanour, and her reactions to certain questions. The remark between parentheses warns against the temptation to explain the applicability of family-resemblance terms such as the adjective 'sad' in terms of a likeness or similarity. There is no illuminating sense in which a facial expression, though expressive of sadness, is similar to the feeling of sadness.

In **§228**, Wittgenstein avers that very general emotional characterisations (e.g. 'hesitant', 'timid', 'sad', but notice that this does not hold for the more technical 'major' and 'minor') are not tied to a specific sense modality. If it is correct to say that one sees, say, the sadness on a face, it is as correct to maintain that one hears the sadness in a given melody.

The next paragraph (**§229**) renders explicit a question that lay in the background of the discussion: though it is perfectly idiomatic to say that one *hears* the plaintiveness of a melody, is this way of expressing one's experience indeed legitimate? (Similar questions have been asked, arguably by Wittgenstein's adversary, in the case of seeing, for example in §§189, 206.)

In **§230**, Wittgenstein imagines the opponent to further elaborate her criticism: a plaintive melody is not heard to be such, but 'sensed' ('empfunden') to be so. He replies that this is uninformative at best and misleading at worst, since the interlocutor fails to specify which sense organ is used to detect the relevant sensation. But this riposte is unconvincing, given that there are many mental states standardly classified as 'Empfindungen' whose detection is not tied to a specific sense organ, e.g. headaches. Wittgenstein does not discuss more radical ways of attacking the idea that one hears the plaint or lament in a melody, such as saying that it is *sensu stricto* incorrect to apply adjectives expressing emotions to things other than human beings and animals, or emotivist theories holding that the emotions in question, though indicative of the beholder's or listener's attitude towards the work of art, are merely projected upon the work and not present in it as such. He concludes that one could go either way and that there is thus no privileged way of expressing oneself: all that can be done is retracing or note ('feststellen') the 'conceptual differences' that separate, say, an empiricist account of musical expressivity from a conceptualist approach. Delineating these differences is arguably a conceptual and not an empirical task.

§231 avers that there is a difference in reactions depending on whether a perceiver recognises (that is, perceives rather than merely knows?) the expression on a face as expressive of timidity or fails to do so. As is rendered explicit in the second sentence, the relevant reaction – what one might somewhat misleadingly call the 'Empfindung' of the face's timidity – does not consist in a specific physiological response to be investigated by empirical methods. Rather, it encompasses a syndrome of behavioural manifestations, as Wittgenstein has argued in previous remarks (e.g. §180). Since the relevant 'Empfindung', i.e. the intuitive awareness that the face expresses timidity, is *ex hypothesi* not observable by experimental means (nor, one would like to add, by introspection), the 'concept of sensation' has been modified. (Hacker and Schulte's justification for rendering 'Empfindungsbegriff' as 'concept of sensing' relies on an overly subtle distinction between 'having a (distinct) sensation' and 'sensing something' that is often not heeded in ordinary parlance. The distinction all but collapses in standard cases of sensations: to have a pain sensation simply

amounts to feeling or sensing pain. In the case of 'sensing' the timidity on a face, both the perceiver's mode or way of sensing and the intentional object of her sensing, i.e. what she senses or feels, are different from ordinary cases.) §231 can thus be read as an addendum to the immediately preceding remark: the reaction to a facial expression obviously varies depending on whether the observer recognises the fearfulness or timidity evident in it, but this reaction does not simply boil down to physiological symptoms or a purely bodily reaction. Even if there were bodily signs that are strictly correlated with what one might feel inclined to call a sensation, sensing, or feeling ('Empfindung') of recognising timidity, (1) recognising the timidity of a face does not consist in experiencing certain physical symptoms and (2) the term 'Empfindung' would have been modified by stipulating purely physiological criteria for having such a sensation (or, if one follows Hacker and Schulte's translation, for 'sensing' in such-and-such a manner).

§232 further explores the differences between straightforwardly seeing and sensing something and seeing and feeling what the expression on a face is indicative of. The failure to be perceptive of or receptive towards the expression on a face is not caused by a physiological defect (say, a lesion of one's visual nerves), whereas the inability to e.g. experience pain is due to a specific neurological condition, just as the incapacity to see the face at all indicates a more general defect of one's eyesight. Whereas there is thus a straightforward correlation between these latter perceptual and recognitional abilities and the respective deficiencies, the inability to detect subtle expressions on a face is not tied to any specific physiological defect. This is not a brute empirical fact, but rather a reflection (Wittgenstein uses the equally metaphorical expression 'ein Symbol') of the logic or grammar of the notions in question.

§233 recapitulates an earlier insight about aspect seeing and applies it to the case of hearing the solemnity or graveness ('Ernst') of a melody. The solemnity in question is in a sense ineffable, since it is nothing present in the notes, e.g. no structural feature of the piece's 'organisation', just as the timidity of the face is no purely geometrical characteristic of it. (The emotional expressivity of a musical piece thus cannot be identified with or reduced to its being in a major or minor key, since the latter is in the end primarily a structural feature; cp. §226.) In order to chime with what Wittgenstein maintained in previous remarks, the term 'Wiedergabe des Gehörten' has to be read in a narrow sense, as designating an exact 'copy' of what is heard, e.g. the musical score or a mechanical, inexpressive reproduction of the sounds (cp. §131 for the case of seeing). For evidently the solemnity of a melody can be conveyed ('mitteilen') by means of certain gestures, by whistling it in a particularly expressive manner (cp. §210), and so on. One could perhaps argue that hearing-as is different from seeing-as in that the intentional object of hearing-as is in some sense private, inasmuch as it cannot be shared due to its supposed ineffability. Though this might chime with Wittgenstein's earlier contention that musical understanding is essentially 'intransitive' (cp. the discussion in the *Brown Book*), later textual evidence supporting this reading is slender at best.

XX. (§§234-38) *Factors responsible for the perception of an aspect (context; eye movements; 'eine bestimmte Beschäftigung')*

§234 refers back to a point first made in §205 (and the immediately following remarks), where Wittgenstein notes that 'a fancy' ('eine Erfindung') can render certain aspects of an object, e.g. a chest, perspicuous (cp. §§206-7). This insight is here applied to a 'beliebiges Schriftzeichen', that is, to a sign in an alphabet or script. (In the light of Wittgenstein's own example – a somewhat clumsily written 'H' – the translation as 'arbitrary cipher' is unfortunate at best; 'beliebig' just means that the example has been picked out randomly, and does not suggest that there is no thorough correlation between the sign and its meaning. Moreover, the signs of a foreign script are standardly

called 'Schriftzeichen' in German.) Wittgenstein contends that such a sign can be seen under various aspects, depending on the 'fiction' ('Erdichtung') by which it is surrounded ('umgeben'). But the point arguably applies more generally, as the context into which a sign is embedded renders certain readings of it natural and perspicuous. Consider the case of the sign EH and its embedment into two different surroundings:

(1) ER IST EIN SEHR EHRLICHER MENSCH.

(2) 그 것은 예의 바른 EH 도지요.

While the appearance of EH is slightly disturbing in both contexts – the sign is incorrect inasmuch as it is written in the 'wrong' font – its phonetic value, though different in the two cases, strikes the reader as perfectly obvious and natural (that is, if she is familiar with both the Latin alphabet as adapted to German and Korean *hangul*). In this sense, Wittgenstein's use of the term 'Erdichtung' may be misleading, especially if one considers the final sentence of the remark: the cases where a reader or listener experiences the meaning of a word do not necessarily involve fictional scenarios, but often encompass real-life situations.

§235 further elaborates on the example delineated in the previous remark: Wittgenstein here contends that seeing a sign in a specific context could metaphorically be described as experiencing 'the echo of a thought in sight' ('ein im Sehen nachhallender Gedanke'), though he does not explicitly endorse this view (cp. 'beinahe', 'möchte man sagen'). It is not evident what the relevant 'Gedanke' – 'thought' in the singular – could be, for the 'Erfindung' cited in the previous remark comprises a number of suppositions and conjectures (i.e. a succession of 'Gedanken'). Moreover, on the broader reading favoured at the end of my exegesis of §234, the suggestion is even more implausible: the impact of the context (Wittgenstein himself here uses 'Zusammenhang') on what one sees cannot be explained by reference to the occurrence of a particular thought before the onset of one's visual experience. Given these exegetical difficulties, it is perhaps best to interpret §235 as a metaphorical recapitulation of the point made in §140 rather than as an explanation of §234.

The next remark (**§236**) is an isolated reminder of certain methodological principles that have been established earlier. It is perfectly possible that physiologists find a strict correlation between the perception of a certain aspect and a specific succession of eye movements. Moreover, this explanation might do justice to the conceptual or grammatical features of seeing-as: it might, for instance, account for the fact that the schematic cube (see §116) cannot be seen as two interlocking prisms. While a physiological explanation as such is innocuous and even illuminating, an excessively narrow focus on physiological observations risks rendering the psychologist oblivious of the distinction between empirical and conceptual problems. In fact, she might be under the impression that she has established that seeing-as is indeed a form of seeing, while all she has done is introduce 'a new, physiological, criterion for seeing'. It is clear that Wittgenstein takes this kind of confusion to permeate psychology: conceptual difficulties are left untouched or even aggravated by the gathering of empirical facts and positive theory building (cp. §371). The aim of philosophical psychology is to render these difficulties conspicuous by examining the relevant concepts (cp. §115).

§237 refers back to §210, where Wittgenstein examined the case of a beholder who suddenly noticed the specificity and expressivity of the look in the duck-rabbit's eye. He there already maintained that one uses the expression 'Sieh, wie er blickt!' only at a determinate moment, and that the relevant sensation or feeling ('Empfindung') is not constantly present while one looks at

or beholds ('betrachten') the drawing. The suggestion under scrutiny in the present remark is the idea that the lighting up of an aspect (e.g. one's sudden realisation that the look on the duck-rabbit's face expresses such-and-such an emotional state) is constitutively tied to a *specific* way of occupying oneself or engaging with the object seen, rather than to the whole process of beholding or looking at the drawing. Wittgenstein's suggestion at the end might be that the novelty and poignancy of the spotted aspect fade away quickly – the lighting up of an aspect is a more or less instantaneous phenomenon – while the observer's mode of engagement with the image does not change as abruptly. (Admittedly, the two questions at the end of the remark could also be substantial rather than purely rhetorical.)

XXI. (§§238-46) *The conceptual link between aspect seeing and the awareness of certain visual features*

After §235, **§238** provides a further metaphor for aspect perception: an aspect is akin to a physiognomy or 'face' emerging from the object seen, which lasts for a certain period but then gradually fades away. While the criterial response of the observer is at first lively – she might, for instance, try to imitate or mimic the 'physiognomy' that she spotted – her reactions become less and less vivid, to the point where she simply 'accepts' ('hinnehmen') the physiognomy without any surprise or bemusement. However, given the evidently metaphorical nature of this account, it is hardly illuminating. Moreover, given the analogy between a 'physiognomy' and an 'organisation' – both seem to be renderings of the same insight, namely the fact that aspect seeing often involves various groupings together of separate areas or objects in an image – the former explanation might be 'too much'. For it encourages the same reifications and misunderstandings that haunted the latter notion (see e.g. §134).

While offering an illustration of the main point made in §237, the phrase that Wittgenstein examines in **§239** is not perfectly idiomatic, for it suggests that 'bemerken' has a more or less specific temporal extension. (The verb 'bemerken' in German, just as its English equivalent 'to notice', does not denote a process extended in time. Though it might take some time to notice something, the noticing itself is instantaneous, as is evinced by the fact that 'to notice' does not have a continuous or progressive form. 'I kept noticing strange sounds' indicates perception of several separate sounds rather than the continuous noticing of a single structurally articulated succession of sounds.) Wittgenstein avers that the putative process of noticing can be brought to an end by two factors. On the one hand, the object or feature that one noticed might simply cease to exist: for instance, the similarity between the faces of a father and his son may become less perspicuous or even unnoticeable once the father changes his facial expression. On the other hand, a perceiver may cease to notice, say, a likeness between two faces once she has become completely accustomed to it, or when her attention moves to another object or feature in the visual field, etc. In this second case, the process of noticing is brought to an end by a change in the perceiver's attitude or way of engaging with what she sees.

In **§240**, Wittgenstein scrutinises various hypothetical answers to the question 'How long were you conscious or aware of a likeness that you noticed', arguably in order to show that the grammar of 'being aware of a likeness' is complex, in that it is susceptible to contextual alterations. Wittgenstein here still continues his examination of 'noticing', for the German phrases 'bemerken' and 'jemanden fällt etwas auf' are closely connected and virtually interchangeable, though the former expression might be taken to put more weight on the efforts of the perceiver to notice something ('being struck by something' has a stronger connotation of surprise and unexpectedness only partially conveyed by the latter expression). Being aware of (and, relatedly, noticing) a likeness between two things can be an almost instantaneous event, a process with genuine duration, or a

dispositional attitude. In the present remark, Wittgenstein does not seem to favour one of these options in particular.

§241 broadens the scope of the preceding remark by examining how long a perceiver can be said to be conscious or aware ('sich bewusst sein') of the three-dimensionality ('Raumhaftigkeit') and depth ('Tiefe') of an object, such as e.g. a cupboard. At the end of the first paragraph, Wittgenstein duly notices that this question creates deep puzzlement both in the first- and in the third-person case, since there is no precise criterial basis for attributing uninterrupted or continuous awareness of, say, spatial depth to an observer. This sets the present case(s) clearly apart from ordinary sensations such as pain. Wittgenstein suggests that the process of learning how to use terms such as 'three-dimensionality' and 'depth' does not prepare a speaker for answering questions of the type 'How long were you aware of the cupboard's depth?'. In the second paragraph, Wittgenstein insinuates that both the affirmative and the negative answer to the question 'rested on a false foundation' ('ruhten… auf falscher Grundlage'), that is, they were moves not licensed, though perhaps not explicitly prohibited either, by the language-game. The question only has a determinate sense in cases where a sort of aspect change could occur, that is, in situations where the perceiver could alternatively experience the object in question as flat or three-dimensional ('räumlich'), as is the case for the convex and concave step in §179. It is noteworthy though that this remark is littered with a battery of questions that are not obviously rhetorical, such that it might be explorative rather than doctrinal in nature. The link between aspect perception and an awareness or consciousness of visual features (with a precise temporal duration) might prove to be important; in any event, it is what connects this seemingly random examination of the notion 'sich bewusst sein' to the broader context.

The next remark (**§242**) continues the discussion concerning the awareness or consciousness of visual features: while §§239 and 240 examined the case of a visual likeness or similarity, and §241 focussed on three-dimensionality (and flatness), the debate now moves on to the case of colour. Wittgenstein rightly notes that there are cases in which looking at, say, a flower, is not sufficient for becoming or being aware of its colour. His main contention here is that such phenomena of 'inattentional blindness' do not form a homogeneous category, since the criteria for attributing them are varied. In some cases, the failure to tell the rose's colour goes hand in hand with not even noticing that there was a rose in front of one's eyes. In others, the perceiver might have been cognisant of the rose, but she just failed to pay due attention to its colour.

§243 provides a further warning against attempts to elucidate certain misleading and puzzling 'turns of phrase' ('Wendungen des Ausdrucks') in purely physiological terms (cp., for the case of 'Empfindung', §231). Wittgenstein does not explain why he thinks that the quoted sentence at the beginning of the remark – which hints at the fact that a perceiver can alternatively direct his attention to the shape or to the colour of an object in her visual field – is a potential source of confusion. (It might, though, suggest that one can only focus upon either the colour or the shape at a given moment, which is obviously incorrect.)

While remarks §§239 and 240 focussed on the notion of being aware of a likeness, **§244** passes on to an examination of the closely related concept of noticing or being struck by a similarity (cp. the opening of §240 for the interconnectedness of these notions; as has been noticed in the comment *ad loc.*, 'auffallen' is perhaps best rendered as 'to notice'). At the beginning of the last paragraph of the remark, Wittgenstein engages in a sort of (admittedly very limited) phenomenological investigation in order to unravel some of the first-person criteria or 'manifestations of noticing/being struck' ('Erscheinungen des Auffallens'). Wittgenstein claims that there are only

two introspectible 'manifestations' in this sense, namely (1) the person's awareness of and capacity to imitate the facial impression that indicated her being struck (or her noticing) and (2) certain exclamations or utterances that she made at that moment, either publicly or *in foro interno*. Wittgenstein's hostility to the introspective method is evident in this passage, since both these inward 'Erscheinungen des Auffallens' are constitutively tied to outward behaviour and could be easily externalised. It is also telling that he does not concede that being struck by something and, to a lesser degree, noticing something have a distinctive phenomenal quality.

§245 denies that noticing or being struck is a mere amalgam or conjunction of looking at a thing and thinking about it. It is unclear why this view should be deemed to be even *prima facie* plausible, since one can look at a thing, think about it and yet fail to find anything striking or noticeable about it. The idea that the concepts of looking, thinking, noticing, and being struck (among others) are interrelated and yet not reducible to one another might indicate that the notions in question are family-resemblance terms and, perhaps more plausibly, that they form a conceptual network.

§246 seems to highlight the fact that such conceptual connections and, negatively, disanalogies are illuminating, though the precise import of the remark is hard to fathom. *Pace* erroneous philosophical accounts of thinking, it is entirely unrelated to 'speaking in the imagination' ('in der Vorstellung sprechen'), as is evinced by the fact that the two notions are bound by strikingly different criteria.

XXII. (§§247-56) *More general characterisations of aspect perception*

§247 reiterates and stresses a point already made at the outset of the discussion on aspect seeing, namely that the perception of an aspect is not akin to the perception of shape or colour. The putative analogy between a visual impression's shape and colour, on the one hand, and its alleged 'organisation', on the other, is based upon and a further source of confusion (cp. §131). While seeing the shape and the colour of an object consists in discriminating specific features of said object, experiencing the lighting up of an object's aspect amounts to detecting (or establishing?) an internal relation between the thing in question and other, relevantly similar objects. The passage is somewhat puzzling because Wittgenstein seems to affirm *propria voce* that there is a correspondence or match ('entsprechen' can stand for both) between the colour and shape of a visual impression and the external object which it is deemed to represent.

§248 (and the following remark) further examine the relationship between interpreting ('Deuten') and seeing ('Sehen'), since it is tempting to think that aspect seeing is an amalgam of thinking and looking (cp. §245; the present remark contends that interpreting is a kind of thinking). Wittgenstein here argues that seeing different aspects is more akin to 'seeing something different' than to seeing the same thing but projecting different interpretations onto it, since seeing-as – just as seeing – is a state ('Zustand'), which implies *inter alia* that it has 'genuine duration', i.e. that it lasts for a precisely quantifiable amount of time. 'Interpreting', on the other hand, is a sort of thinking ('Denken') and acting or doing ('Handeln'), which suggests that it might be dispositional in nature, that it can be performed intermittently, and so on. This is the first passage which indicates *why* one might take seeing-as to constitutionally involve 'Deuten', and it gives substance to the gnomic claim in §245 that 'many of our concepts cross here'.

§249 gives a more substantive explanation as to why seeing-as is more akin to ordinary seeing than to interpreting. As the first two sentences affirm, interpreting consists in the formation of hypotheses that can be tested and, if indeed incorrect, falsified. On the other hand, the claim that one sees such-and-such cannot (and most crucially, does not need to) be verified by experimental

means, and the same holds for cases of seeing-as. The present remark is important because it clearly represents Wittgenstein's own views – he does not use any of his typical markers of distance and hesitation, e.g. quotation marks, conjunctives, 'one would like to say'-clauses, etc., and the 'nun' at the beginning indicates that some positive explanation is being provided. Nonetheless, the passage is still fairly unspecific. For does the fact that claims of the form 'I see that…' cannot be verified indicate that it is nonsensical to say e.g. 'It is true that I see that…' and that factivity markers such as 'I know that' can only be used emphatically rather than substantially? Or does it amount to the claim that seeing is *per se* veridical, such that there could be no non-veridical cases correctly described by means of the verb 'to see'? More importantly, Wittgenstein seems to run together two separate issues: while an interpretation consists of empirical hypotheses that can ideally be checked against reality, an agent's holding a specific interpretation – just as her having a particular colour sensation – is subject to first-person authority and does not stand in need of verification.

Both **§§250** and **251** contain succinct methodological reminders as to how seeing (and other psychological notions) are best investigated. First of all, philosophers of mind should not presuppose that they exactly know what 'seeing' means or amounts to in each and every individual case. Rather, they should be open to a careful survey of the use of the term, since the meaning of a word is disclosed by its use. §251 is a very striking aphorism which suggests that philosophical puzzlement about aspect seeing is the result of a lack of puzzlement about seeing more generally. The remark suggests that seeing is indeed enigmatic or puzzling ('rätselhaft') but offers no hints as to what this mysteriousness might consist in. Moreover, philosophers tend to be puzzled about seeing in general – they are bound to ask questions such as 'How can visual perception serve as a legitimate basis for knowledge claims about the world?'.

§252 suggests that even plane, two-dimensional representational vehicles such as e.g. photographs are not perceived as lacking three-dimensionality or 'spatial character' ('Räumlichkeit'). When looking at a photograph, the beholder willy-nilly and without conscious effort perceives the represented object as occupying three-dimensional space. Accordingly, it is difficult for her to describe what she sees as an arrangement of purely geometrical shapes, lines and dots on a flat surface. Nonetheless, the 'Räumlichkeit' attributed to or detected in conventional two-dimensional depictions is different from the one perceived in representations that aim to create a more realistic semblance of actual three-dimensionality (e.g. stereoscopes). **§253** offers a motivation for §252: its three-dimensional character is one of the puzzling aspects of seeing which generally pass unnoticed. Accordingly, §251 is best read as concerning the actual functioning of seeing rather than its epistemological role.

§254 further emphasises the conceptual connections between aspects and imagination ('Vorstellung', which in this context means 'an instance of imagining' rather than 'representation'). §217 already insisted that imagination ('Vorstellungskraft') is a precondition for perceiving certain aspects, e.g. those of the triangle in §162. The second paragraph of the present remark again stresses this point: the capacity to unravel certain features of, say, a musical theme presupposes imagination or 'Phantasie'. (While 'Vorstellungskraft' and 'Phantasie' are virtually interchangeable in most everyday contexts, 'Phantasie' puts a stronger emphasis on creativity.) But the first paragraph is arguably broader in scope: imagination is not just a precondition for certain cases of aspect perception, but there are deeper conceptual affinities between imagining and seeing-as, such that both share a number of conceptual features. The remark ends by noting that hearing a tune as a variation, though requiring imagination, amounts to a perception and is veridical or objective.

§255 points out that imagining certain changes in, say, a geometrical figure might enable one to produce (and, relatedly, to understand) certain mathematical proofs. In this respect, imagination plays an analogous role to aspect seeing, for the capacity to see certain spatial aspects shift might enable a beholder to easily grasp a geometrical demonstration (see §179).

In **§256**, Wittgenstein continues his examination of imagining ('Vorstellen') and stresses a respect in which aspect seeing is disanalogous to ordinary seeing (in contrast to §§248-9). In cases of seeing-as and imagining, it makes sense to ask, encourage, and order a subject to perform the relevant mental act. Relatedly, it is meaningful to ascribe to said subject an attempt to imagine something or to see a certain aspect. Given these conceptual features, both seeing-as and imagining are 'subject to the will' ('unterstehen dem Willen'), in contrast to common-and-garden seeing.

Part II: *Systematic interpretation of key themes* in PPF

Chapter 3 (II. 1): Aspect Perception, Thinking, and Seeing

The aim of the present chapter, which divides into three sections, is to elucidate Wittgenstein's concept of aspect perception from both an exegetical and a more substantial viewpoint. In doing so, the text provides a more systematic overview of some of the key points mentioned in the preceding paragraph-by-paragraph commentary. In the first section, I will discuss several general features of seeing-as that are worth keeping in mind, but that do not serve to distinguish it from other mental states and processes. Here it will also emerge that, in the light of the examples cited by Wittgenstein, aspect seeing cannot be a perfectly uniform concept. In the subsequent second section, the characteristics that link the concept (and the related phenomenon) to thinking will be examined, while the kinship between aspect perception and ordinary seeing will be scrutinised in section three. The upshot of the discussion in these two sections is that seeing-as is a *sui generis* phenomenon, not just because it displays its own distinguishing phenomenology, but also because the associated concept possesses features which set it apart from relatively closely connected concepts such as thinking and seeing.

1. Preliminaries about aspect perception

Before starting off into a more detailed examination of aspect perception, it is worth mentioning that the phenomenon in question, though peculiar and relatively rare, is not as unified as it seems at first glance. From what might be called a phenomenological point of view, experiences of aspect seeing belong to at least three different categories, which may be dubbed 'aspect dawning', 'aspect switch or change', and 'aspect transformation'. As will become evident in what follows, these three classes comprise instances that are highly varied as to their specifics, and they are fairly permeable, such that they allow for borderline cases.[61]

Firstly, there are cases in which something about a drawing or a piece of music (etc.) comes to strike the perceiving subject, and in which a novel, hitherto undiscovered aspect of the object of perception dawns upon her. This kind of experience is typically accompanied by exclamations of surprise and wonder and can be aptly characterised as an episode of 'aspect dawning'. For instance, someone might be unaware that the face-vase drawing devised by Edgar Rubin is an ambiguous or dual-aspect picture, and see it only as a white vase against a black background. All of a sudden, she comes to realise (i.e. visually experience) that there are two black faces in profile to be seen in the drawing: a hitherto unnoticed aspect has dawned upon her. Moreover, most of us are familiar with the experience of seeing a person in a crowd that oddly stands out, though we cannot recall where we have seen that face before. Suddenly, it dawns upon us that the strangely familiar person is, say, a colleague from our undergraduate days, and we are surprised to meet him in this specific

[61] see Ahmed (2017), p. 518, who maintains 'that "the lighting up of an aspect" is a family-resemblance concept'. I agree with his conclusion that there are no individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for counting as an episode of aspect perception, though I try to delineate in this section some fairly general characteristics that apply to (almost) all instances of the phenomenon.

place.[62] As a further example, consider some of the seemingly random jumbles of lines and blobs devised by psychologists (encompassing but not limited to Rorschach drawings). When looking at such a picture, one might be surprised to find the contours of, say, a dalmatian emerging, and this transforms the whole experience of the picture. Lastly, one might see the sequence of letters Москва and read it out in a way familiar from one's native language, which (let us suppose) uses a variant of the Latin alphabet. Then suddenly, one notices that it is the name of the Russian capital written in Cyrillic, and that it should be read accordingly.

Secondly, there are cases where the subject in question still experiences a characteristic shift in what she perceives, but is no longer surprised (though perhaps still puzzled) by the change of aspects, if only because she has become overly familiar with it. Jastrow's rabbit-duck drawing is a case in point: persistent readers of Wittgenstein still experience the shifting back and forth of the rabbit- and the duck-aspect, but they are hardly struck by it. The labels 'aspect switch' or 'aspect change' can be applied to this class of cases. Further examples include the so-called Necker cube, where a perceiver can alternatively see one and the same face as protruding or as receding, and the double cross. Moreover, it is possible to see a pattern of six (equidistant) marks alternatively as two triplets or three pairs of marks.[63] There are also instances of this phenomenon which only marginally involve perception. For instance, it is possible to read or understand a word with two or more different and unrelated meanings (e.g. 'till', 'bank') first with one meaning, then with another.

Thirdly, there are those cases in which the acquisition of new concepts or pieces of knowledge supposedly favours an alteration in the way in which the subject perceives a given object. A basic instance of this would be a logic student who becomes able to see, without much cognitive effort, that the formula '$\neg(p \wedge q)$' is (via De Morgan's laws) equivalent to '$\neg p \vee \neg q$'.[64] In a more complex scenario, learning what a fugue is enables someone to discover hitherto unnoticed layers of meaning in, say, Bach's compositions. Similarly, Kuhn contended that the adoption of a novel scientific theory enables the researcher to not just view the investigated bit of reality in a new light, but to literally see it differently. Since this last range of cases typically involves a thorough reassessment of the significance of what is perceived, the term 'aspect transformation' will be used to refer to them. Such cases appear to be intimately linked to instances of aspect dawning, although the *perceptibilia* in question, e.g. works of art and scientific theories, are much more complex.[65] In general, this category comprises some of the philosophically most interesting instances of aspect perception, which unfortunately do not lend themselves to any straightforward analysis, given their sheer complexity. In what follows, I will thus mainly focus on the first two categories, which are more readily assessable.

As a further preliminary, it is noteworthy that in locutions of the form 'to see *x* as *y*', the first variable is to be replaced with purely extensional notions, while the second governs an intensional context. In the case of someone looking at the duck-rabbit drawing and spotting the rabbit-aspect,

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[62] It is a moot point whether episodes of suddenly recognising a person or object are indeed cases of seeing-as or just instances of a closely related phenomenon. A notable difference is that recognition is factive, whereas aspect perception is indicative of facts in a more restricted sense, as will be elaborated below. When someone recognises a person in a crowd as her friend, that person must in fact be her friend, or otherwise the use of the verb 'to recognise' would be inappropriate. When she merely claims to see the person in the crowd as her friend, it might still turn out that he is a complete stranger (e.g. when the perceiver was mistaken or engaged in whimsical make-believe).

[63] see ibid., p. 517.

[64] see ibid. for a structurally similar example.

[65] For a thorough and illuminating discussion of what I have labelled 'aspect dawning' and 'aspect transformation', see Child (2018), *passim*.

the following three descriptions are interchangeable and equally correct, independently of what the perceiver in question actually knows about the duck-rabbit drawing:

(1) She sees the duck-rabbit as a rabbit.

(2) She sees Jastrow's drawing as a rabbit.

(3) She sees the drawing first published in an obscure satirical magazine as a rabbit.

This indicates that what is seen-as (the object which is deemed to display a given aspect) can be indicated, defined ostensively, etc., and need not be given under a specific description. The same does not hold for the second variable: here the way in which a perceiver is inclined to describe what she is seeing determines whether a characterisation of her experience is correct or not. To illustrate this point, consider the case of someone vividly realising that the three sides of an equilateral triangle are of equal length. In these circumstances, the following claim is true:

(4) She sees the figure as an equilateral triangle.

However, in cases where the subject does not possess the (admittedly highly specific) concept of equiangularity or where she simply fails to direct her attention to the angles (rather than the sides) of the triangle, the subsequent description of her experience would be inadequate, in spite of the fact that 'equilateral triangle' and 'equiangular triangle' are coextensive notions:

*(5) She sees the figure as an equiangular triangle.

From this it follows that the description of the aspect seen is more fine-grained or granular than the characterisation of the object that displays the aspect, where any of a range of nearly synonymous expressions will be appropriate. In this sense, seeing-as appears to be a striking amalgam of objectual and propositional seeing. Similar to cases of seeing things (rather than seeing that things are such and such), aspect perception is directed at an object in our environment (or a feature thereof) which it pinpoints extensionally. And analogously to seeing-that, which is typically reckoned to be intensionally sensitive, the second variable does not allow for a *salva veritate* replacement from a range of coextensive or nearly synonymous expressions.[66]

At this point, it is expedient to introduce a further distinction familiar from the philosophy of perception, namely that between the material and the intentional object of perceptual states. In the case of aspect dawning, the perceiving subject could experience a new, hitherto unnoticed feature of her (visual, auditory, etc.) impression. Alternatively, she could be taken to unravel an aspect of the concrete, 'physical' object that the particular act of perceiving is directed at, which is the interpretation adopted here. In the case of seeing, the material object of perception is typically a thing or a feature thereof that is demonstrable, i.e. that can be pointed to. In the case of hearing, the nature of the material object is harder to pin down: while it is intimately linked to what impinges upon the eardrums of the hearer, e.g. pressure waves caused by vibrations in the air, it arguably presupposes some amount of feature integration.[67] With regards to the intentional object of

[66] In the case of seeing, though not in that of other intentional mental states, there is thus an exact match between the perceptual state's being objectual and its being extensional, on the one hand, and its being 'thatish' and its being intensional, on the other. While objectuality thus amounts to extensionality in the case of visual perception, the same does not hold for e.g. recognition. The locution 'to recognise *x*' is objectual but governs an intensional context.

[67] The case of visual perception is not altogether different, for seeing a drawing *qua* material object of an episode of aspect perception already amounts to seeing a meaningful whole rather than, say, a mere jumble of lines. The difficulty becomes just more prominent because the material object of hearing is not a demonstrable.

hearing, there are at least two salient options.[68] Firstly, it could be the source of a sound, such that someone who auditorily experiences the roaring of an engine thereby hears a car (without the mediation of any further perceptual and cognitive states). Secondly, what one hears might be sounds *qua* transient and ephemeral denizens of the world that are nonetheless imbued with a specific meaning.[69] In what follows, I will sometimes use locutions such as 'the content of a perceptual experience', 'what is (visually, auditorily, etc.) experienced', and 'the *representandum*' to refer to the intentional object, while I variously characterise the material object as 'the medium', 'the representational vehicle', or 'the *representans*'.[70]

With this crucial distinction in place, the alleged paradox of aspect perception can be defused. It is indeed true that some of the locutions used to express episodes of aspect dawning and shifting smack of paradox[71], and such experiences are indeed striking and slightly puzzling. In fact, what is seen in, say, a drawing (*qua* intentional object) can change while the object which the perceiver's attention is directed at (the drawing itself *qua* material object) remains unchanged. But this is no more paradoxical than the fact that a person's outlook or perspective on a situation can change even in the absence of any alteration in the situation itself. It just serves to show that the character of an episode of aspect perception, while being sustained by and based upon what serves as its material stimulus, is not in all respects determined by it. What is (perhaps) paradoxical is the fact that human beings possess such a Janus-faced perceptual capacity, which unites properties of ordinary seeing, namely a distinctive sensuous nature, with those of certain cognitive mental operations. With this further distinction in place, one peculiarity of aspect perception is now more readily explicable. The fact that the first variable *x* in the locution 'to see *x* as *y*' governs an extensional context is due to the circumstance that the variable's domain features only material objects of perception, whereas the second variable *y* opens up an intensional context because it ranges over a set that exclusively comprises intentional objects of perception.

The material objects which display visual aspects or can be seen-as can be grouped into three categories. First of all, some such objects are either representational, such as drawings and written words, or else governed by elaborate conventions, as is the case for e.g. gestures. Secondly, there is a class which comprises those objects that are naturally expressive, such as faces and postures. Lastly, there are objects which are not deemed to be representational or expressive, and which yet can be seen (in special circumstances) as something, such as clouds, rock formations, cereal flakes, or the headlamps and radiator grilles of certain cars.[72] Episodes of aspect perception which are sustained by objects from this latter category are called 'pareidolia' by psychologists, and they are

[68] Depending on the context, the sense of hearing might be attuned to different intentional objects. When actively engaging or interacting with the outside world, it is often crucial to perceive the source from which a sound is emanating; compare Nudds (2009). But when listening to music, hearing the qualities of the sounds themselves is arguably the more fundamental perceptual capacity; compare Scruton (2009).

[69] Cases in which we hear pure noises or mere sequences of sound that remain unidentified and do not yet possess any meaning are comparatively rare. Typically, one auditorily perceives words, sentences, melodies, and so on. (Even the perception of phonemes and chords presupposes a structuration of what impinges on the senses.)

[70] These are meant to be mere stylistic variants, and I do not want to import or sneak in any substantive philosophical doctrines or subtle distinctions.

[71] see e.g. PPF §113: 'I *see* that [the face] has not changed; and yet I see it differently.'

[72] The last example may be a contested case, because headlamps and radiator grilles have been consciously designed, such that it is in some cases intentional that the front of a car wears, say, a menacing, fierce facial expression (and in this sense, it is to be seen as such if one wants to appreciate the design features of the car).

not the focus of Wittgenstein's interest, perhaps because they seem to be strongly projective in nature.[73]

It is a crucial feature of most episodes of aspect perception that in them aspects can be experienced to shift or change.[74] Moreover, the currently perceived aspect is experienced as being incompatible with the previously noticed aspect that it replaces. In situations where there is no contextually salient contrast class (i.e. in most cases of seeing readily identifiable everyday objects), there is no room even for potential incompatibilities, such that it is illicit to qualify them as instances of aspect perception. However, it is important to correctly locate the relevant incompatibility in order to prevent certain misgivings. For even in the basic case of the rabbit-duck drawing, it is evident that the spectator perceives several aspects at the same time, in that she sees the elongated shape as, say, the rabbit's ears, the dot as the rabbit's eye, and so on. Even more so, in the case of works of art, a spectator or auditor needs to simultaneously pay attention to various aspects if she is to fully appreciate the work in question. As such, a global or general aspect (e.g. the rabbit vs. the duck) is sustained by or based upon a number of more finely grained 'local' aspects (e.g. the neck of a rabbit vs. the neck of a duck). With regards to one specific area of an image or one precise section of a musical composition *qua* determinable, one can only perceive one single aspect at a time. In the case of simple ambiguous drawings, the same sort of incompatibility obtains with respect to the global aspect, but it is debatable whether this also holds for sophisticated works of art.[75]

On a related note, it is worth keeping in mind that a range of intentional mental states can be directed at aspects, such that it is perfectly possible to be aware or cognisant of two mutually incompatible aspects. This is, for instance, the case for most observers already familiar with Jastrow's drawing: they are aware that the aspect which they are currently seeing is not the only one that there is to be seen, and they know what the other aspect looks like. In this specific case, this sort of knowledge is underpinned by previous experience(s) of the alternative aspect. However, it is possible to merely know (in the abstract) that a given aspect is incorporated in an image. Again, this is more evident in cases where the object of perception is complex and multi-layered, as is the case for many works of art. For instance, a listener may know that a given composition is a passacaglia, and she may even be capable to discriminate experientially some fairly superficial characteristics which make it a composition of this type, without being able to actually hear it as a passacaglia.[76]

As regards the manifestation of episodes of aspect perception, it is crucial for Wittgenstein that the verbal as well as the non-verbal behaviour of a person discloses whether she is indeed seeing

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[73] They are nonetheless subject to explanatory reasons. For instance, when I claim to have spotted Abraham Lincoln in a cloud, my interlocutor has a right to be told where I locate the beard, the characteristic hat, and so on. In short, I can (and typically will) be asked to make my statement intelligible.

[74] As mentioned above, in some cases of aspect dawning, the aspect that is perceived emerges, as it were, out of nothing (without replacing any previously perceived aspect) and thereby imbues a hitherto meaningless jumble of lines or succession of sounds with a distinctive significance. While such episodes still feature the experience of a shift, the logical cases mentioned as basic instances of 'aspect transformation' (e.g. coming to realise that '$\neg(p \wedge q)$' is equivalent to '$\neg p \vee \neg q$') typically fail to display an experiential dimension.

[75] I will discuss this matter in more detail in the first chapter of part III, where I investigate applications of Wittgenstein's insights concerning aspect perception to the philosophy of art.

[76] In some places Wittgenstein even hints at a finer distinction between merely knowing, actually and vividly experiencing, and being conversant with an aspect. In the aesthetics of music, it is a widely accepted view that experiencing e.g. certain structural features of music is a necessary condition for appreciating or understanding a composition; compare e.g. Budd (2008), p. 124, who contends that some 'concepts must inform someone's experience of a musical work' if she is to understand it. The relevant concepts are not grafted onto the experience *ex post hoc*, but directly transform it.

an object under a particular aspect. As such, an agent who in fact perceives the rabbit aspect would be inclined to point to drawings and photographs of rabbits when asked what she is seeing (she might in such a case even indicate a real rabbit, even though what she is seeing is only a depicted rabbit). Moreover, such treating the object seen under an aspect in an unprecedented fashion usually goes hand in hand with certain characteristic reports of what one is seeing, which Wittgenstein frequently calls 'avowals'. Such avowals are not descriptive in nature, that is, they do not serve as descriptions of either the mental state which an agent is in or the condition of the world represented by such a state. Rather, they are primarily expressive in nature, in that they are accompaniments or even replacements of characteristic bodily behaviour (and this is also why we tend to take an explicit avowal as a strong indication for a person's seeing an object under an aspect). It is, however, worth noticing that avowals are not *per se* exclusively expressive, in that some of them, namely those which take the form of affirmations rather than exclamations, are truth-apt and stand in inferential relationships.[77]

This last point is closely connected to Wittgenstein's contention that there are, at least in the long run, criteria which reveal whether an aspect has indeed dawned upon a person. While a person who is unable to experience the sudden dawning of a hitherto unnoticed aspect might in principle treat the object seen in exactly the same way as a person upon whom the aspect has indeed dawned, certain traits of her behaviour will eventually betray that she does not see the object under the aspect in question. For instance, a person who seemingly appreciates a schematic drawing as of a cube might also (under adequate experimental circumstances) treat the same drawing as a two-dimensional representation of three parallelograms.

In addition to this, aspects are objective in at least the sense that two beholders may perceive the same aspect; that is, they are objective inasmuch as they are intersubjective. This amounts to a negation of the contention that aspects might be subject to privacy of ownership, and thus to a refusal of the claim that the perception of an aspect is largely dependent upon the idiosyncratic mental make-up and/or the bodily constitution of some particular observer. In principle, it is of course possible to maintain that the fairly high level of intersubjective agreement concerning aspects is either purely coincidental or based upon, say, widespread associations, which are merely grafted upon what is seen and do not have a *fundamentum in re*. However, this view is arguably no more plausible than the analogous claim that colours are purely subjective qualities. In this context, it is also noteworthy that speakers tend to characterise aspects as something relatively robust and enduring: for instance, when I am looking at the duck-rabbit drawing but unable to see it under the rabbit aspect, somebody might give me a hint and point out that there is a rabbit aspect to be spotted. As such, we are also inclined to think that it is not a brute fact that we happen to see the same aspect(s) when looking at e.g. the duck-rabbit picture; rather, we assume that some sort of explanation (possibly causal in nature) must be available. Inasmuch as ontological matters are concerned, it is licit to assume that aspects supervene upon material properties of, say, the drawings in which they are realised, given that an aspect *qua* enduring *perceptibilium* only changes if the corresponding material object (e.g. the configuration of lines on paper) is altered. While two materially different objects may display the same aspect, two objects which are qualitatively identical cannot instantiate different aspects.

From a taxonomical point of view, it is striking that 'types of aspect perception differ according to the *degree of thinking* involved'[78]. There are instances in which concepts play a pivotal role (e.g.

[77] see Glock (1996), p. 53.
[78] ibid., p. 38.

that of the rabbit-duck drawing, and most evidently that of 'the aspects of the triangle' in PPF §162), but there are also cases which are mainly optical (e.g. the double cross in PPF §212), although certain concepts, namely those of background and foreground, are operative in them, too. Even if one holds that thinking or a knowledge of categories are involved in cases which are alleged to be events of pure or deictic seeing[79], it may still be insisted that these are differentiated from episodes of aspect perception according to the degree of thinking or the amount of intellectual resources involved.[80] Likewise, experiences of aspect dawning and change can be classified tentatively depending on whether they involve an extensive deployment of conceptual abilities or not. Relatedly, some such experiences presuppose a fair amount of stage setting and contextualisation, whereas some aspects such as those of the double cross can be spotted even in the absence of contextual cues. Those perceptual experiences which were bundled together under the heading 'aspect transformation' (including cases favoured by Kuhnian paradigm shifts) typically demand elaborate and protracted explanations in order to render certain previously inaccessible or hidden features of an object salient, prominent, or even perceptible in the first place. Also, these episodes of aspect perception require extensive cognitive efforts on the part of the perceiver.

Furthermore, it is arguable that a taxonomy of the experiences of seeing-as may be established by recurring upon the notion of (relative) incorrigibility and first-person authority. Accordingly, there are cases in which a perceiver's claim that he has spotted a determinate aspect is easily corrected, while in other cases the agent cannot literally be in error. For instance, when someone looks at the double cross and claims to have spotted an aspect other than the black or the white cross, listeners are likely to assume that she must be mistaken.[81] In contrast to this, there are cases in which we try very hard to see the aspect(s) which someone is seeing, although we are inclined to think that she may be mistaken. A paradigmatic instance of this phenomenon might be the case where someone claims that two apparently dissimilar faces look similar in some sense. In such a case, one might claim that the perceiver of the aspect has a somewhat wild imagination, while nonetheless conceding that she is indeed seeing the faces under that determinate aspect, and the same point holds *mutatis mutandis* in the case of pictorial representations. In general, aspects which require a considerable amount of contextualisation are likely to give rise to experiences subject to strong first-person authority, under the proviso that the perceiver in question is capable of making his claim to have spotted a certain aspect intelligible.[82]

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[79] Perhaps unjustly, Kant is often regarded as a classical proponent of such a theory, which bears close affinities to (state) conceptualism about perceptual content. (Notice that the 'given' in Kant, that is, unconceptualised intuitions, do not amount to genuine experience.) As an interpretation of Wittgenstein, such an account has been advocated by O'Shaughnessy; see O'Shaughnessy (2012), *passim*.

[80] These issues will be discussed in more detail in the second chapter of Part III.

[81] Several difficulties crop up when trying to enumerate the precise number of aspects under which a particular object may be seen, unless one gives up the notion of 'continuous aspect perception'. If the instantaneous, abrupt shift between two aspects (characteristic of our experience of e.g. the duck-rabbit drawing) is not taken to be a constitutive mark of aspect seeing (and if 'continuous aspect perception' is a genuine instance of aspect seeing, such a shift cannot be definitive of experiences of aspect perception), then it is unclear how many aspects there are to be spotted in, say, the double-cross drawing. As such, it is unclear whether, for example, 'seeing that the double cross is octagonal' is an instance of aspect seeing. In this context, Baker advocates the extreme view that the number of aspects that can be spotted in a given picture is open-ended; see Baker (2004), p. 282. I will waive this issue and stipulate that cases of 'continuous aspect perception' are only peripheral instances or delimiting cases of aspect seeing.

[82] Baker contends that an aspect can only be made intelligible to an observer if it has already dawned upon her; see ibid. While this assumption is perhaps plausible in the case of the more basic cases of seeing-as discussed at greatest length by Wittgenstein, it arguably fails to apply to instances of what I have dubbed 'aspect transformation', which extensively draw upon previously acquired knowledge, theoretical understanding, and so on.

In this context, it is also expedient to discuss whether or in what sense aspect perception is part of the realm of reasons. Firstly, in those cases in which a perceiver can willingly make an aspect dawn or change, she can typically provide a motivating reason, which indicates what drove or impelled her to a given mental act.[83] In typical cases, the motivating reasons for an episode of aspect perception rely on previously obtained information. For example, the consideration that the elongated shape may represent the ears of a rabbit (to which some other perceiver might have alerted me) weighs with me when I (try to) see the rabbit-duck drawing as the depiction of a rabbit. Secondly, normative reasons indicate why a given change of aspects ought to be brought about, and this sort of reason is especially salient when it comes to instances of 'aspect transformation'. In order to appreciate the full depth and the expressive significance of, say, a fugue by Bach, one should or ought to fully employ one's musicological knowledge in listening to the piece.[84] Lastly and perhaps most importantly, someone who claims to have experienced the dawning of an aspect (or an aspect switch) is in a position to explain or make intelligible what she has perceived, that is, she can provide an explanatory reason for the corresponding mental occurrence. For example, someone who has seen the rabbit-duck as a rabbit can provide a story as to what the elongated shape on the left represents, tell what the dot's significance is, and so on. In doing so, she enables observers to understand what experience it was that she underwent.

Having delineated several distinctive and arguably necessary characteristics of aspect perception, it is now time to examine what the exact scope of the phenomenon is. A cursory look at the examples described above indicates that aspect perception does not only occur when looking at cleverly constructed ambiguous drawings. Rather, Wittgenstein thinks that this sort of perception plays a pivotal role in noticing likenesses between fairly ordinary objects, such as e.g. faces. Moreover, it is arguable that the appreciation of works of art is also partially founded upon the capacity to see and hear aspects. Lastly, in some cases aspect perception seems to involve the operationalisation of otherwise abstract knowledge, as is the case when someone auditorily experiences a given composition as, say, a passacaglia and thereby becomes able to follow along the compositional structure as it is unfolding.

In the light of the admittedly broad scope of aspect perception, one might feel tempted to assume that it is a pervasive phenomenon. Although this claim is untenable from an exegetical point of view[85], it assumes a key role in two largely independent and equally interesting arguments. Here I will just briefly sketch the logical structure of these arguments; given that they are not directly relevant to the primarily exegetical points discussed presently, a detailed discussion will be postponed to later parts of the thesis, namely the first and the third chapter of part III. An obvious but rarely noted shortcoming of the view that seeing-as is ubiquitous is that it deprives us of a concept that is useful in characterising certain seemingly extraordinary visual experiences, namely

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[83] It is perhaps *prima facie* strange that mental acts (in addition to bodily actions) can be subject to motivating reasons or, for that matter, any other type of reason. But it is evident that there are considerations which weigh with a subject and lead her to engage in certain mental activities and acts. In general, a mental act can be subject to reasons if it is under the agent's control and can be manipulated more or less deliberately, that is, if it is 'subject to the will' (in Wittgenstein's terminology, compare RPP II §544).

[84] The 'ought' in question (and the corresponding normative reason) is evidently instrumental in nature, such that it is only binding for listeners who are already interested in Bach's compositions. There is no unrestricted or categorical obligation to (try to) unravel the various auditory aspects of such a work, or at least a substantial argument would be needed to establish the opposite.

[85] Wittgenstein indicates that seeing-as is not ubiquitous in PPF §§122-4: in cases where a putative aspect cannot change under ordinary circumstances, such as that of perceiving a fork, it is illicit to speak of aspect perception or seeing-as. For a dissenting voice and a sustained defence of the ubiquity thesis on exegetical grounds, see Mulhall (2001). I will discuss Mulhall's views at greater length in the third and last chapter of the present part of the thesis.

episodes of aspect dawning and shifting. If the ubiquity thesis were correct, such episodes would not be substantially different from common-and-garden visual experiences, despite initial appearances to the contrary.

The first argument, which underlies Richard Wollheim's discussion of seeing-as in the second edition of *Art and its Objects*, aims to establish that seeing-as is ubiquitous, and that seeing *simpliciter* is thus to be equated to it. The argument displays the following structure:

(P1) Episodes of seeing *per se* feature concepts.
(*auxiliary consideration*) What is seen is *ab initio* imbued with meaning, in that perceivers are cognisant of *Gestalt* shapes and patterns; such *Gestalt* perception is based upon the conceptualisation of what impinges on our senses.
(P2) This conceptualisation of ordinary visual perception can only be brought about by seeing-as.
(C) Seeing-as is involved in all episodes of ordinary seeing.

The auxiliary consideration is meant to make (P1), itself a substantive assumption, more plausible.

A second, more frequently discussed argument can be extracted from the writings of John McDowell (and other members of the Pittsburgh school). Here, the contention that seeing-as is ubiquitous is taken as a premise which serves to establish that seeing *generaliter* is conceptual:

(P1') All seeing is seeing-as.
(*dismissal of the 'myth of the given'*) There is no such things as a pure, unadulterated perceptual 'given'.
(P2') Seeing-as is a sufficient condition for conceptualisation.
(C') Seeing *per se* involves the subsumption of what is seen under concepts.

As might be reckoned from the fact that different cases of aspect perception may be preliminarily classified according to the degree of thinking which they involve, the seeing of aspects is arguably a phenomenon which lies midway between common visual perception on the one hand and thinking, interpreting, imagining, and other cognitive operations on the other. In the following paragraphs, I will analyse what assimilates aspect perception to interpreting and seeing, respectively.[86] As has already emerged in the previous passage and as will become more conspicuous in what follows, it is hard to give an uncontroversial and yet informative characterisation of the features deemed to be definitive of aspect seeing, just as it is difficult to characterise with any precision the nature of at least some other psychological states.[87]

2. In what sense is aspect seeing akin to thinking?

In the present and the following section, I will try to delineate in what sense 'the concept of seeing an aspect lies between that of seeing […] and that of interpreting […]'[88]. The idea is that seeing-as occupies a central position on a continuum that has ordinary seeing and interpreting as its respective end points. More broadly speaking, Wittgenstein's guiding idea seems to be that seeing-as has both a sensuous and an intellectual dimension. Depending on the details of the case he variously uses the terms 'Deuten' (PPF §§116, 117, 249), 'Denken' (PPF §§139, 140, 144, 163, 245),

[86] In what follows, I will elaborate some points which have been delineated by Hans-Johann Glock in his entry on aspect perception in the *Wittgenstein Dictionary*; see Glock (1996), p. 36.
[87] see Hacker (1996), p. 433 f., who intimates that this was perhaps the prime reason why Wittgenstein's attempts at systematically classifying psychological phenomena (in RPP I §836 and RPP II §§63, 148) were abortive.
[88] Glock (1996), p. 38.

'Vorstellung' (PPF §211, 254), 'Vorstellungskraft' (PPF §217), 'vorstellen' (PPF §§234, 256), and 'Phantasie' (§254) to characterise facets of the latter. It is important to keep in mind that he did not strive to provide a reductive analysis, but rather tackled an elucidatory or clarificatory task. Accordingly, he rejects the suggestion that noticing an aspect is a mere combination of looking and thinking (see PPF §245). Rather, there is a spectrum of cases in which seeing and thinking are not only involved to different degrees, but in different ways.

Aspect perception unites conceptual features of ordinary seeing and certain psychological or (more strictly speaking) intellectual capacities, i.e. 'thinking', 'interpreting', and 'imagining'. The thinking in question is not abstract rumination or thinking *ad libitum*, which encompasses a series of potentially unrelated thoughts crossing the agent's mind, but thinking directed at or about what is seen. As such, it may require the deployment of various 'Vorstellungen' ('representations' or 'ideas'), which include but are not limited to mental images, and which range from fairly sober suggestions to somewhat fanciful and whimsical insinuations. In general terms, the aim of this activity of thinking can be described as a 'Deutung'. Such an interpretation or 'reading' enables the perceiver to classify, understand, or appreciate what she sees, but given that it does not draw on any conclusive evidence, it is necessarily 'hypothetical' (cp. PPF §249) or tentative in nature.[89] In what follows, I will use the terms 'interpreting' and 'interpretation' to denote operations of thinking which are directed at specific objects and serve to unravel their meaning or significance.[90] Aspect perception is more like interpretation in this broad sense in at least three respects, which I will discuss in turn.

First of all, the object whose aspect is perceived to have changed is known to have remained unaltered (cp. PPF §113, RPP I §27a). In this sense, it is similar to an *interpretandum*, which does not vary in dependence of the manifold readings proposed of it. In the case of interpreting e.g. a work of art (but also, though arguably in a somewhat restricted fashion, when interpreting single linguistic utterances), an interpreter may proffer two starkly different or even incompatible readings of, say, a novel without thereby falling prey to inconsistency (as long as she remains aware of the fact that she is indeed proposing two distinct readings). Accordingly, it is uncontroversial that there are different routes of access to one single, unchanging *interpretandum*.[91] However, this arguably does not hold in the case of seeing. For one thing, saying that one has had two different 'visions' of the same material object is all but unintelligible in everyday language. Similarly, when standing in front of e.g. the Radcliffe Camera, one does not give two wildly different or incompatible answers to the question what one is seeing, unless the circumstances (say, the meteorological conditions) or one's state of mind have radically changed in the meantime.

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[89] In *Philosophy of Psychology – A Fragment*, Wittgenstein thus uses the terms 'Deutung' and 'Deuten' with their ordinary meaning, and not in the technically restricted sense in which they assume a pivotal role in the rule-following considerations. There, giving a 'Deutung' amounted to providing a replacement or reformulation of one rule by another. Accordingly, Tilghman's claim (with explicit reference to PPF §249) that '[t]o interpret is to form an hypothesis' is prone to lead to misunderstandings, though he concedes that such a hypothesis may involve 'a series of hypotheses'; see Tilghman (1984), p. 134.

[90] This move is motivated by the fact that the concept of thinking is 'widely ramified' and its use 'tangled [or confused]' ('verworren'), as Wittgenstein duly notices (Z §§110, 113); compare Glock (1996), p. 359. Interpreting as defined above is closely related to thinking of or about something, and in certain cases it involves thinking, believing, or opining that, but it is different from thinking something up (as an act of the imagination unrestricted by any factual constraints).

[91] This is not to suggest that it is perfectly clear what exactly an *interpretandum* is. In the case of works of art, it is notoriously difficult to specify the precise ontological status of the *interpretandum* in question, if only because novels, plays, and pieces of music *qua* abstract entities have different realisations or tokenings. With regards to *visibilia* that can be seen under an aspect, ontological questions of this sort are not as pressing: objects of vision are typically occupants of space that can be pointed to.

As such, the diversity of the descriptions which one uses to convey what one is seeing is readily explained. For on the one hand, some cases in which one offers importantly different descriptions of the same object of vision (e.g. those situations in which one advances disparate aesthetic evaluations of it) arguably occur in situations during which the state of mind of the describer is impregnated by a distinctive feeling or mood. For instance, minutes before handing in an assignment, I may describe the Examination Schools as the most dreadfully unoriginal building in the whole of Oxford, while praising it on other, less stressful occasions as a perfect exemplar of Victorian gothic architecture.[92] On the other hand, some cases in which one makes diverging statements as to what one is seeing are simply due to a change in external circumstances. For example, the description of what one sees from a vantage point may be radically different according to whether it was offered in the early morning (when the whole town was still shrouded in fog) or at noon (when the sky had cleared, so that one could enjoy the panorama). In the two preceding cases, the passage of time seems to be the crucial factor which allows me to proffer diverse descriptions as to what I am seeing without being prone to inconsistency. In contrast, when interpreting e.g. a sibylline utterance, one may know full well that the two readings which one offers are incompatible and yet propose them at the same time, as long as one does not completely endorse either of them. Aspect perception seems to be an intermediary case: at any given moment in time, the perceiver has to adopt a single 'interpretation', but she is licensed to change her judgement swiftly, namely as soon as she experiences a shift of aspects.

Secondly, aspect perception differs from ordinary perception and is again more akin to interpreting in that it may be (at least under certain circumstances) 'subject to the will' (RPP II §544, cp. LW §451a). At first glance, this affirmation seems to be rather contentious. On the one hand, it seems to overemphasise the role of volition in experiences of aspect dawning: after all, a given aspect may force itself upon me (I might, for example, be taking a casual glance at the duck-rabbit drawing without the slightest intention of spotting the rabbit aspect), and it is conceivable that an aspect dawns upon me while I am coerced to keep looking at a drawing (cp. LW §612a). Accordingly, subjection to the will is not a defining characteristic or necessary condition of aspect perception, although such perception is in some instances subject to the agent's deliberate control. On the other hand, certain cases of ordinary vision are also in a sense subject to the will. For instance, if one is a passionate bird watcher, one can form the intention to see a kingfisher and take several steps which increase the likelihood of encountering this kind of bird. In the case in which one finally succeeds in spotting a kingfisher, one's doing so would perhaps count as a deliberate or voluntary action (analogous to the case in which one tries, for instance, to see the duck-rabbit drawing under the duck aspect).[93] Nonetheless, efforts to increase the likelihood of seeing something and, more generally, looking out for a specific thing may perhaps be necessary conditions for a visual act to count as voluntary, but they are not sufficient. Regarding the aforementioned scenario, what is subject to the will is intimately connected to physical acts concerning *inter alia* the placement of one's body in the environment and the adoption of a particular vantage point, and no matter how meticulous one's preparations are, one can never force a kingfisher to enter one's field of vision. In contrast, our ability to manipulate or influence our perception of aspects is stronger. If the beholder knows that the object which she is currently looking at may be seen under more than one aspect, and if she further has some information about

[92] The complexity of the concepts employed here already serves to show that cases in which we see the same object in a completely different light are comparatively rare occurrences.

[93] Even in this case, it is arguable that what counts as voluntary is the perceiver's *spotting* the bird rather than her seeing it. Also, both spotting and seeing are perceptual activities which an agent cannot simply decide to engage in, in contrast to e.g. scanning, perusing, and watching out.

the aspect which she has hitherto been unable to detect (for instance, if she knows that what served as the duck's bill may as well serve as the ears of a rabbit), she is almost in a position to make the rabbit aspect dawn upon her. The relevant difference appears to be not merely one of degree, but one of quality: cases in which an agent, as it were, makes an aspect dawn upon her constitutively involve certain (mainly) cognitive efforts, whereas what is subject to the will in cases of ordinary perception necessarily involves certain changes in one's bodily position. Relatedly, in cases where one strives to spot a particular aspect, what one intends to see is in a sense already in front of one's eyes.

Also, it is noteworthy that in most cases of seeing (that is, in those cases which do not involve our explicit efforts to spot some determinate thing), what is placed in front of us impinges upon our senses without the mediation of our will. As such, it is arguably nonsensical to speak about my wanting or trying to see an object which is placed directly in front of me (under the condition that I have unimpaired vision), given that I will perceive it willy-nilly if my eyes are open, and if my ability to see is sufficiently reliable (e.g. if I have not been placed into extraordinarily foggy surroundings). In the case of aspect seeing, on the other hand, it makes sense to encourage or ask someone to see (or at least try to see) a certain aspect (see RPP II §545), provided that one has given her a sufficiently clear characterisation of what the aspect in question looks like.

Thirdly and lastly, seeing an object under an aspect is akin to thinking in that it instates or gives rise to (internal) relations of similarity and dissimilarity between the object thus seen and other objects. While it is conceivable that, for instance, different depictions or images of rabbits come into the mind of the perceiver when she is seeing the rabbit aspect of the duck-rabbit drawing, the establishment of the aforementioned internal relation(s) does not simply consist in the realisation of this type of psychological association. Rather, in contrast to certain forms of purely deictic or *de re* objectual seeing, where the perceiver can in some cases simply point to what she is seeing without thereby effecting a categorisation ('What I see is →*this*'), the very use of the locution 'to see *x* as *y*' indicates that classification of some kind has taken place[94], and that the object in question is seen as similar or akin to objects of a specific type.

3. In what sense is aspect seeing akin to visual perception?

While the factors which approximate aspect perception to thinking or interpreting have been discussed in the previous section, I will now analyse what links such perception to more ordinary kinds of (mainly visual) perception. By doing this, it will become clear that aspect seeing indeed occupies a *sui generis* position between thinking and seeing, and is not reducible to any of these phenomena.

In the first place, it is worth noting that aspect perception is a state (cp. RPP I §1025), in contrast to thinking, which is usually reckoned to be a process. As such, it is possible to determine with relative precision the moment in which an aspect dawns upon one (cp. RPP II §388), and an agent can say with accuracy when his perception shifts from one aspect to another. It is thus broadly similar to ordinary perception, where we can say (again, with relative precision) when an object

[94] It is likely that the classification in question has been effected by means of concepts or of other less demanding (i.e. language-independent) classificatory devices. It is a moot point whether, in the case of mainly 'optical' dual-aspect figures such as the double cross, such classification can take place without the operation of concepts.

enters our visual field and when it disappears from our view.[95] A consequence of this fact is that an episode of aspect perception has a duration which may be measured more or less accurately. Moreover, in the case of interpretation or thinking, it is nearly impossible to determine the precise moment at which a given thought entered our mind; similarly, the transition from one thought to the next is typically rather gradual, in that we do not jump from one thought to another. Even when thoughts suddenly force themselves upon us, their arrival is often mediated by some seemingly unimportant detail of the preceding thought. This stands in an obvious contrast to the seeing of aspects, where shifts occur abruptly and, as it were, out of the blue.[96]

Secondly, in the case of seeing aspects, there is no informative direct way of specifying the *visibilium* apart from saying that one sees it as such and such. Similarly, no neat distinction between the raw data (if there are e.g. such things as sense data) and the fully fledged experience is assumed in our ordinary talk about visual experience. However, in the case of thinking or interpreting, most speakers are aware of a difference between the *interpretandum* (conceived in a broad sense as what a thought is about) and the process of thinking or the thought itself.[97] It is arguable that this is not just a point about the way in which we happen to speak, respectively, about our experiences of thinking, seeing and aspect seeing. Rather, it turns upon certain characteristics of the grammar of these different experiences (or, at least, of the grammar of the terms used to designate these experiences, if there is such a distinction to be made). Accordingly, it is not correct to say that the distinction between what is unelaborated and what has been processed is patent in the case of interpretation or thinking, but merely latent in that of ordinary seeing and aspect perception. Rather, this difference falters when it comes to the case of aspect perception (and arguably in that of ordinary vision, too).[98] In this context, Wittgenstein avers that both ordinary seeing and aspect perception are not 'hypothetical' in nature, which suggests that visual perception in general is not underpinned by or founded upon data of any kind (say, sense data or unprocessed stimuli) and does not stand in need of verification or corroboration by further evidence (see RPP I §8, cp. RPP II §547, PPF §249).

A third and last characteristic which sets aspect perception apart from thinking or interpreting (but probably also seeing) is that it is a state in which the possibility of error seems to be precluded, which according to Wittgenstein is a logical or 'grammatical' consequence of the non-hypothetical character of this kind of state. Nonetheless, this claim allows for several different readings. On the one hand, if the perception of an aspect is considered to be a mental state, then an agent who perceives an aspect *ipso facto* self-reflectively knows that she is perceiving that aspect, at least if one grants that mental states of this kind display luminosity or transparency. Put in a more

[95] Of course, this is not to say that a perceiver is self-conscious as to which objects populate his visual field at any given time, as is evinced by phenomena such as inattentional blindness and subliminal priming. Nonetheless, when asked to concentrate and tell whether such and such an object occupies her field of vision at a specific moment, she can do so with a high degree of accuracy.

[96] In the case of aspects which require extensive contextualisation, such as those of the triangle in PPF §162, this claim needs to be qualified somewhat. Nonetheless, even in such cases, the perceiver can precisely specify the moments when she started and ceased to see a given aspect.

[97] This does not imply that ordinary speakers are in a position to detect the precise criteria of identity of the respective *interpretanda*, but simply means that most intelligent speakers do not have any problems in distinguishing between, say, a sentence as a linguistic entity and their understanding of that sentence. Accordingly, we may here waive the problem that the criteria of identity of e.g. works of art tend to be hard to determine.

[98] This point touches on controversial issues in the philosophy of perception that will be discussed in more detail in Part III of the present thesis. In particular, the claim made presently seems to mirror (Sellars's and) McDowell's contention that there is no pre-conceptual, purely perceptual given. Also, it stands in obvious contradiction to the assumption, shared by most contemporary cognitive scientists, that certain sub-personal modules in the brain process pre-conscious and pre-conceptual visual raw data.

Wittgensteinian vein, episodes of aspect perception are subject to first-person authority, such that it turns out to be a 'grammatical' or conceptual truth that a perceiver's (sincere) avowal as to what she is seeing cannot be mistaken. But no matter how one phrases this point, it cannot serve to distinguish aspect perception from instances of thinking and/or seeing, since it applies to a broad range of psychological phenomena.[99]

On the other hand, it is hard to conceive of cases in which one's thinking that one is seeing an aspect and one's actually seeing that aspect do not coincide. And this is one of the respects in which aspect perception differs from both interpretation and seeing: cases in which one's interpretation fails to reflect or chime with reality occur fairly often, and in the case of vision, illusions are possible, though less frequent. Episodes of aspect perception are thus not only subject to first-person authority, but also factive (at least in a sense): when I avow seeing, say, a black cross against a white background upon looking at the double-cross drawing, a good case can be built for the claim that there is indeed such a black cross to be spotted in the picture, such that an explanatory reason is readily available. Relatedly, it should be mentioned that in the case of thought, but arguably also in that of seeing, it is possible (firstly) to recognise when someone is mistaken and (secondly) to explain to that person why she has been in error. If, for instance, somebody misconstrues a sentence in a natural language, there are certain ways in which one could explain the sentence to her, e.g. by indicating various contextual features or by using a synonymous sentence. Similarly, in the case of an illusionary vision (e.g. when someone sees a stick immerged into water as broken), it is possible to illustrate to the beholder that her seeing a broken stick was actually an illusion (one could, for instance, remove the stick from the water and point out that it has been intact all along).[100] In contrast, when somebody claims to be seeing a complex and fairly abstract aspect (for instance, when she claims to see a similarity between two faces which at first glance seem to be very unlike each other), there is no established procedure for correcting her.[101] It should thus in conclusion be noted that the fact that we cannot be mistaken about seeing an aspect is not necessarily due to an exceptional epistemological prowess, e.g. to the capacity to intuit with absolute certainty the aspects under which objects can be seen. Rather, the (mainly linguistic) practice of expressing our perception of aspects does not allow for the possibility of directly pointing out that someone is mistaken with regards to the seeing of a particular aspect, as long as her overall behaviour is consistent with her seeing that aspect. In order to convince someone that she was mistaken when she claimed to be seeing a given aspect, all one can do is adduce subtle or even 'imponderable' evidence (cp. PPF §359c), point out dissimilarities, and thereby start a gradual and potentially abortive process of conviction and conversion.

Furthermore, it is worth examining whether 'to see as' can be construed as a factive verb. Such verbs denote (*inter alia* mental) states and activities which are directed at a state of affairs that cannot fail to obtain, unless the verb in question is used improperly or illicitly. Given that aspect perception has frequently been placed in the vicinity of illusions and other kinds of non-veridical perception, the suggestion that aspect seeing might indeed turn out to be factive (in a sense that is yet to be specified, see (6b) below) seems highly dubious.

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[99] see Hacker (1996), pp. 434 f. The self-attribution of some psychological characteristics – Hacker mentions 'stupid', 'intelligent', and 'neurotic' – is not subject to first-person authority and requires self-observation.

[100] Notice that in both the case of interpretation and that of seeing, there is no easy way to counter radically sceptical arguments according to which the acts of identifying a correct understanding and a veridical vision are based upon something seemingly arbitrary such as principles of parsimony, etc.

[101] There are, of course, ways which supposedly allow us to check whether e.g. two faces are similar to each other, such as making a survey among people from the same cultural background.

In the philosophical literature on perception, it is commonly assumed (though perhaps not entirely uncontroversial) that so-called propositional seeing, that is, the kind of seeing expressed by the use of a 'that'-clause, is factive. Indeed, the following entailment seems to be valid:

(1) The child sees that the front door is open. → The front door is open.[102]

If one grants that such an entailment does indeed hold in the case of perception, either expressing a perceptual illusion by means of a 'that'-clause or using the verb 'to see' becomes illicit:

*(2) The child sees that the stick immersed in water is bent. → The stick immersed in water is bent.

The case of so-called objectual seeing is more difficult to assess, especially if one assumes that all visible objects belong to one single kind. In fact, many philosophers of perception fall prey to Procrustean tendencies, by supposing that material objects of sight (in contrast to intentional ones) must be either medium-sized dry goods[103] or, perhaps less restrictively, objects which present only one of their surfaces. The latter claim is based on the tacit assumption that (a) all visible objects have a surface and (b) that they are opaque and essentially seen, for any specific moment *t*, from a perspective, such that some of their visible features remain occluded.[104] Take the humdrum case of the mug standing on my desk: when seated behind my desk, I only see one side of the mug, I do not see its bottom, etc. In such cases, logical entailments such as the following seem fairly unproblematic:

(3) I see the mug on my desk. → I see that there is a mug on my desk. → There is a mug on my desk.

Nonetheless, even with respect to this kind of everyday case, it is important to notice that the move from an extensional to an intensional context is fallacious as a general scheme of inference. As a matter of fact, the first inference in (3) holds only in cases in which the perceiver is aware of the identity of the object seen. When the object remains for some reason, e.g. a lack of relevant knowledge or sub-standard viewing conditions, unidentifiable from the perceiver's perspective, the inference is fallacious. If the object on the desk had been a cleverly disguised wiretapping device rather than a mug, the inference would not go through. Also, for the first inference to be valid, the onlooker must see the mug and the desk separately, but the clause on the left-hand side is compatible with her being aware of the mug exclusively (for some reason, she might fail to notice that it is indeed a desk that the mug is standing on).

Moreover, there are perfectly familiar objects of sight to which the abovementioned points do not apply, and in these cases it is even harder to assess factivity claims. Take, for example, the case of visible objects that have no exact spatial location and no surface, and which in a sense are seen through and through, i.e. without one of their sides being hidden. In the case of rainbows, for instance, a factivity claim analogous to (3) still seems to go through, though one might have reservations concerning the first entailment in particular:

(4) I see a rainbow. →? I see that there is a rainbow. → There is a rainbow.

[102] In what follows, I adopt the convention of marking an entailment that is problematic with a question mark, while entailments that (arguably) do not hold are marked with an asterisk.
[103] For a critique of this idea, see Austin (1962), p. 8 f.
[104] compare Künne (1995), pp. 106 f.

In the case of mirages, factivity claims of this sort appear to be even more contentious, arguably because it is (in typical cases) not clear from the perspective of the perceiver that the object seen is indeed merely a mirage:

(5) The hiker sees a mirage. →* The hiker sees that there is a mirage. →? There is a mirage.

Indeed, given that rainbows and mirages do not conform to the philosophical picture of what an object of sight is supposed to be, one might be tempted to liken them to visual illusions: just as it is illicit to use the locution '*A* sees that' when confronted with an illusion, it would be strictly speaking nonsensical to say that one sees a rainbow or a mirage. Nonetheless, this is an oversimplification. For firstly, in ordinary parlance it is perfectly acceptable and even commonplace to say that one sees a rainbow (or a mirage). Secondly, there are substantial reasons that speak in favour of adopting a more permissible notion of visible object. For one thing, rainbows and mirages are objective (if short-lived) denizens of our environment, inasmuch as perceivers equipped with the requisite visual capacities agree that there is e.g. a rainbow that can be spotted from a given location at a specific time. This clearly sets these admittedly peculiar visual objects apart from hallucinations, which are purely subjective and idiosyncratic visual experiences. Moreover, the precise physical causes for the appearance of rainbows and mirages have been established, and the fact that our visual apparatus is sensitive to them is no less mysterious than the fact that we are perceptually alert to chairs, mugs, and other medium-sized dry goods.

The case of aspect perception or seeing-as is even more complex than that of so-called objectual seeing. This difficulty arises in part from the fact that the instances of aspect seeing that Wittgenstein discusses at some length involve schematic drawings that are sometimes (in those cases where a whole range of 'interpretations' is permissible, such as the triangle in PPF §162) highly context-sensitive. The following factivity claim is surely incorrect:

(6a) The perceiver sees the rabbit-duck drawing as a duck. →? The perceiver sees a duck. →? The perceiver sees that there is a duck. →* There is a duck.

However, if the circumstance that the duck in question is not a real but a depicted one is taken into consideration, a more promising chain of entailments can be formulated, such that none of the steps is patently absurd:

(6b) The perceiver sees the rabbit-duck as a duck. → The perceiver sees a duck *qua* pictorial object. → The perceiver sees that there is a duck to be spotted in the drawing OR The perceiver sees that the drawing represents a duck. → There is a duck to be spotted in the drawing OR The drawing represents a duck.

Moreover, there is another series of *prima facie* legitimate inferences that indicates that aspect perception might well be factive:

(7a) The perceiver sees the rabbit-duck as a duck. → The perceiver sees the duck aspect of the rabbit-duck. →? The perceiver sees that there is a duck aspect. → There is a duck aspect.

(7b) The perceiver does not (fails to) see the rabbit-duck as a duck. → The perceiver does not (fails to) see the duck aspect of the rabbit-duck. → The perceiver does not (fails to) see that there is a duck aspect. → There is a duck aspect.

The special kind of factivity that has been adumbrated in the preceding paragraphs further likens seeing-as to ordinary seeing, where that latter notion encompasses both propositional and objectual visual perception. It is noteworthy that the intellectual or cognitive abilities that are either

exercised during episodes of seeing-as or at least conceptually connected to aspect perception are not factive in any sense of the term. For neither of the following inferences is valid:

(8a) The perceiver thinks (imagines, supposes) that the rabbit-duck is a duck. →* The rabbit-duck is a duck.

(8b) The perceiver thinks (imagines, supposes) that the rabbit-duck represents a duck. →* The rabbit-duck represents a duck.

While thinking is indicative of facts on some occasions, namely in those situations in which what we think indeed coincides with reality, imagining appears to be strictly non-factive: it makes little sense to imagine what is indeed the case[105], and the imagination is typically not in the business of tracking the truth. The upshot is thus clear: if seeing-as turns out to be factive in a limited sense of the term, this is due to its close connection to common-and-garden visual perception.[106]

[105] The verb 'to imagine' can indeed be used to flag a reasonable assumption, but these are arguably marginal or at least derivative cases. In general, 'to suppose' and 'to imagine' are not synonyms.

[106] Wittgenstein would argue that the connection in question is a conceptual or 'grammatical' one, but one might contend that it hints at a kind of functional complementarity: the cognitive abilities employed in everyday visual perception are also operative in aspect seeing, and while ordinary perception primarily serves to track external reality, aspect perception (at least as long as it is directed at drawings and other artefacts) helps us uncover socially constructed bits of reality. But a further exploration of these substantive connections would be beyond the remit of the present discussion.

Chapter 4 (II. 2): Wittgenstein on 'secondary' meaning

1. The normative dependence of 'secondary' on 'primary' meaning

In §276 of *Philosophy of Psychology – A Fragment*, Wittgenstein tentatively introduces a distinction between two kinds of meaning or, rather, between two nuances of the word 'meaning'. The relation between what he labels 'primary' and 'secondary' meaning is strikingly asymmetric. For it is evident that the former is temporally prior: only a speaker who has previously familiarised herself with the primary meaning of a term can understand and use it in its secondary sense. Moreover, inasmuch as normative matters are concerned, primary meaning seems to be the only thing that counts: when it comes to explaining and justifying the use of a specific word in a somewhat extravagant setting (that is, when secondary meaning is at play), speakers can only resort to the primary, established and generally accepted meaning of that term (see PPF §§275, 277).

To illustrate the logical or grammatical connection(s) between a word's primary and its secondary meaning, Wittgenstein cites two startlingly different examples. Firstly, a speaker might feel an inclination or even an urge to apply adjectives such as 'lean' and 'fat' to days of the week. From a normative point of view, it is obvious that the meaning of e.g. 'fat' cannot be explained by reference to Wednesdays, if only because that adjective (in its standard meaning) chiefly applies to physical objects. Furthermore, Wittgenstein concedes that such a use of 'fat' cannot, strictly speaking, be defended or justified – the only thing a speaker could do when challenged is (a) insist on his deep-rooted inclination and/or (b) provide a standard definition of 'fat', point to instances of fatness, etc.

The second example of secondary meaning cited in the text is perhaps less dumbfounding, but equally unexpected. In fact, given the placement of PPF §277 in the midst of his discussion on the topic, Wittgenstein suggests that the verb 'to calculate' is used in a secondary sense in the locution 'to calculate in one's head'. Both these uses seem to pay heed to the standard lexical definition of calculation, in that both apparently refer to processes which end with the determination of a numerical value. Nevertheless, there are clear criterial differences, in that the steps of a calculation on paper or by means of an electronic calculator typically remain tractable not just for the calculating subject, but for onlookers as well. Most crucially however, a speaker is only justified in using the term 'calculating' to characterise a mental going-on once she is acquainted with its application to outward processes.

2. What is 'primary' meaning?

When it comes to normative force, Wittgenstein thus clearly grants pride of place to what he hesitatingly calls 'primary' meaning. But what exactly does this term refer to? In PPF §274, he also talks about the ordinary or usual ('gewöhnliche') meaning of a word, and it is safe to say that it is closely tied to a word's use in a language. For the differentiation between primary and secondary meaning mirrors the distinction, in §43 of (Part I of) the *Investigations*, between 'the large class of cases of the employment of the word "meaning" [where] the meaning of a word is its use in the language' and the hitherto undealt-with rest of cases. The notion of use, which is meant to specify or at least elucidate the concept of ('primary') meaning[107], is broad and vague, and so stands in

[107] The idea that meaning and other semantic phenomena such as understanding are reducible to certain non-semantic phenomena (e.g. use) has been disputed by John McDowell and Barry Stroud, among others; see McDowell (1985)

need of specification. For a generally competent individual speaker can sometimes use a given word in a contrived, extravagant, unidiomatic or otherwise deviant manner. Moreover, she is prone to commit linguistic mistakes under certain circumstances (e.g. when extremely tired, stressed out, etc.). Such uses of a term, however, are not constitutive of its meaning, or else the notion of *mis*use would be a contradiction in terms. The kind of use that is meant to account for a term's meaning must thus be normative in nature: it must be that term's standard, correct, or at least broadly accepted usage.

This specification has wide-ranging consequences. For it entails, firstly, that ('primary') meaning is not to be identified with what a speaker intends a word to mean and, secondly, that the community of language users, however small, plays an essential role. Moreover, it shows that the meaning of a term cannot be defined by exclusive reference to its causal origins and effects, as these can be (in admittedly relatively unusual scenarios) random.[108] Whereas Wittgenstein thus emphasises that the role assumed by a given word in a language (or in a specific language game) determines its meaning, he insists that that role can neither be specified (a) in terms of the function that the correlated concept might play in the mental life of competent speakers, nor (b) by invoking causal mechanisms. Such accounts fail in part because they try to account for the meaning of an expression in non-normative, purely descriptive terms.

The notion of a rule assumes a pivotal role in Wittgenstein's positive account of the function of words (and, accordingly, of their 'primary' meaning). The importance of rules for language is evinced by the fact that speakers can become subject to criticism and correction, and by the circumstance that they can, when challenged, resort to explanations and justifications. However, the notion of linguistic rules, and especially their supposed analogy to the rules of games such as most notably chess, is liable to create misunderstandings. For the rules of a language are not explicitly stipulated, and they cannot be consulted in a rulebook. Note, for instance, that grammar books and dictionaries essentially express pre-existing standards, in that they strive to capture the use competent speakers make of the language in question.[109] Moreover, where languages have governing bodies with far-reaching competences or high prestige (such as the *Académie française* in the case of French), their proscriptions are frequently criticised and even rejected by speakers which e.g. do not share their traditionalist proclivities. The rules governing a language are thus typically implicit and relatively malleable, so that they are subject to fairly limited synchronic variation and more important diachronic change.

Despite these differences between linguistic rules and the rules of a game, it is undeniable that crucial aspects of linguistic practice, such as e.g. teaching, explaining, criticising, and justifying, are permeated by a kind of normativity that cannot be explained (away) in psychological or causal (that is, purely descriptive) terms.[110] The norms that govern a language range from general ones, such

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and Stroud (1996). The suggestion here is that the notion of use at least illuminates that of meaning, and that the former is arguably temporally and explanatorily basic: in order to understand a term or grasp its meaning, one needs to familiarise oneself first with the use of that term and not *vice versa*. The claim that meaning (and *mutatis mutandis* for understanding) is reducible to or ontologically grounded in use is more ambitious and would require careful elaboration that is beyond the remit of the present section.

[108] see Glock (1996), p. 379 f.

[109] These points also serve to distinguish natural from constructed languages. The rules of the latter are explicitly stipulated and typically remain strictly regulated even after the death of their original creator(s).

[110] The contention that semantic normativity is thus primitive has in recent years come under pressure on two fronts. Firstly, there are philosophers of language who argue that meaning can be naturalised, i.e. reduced to notions that are not themselves normative. In this vein, Horwich has argued that Wittgenstein proposes to reduce meaning to use (conceived as a non-normative practice); see Horwich (1998) and (2012), pp. 105-143. Secondly, some philosophers deny that meaning is normative in the first place; see Wikforss (2001), Hattiangadi (2006), Glüer and Wikforss (2009).

as the basic rules of syntax and humdrum lexical definitions, to occasion-dependent ones, e.g. ostensive definitions in which a term is explained by pointing to a canonical sample. And the rules for the correct use of a term form its grammar, a complex and dynamic web of interlocking rules, which are absorbed and internalised by most native speakers (provided that they are competent users of their native tongue), but blithely ignored or distorted by a majority of philosophers (or so Wittgenstein argues). Given that competent speakers have mastered the rules underlying their native tongue through a process of immersion rather than active memorisation[111], the former have become second nature to them. In fact, the speakers of a language do not draft, as it were, their own book of linguistic rules which can be consulted whenever needed (e.g. when unclarities arise).

The complete familiarisation with the normative structure that underpins language is evinced by two striking phenomena. Firstly, speakers who have absorbed the norms of what Wittgenstein calls 'grammar' can produce off-the-cuff explanations and justifications of their use of a specific term. While they will, in some cases, refer to a rule previously stipulated or captured by a reputable authority, say, a dictionary or grammar textbook, their linguistic competence is most evident in the (often tentative and potentially defeasible) explanations that they can produce on the fly, by citing for example parallels between the case at hand and other instances where the term applies. Wittgenstein's claim that 'the meaning of a word is what an explanation of its meaning explains' (PI §560, actually a self-quotation from the *Big Typescript*) might strike one as either trivial or gnomic, but it captures an essential insight: the meaning of a term is nothing over and above the normative practices that constitute it. In particular, it is neither a Platonic object nor an ironclad grid of linguistic rules deemed to subsist independently of the linguistic competence of the individual speaker.

Secondly, the thorough mastery of the norms underpinning a language manifests itself in a phenomenon that is harder to fathom, namely the fact that words have a familiar feel, a specific 'physiognomy' or even a 'soul' for the speakers who use them. This provides a natural transition from Wittgenstein's initial preoccupation with 'primary' meaning to his growing interest in 'secondary' sense. Only the former is constitutive of language – there could be a language which is operated by its speakers like a fine-tuned machine, in which the individual words are just tools for a specific function and thus lack a 'soul' (cp. PI §530). But arguably our own language, i.e. the natural languages used by human beings, is not (throughout) such a 'soulless' language; rather, the medium of communication of the meaning-blind would be like that.[112] This is evident from the fact that Wittgenstein, in *Philosophy of Psychology – A Fragment*, insists on the importance of the attachment which speakers show to their words and the way in which they value them (in quite specific but salient circumstances). It is precisely in this context that 'secondary' meaning becomes relevant.

Some commentators have argued that this emphasis on our familiarity with and attachment to language marks an important departure from the almost exclusive focus on use and rules that dominated (Part I of) *Philosophical Investigations*. This view is not unappealing, given that Wittgenstein himself noticed that his specification of meaning as use renders certain seemingly innocuous claims about meaning highly problematic. For instance, speakers might insist that they

[111] Linguistic competence is thus founded upon what Hanfling aptly calls 'participatory knowledge'; see Hanfling (2000), p. 54 f.

[112] Wittgenstein suggests that constructed languages such as Esperanto are also soulless; compare CV, p. 52 [WA VIII, p. 524]: 'The word [i.e. a specific word in Esperanto] is cold, lacking in associations, and yet it plays at being "language".' Since it is perfectly possible to associate a word in Esperanto with e.g. idiosyncratic or personal experiences, the relevant associations are arguably communal or collective ones.

have grasped the meaning of a term in a flash, e.g. when they have been given a particularly illuminating explanation of the meaning of a hitherto unknown word. If the meaning of a term were to be equated with its use (or the rules governing that use), this becomes perplexing: for the overall use of a term, being extended in time and comprised of a multitude of different occasions of use, surely cannot be grasped instantaneously (cp. PI §138), and *mutatis mutandis* for the rules of use. In the case of use, these doubts can be easily alleviated: Wittgenstein never claimed that a term's meaning is exhausted by its use (cp. PI §43) or, perhaps less controversially, never maintained that meaning is to be identified or equated with use. The case of rules is more complex, since the assumption that language is a rule-guided activity plays a crucial role in the so-called private language argument.[113] But as will emerge in what follows, there are certain instances of language use in which rules are pushed to their limits, to say the least.

3. What is 'secondary' meaning?

The difference between 'primary' and 'secondary' meaning can be spelled out in terms of a provisional and admittedly unduly pat distinction between the (broadly speaking) communicative role of language and its expressive and emotional dimension. When making statements, asking questions, or imparting orders e.g. in most everyday situations and in a scientific or legal setting, only the 'primary' meaning of the terms used is of relevance. Moreover, it typically exhausts what has been said *in a literal sense*; that is, it accounts for the semantic content of words and the sentences they are employed in. 'Secondary' meaning, on the other hand, becomes salient in artistic contexts, e.g. when writing poetry or when searching for the apt translation of a word, but also in contexts where we try to convey our emotions, our outlook on life, etc. This much becomes clear from the cases in which Wittgenstein, either explicitly or implicitly, operates with the distinction between these two shades of the meaning of 'meaning' (cp. PI §532 for the analogous case of 'understanding'). In order to get a firmer grasp on what 'secondary' meaning precisely is and involves, it is expedient to closely scrutinise the different situations to which Wittgenstein applies the notion.

There are chiefly three kinds of scenarios in which 'secondary' meaning assumes a pivotal role. The first one has been mentioned at the beginning of the present chapter to illustrate the logical relation between a term's 'primary' and its 'secondary' meaning: the case in which a speaker uses an ordinary term in a highly idiosyncratic and enigmatic fashion, while still maintaining that she did not allocate a new meaning to it. As examples, Wittgenstein cites his own personal inclination to call Wednesday 'fat' and Tuesday 'lean' (PPF §274). Moreover, he mentions a person who has a proclivity to attribute colour predicates to vowels (and probably other sounds as well) and who thus might maintain that the vowel *e* is yellow (PPF §278). It is difficult to understand why Wittgenstein thinks that such cases reveal something deep about our linguistic capacities. For the ordinary grammar of the terms used – in the examples cited, 'fat', 'lean', and 'yellow' – seems to be overridden completely. As a consequence, it is impossible to use sentences employing a term in its 'secondary' sense as explanations (e.g. as paradigms, exemplifications, etc.) and they are thus normatively idle. Moreover, the only justification a speaker can provide for such an idiosyncratic use of language is the fact that she felt an inclination or perhaps temptation to employ the word in question in exactly that way (cp. PPF §§274, 278). While she thus cannot give any reasons or

[113] Glüer and Wikforss deny that the late Wittgenstein conceived of language as a rule-guided activity, but their view is not widely accepted; see Glüer and Wikforss (2010). Discussing this issue in more detail would be beyond the scope of the present investigation.

grounds for her employment of the term in such an unusual context, she might be able to recollect or form hypotheses about what caused her to use the word in this manner (cp. PPF §274). Typically, she will mention deep-rooted associations or a specific neurological condition such as e.g. synaesthesia. In order to causally explain her proclivity to apply adjectives such as 'lean' and 'fat' to days of the week, she might e.g. cite the fact that as a child she used to have a rich and abundant meal on Wednesdays.[114] Synaesthetes, on the other hand, describe vowels and other sounds as having a colour because they actually have a succession of colour sensations when their sense of hearing is stimulated.

These puzzling core cases of 'secondary' meaning, however, are not the only instances to which the notion can be applied. Indeed, there are occasions on which the 'secondary' sense underpins the specific 'ring' of an expression, that is, its emotional, expressive, or aesthetic value (cp. PPF §294).[115] As has been noted before, these are in a sense additional ingredients or supplements to a speaker's linguistic capacity *sensu stricto*: there could be a language in which such aspects played no role at all (cp. PI §530, PPF §294), and most philosophers of language and formal semanticists aim to describe the fundamental layer of language in which such phenomena do not play a role.[116] Wittgenstein's talk about 'secondary *meaning*' (in addition to 'secondary sense' and 'secondary use') might indeed give rise to misgivings, in that it suggests that the terms in question have two independent and separable meanings, which would make them ambiguous. However, as his insistence on the univocality of the terms in question indicates, this is an obvious misreading of his remarks. Rather, secondary uses of an expression hint at a complementary and seemingly subsidiary aspect, dimension, or layer of the term's original meaning that is rendered more prominent when the term is used in a particular, striking, and unexpected setting.

The feeling that words are representative of their meaning is a relatively familiar one. Firstly, we are sometimes under the impression that a name captures the essential trademarks of its bearer and suits the latter (cp. PPF §270). More typically, we feel that the random substitution of proper names is problematic: replacing the name of an inmate by a numeral, for instance, is dehumanising. Similar considerations apply *mutatis mutandis* to other types of words. For instance, when learning a foreign language so-called false friends are hard to memorise and internalise because we are inclined to think that they do not fit to or even misrepresent the concepts which they are deemed to express.[117] And quite generally, the vocabulary of a language that we have just started to learn feels strangely alien and inanimate. Secondly, certain expressions are evocative of the emotion or

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[114] The name of the last day before the beginning of Lent ('Mardi Gras', which literally means 'fat Tuesday' in French) is etymologically based on just such an association, namely on the fact that in olden days people would use up all the available fat and grease on that day. It is striking that Wittgenstein, this collective association notwithstanding, feels strongly inclined to describe Tuesdays as lean (PPF §274).

[115] Terminologically speaking, this claim is contentious: one could well argue that the term 'secondary meaning' has a very limited scope, in that it only applies to scenarios like the ones mentioned in the preceding paragraph. 'Experiences of meaning', so the argument goes, are strictly speaking unrelated to secondary meaning, as is evinced by the fact that they belong to a different realm of reality – they concern the speaker's psychology and/or phenomenology, not his use of language. However, the transition from secondary meaning to experiences of meaning is seamless in Wittgenstein's text, and both are linked by a common thread: they are occurrences that cannot be explained by an account that focusses exclusively on the relation between an expression's meaning and its (actual or correct) use.

[116] Frege, for instance, maintains that expressions have a *Färbung* (tone, colouring) in addition to their *Bedeutung* (reference, meaning) and *Sinn* (sense), but refrains from a detailed discussion of the former.

[117] Wittgenstein describes a more extreme variation of this case in PPF §263, where he imagines someone who quite randomly replaces the word 'bank' by 'tower'. But the phenomenon is familiar to anyone who has ever set out to learn a foreign tongue: why do бутерброды (*buterbrody*), for instance, come in varieties that do not have any butter on them, and why do парикмахеры (*parikmakhery*) cut hair instead of manufacturing wigs? Or, to cite an example that lies perhaps closer to a philosopher's heart: in French, problems concerning scientific knowledge and methodology are discussed in 'épistémologie', while 'théorie de la connaissance' and 'gnoséologie' deal with epistemological questions.

attitude that they stand for. This does not mean that the relevant state of mind breathes life into an otherwise lifeless sign via a process of meaning, nor that that state is constitutive of the ('primary') meaning of the word in question. But in the case of words such as 'hope', the associated feeling guarantees that the expression has (in sincere utterances) a specific 'ring', so that its significance or point resides in the feeling (cp. PI §545). Accordingly, an utterance that is genuinely expressive of hope sounds different from an untruthful one, and the same holds *mutatis mutandis* for other emotionally charged expressions.[118]

Thus far two contexts where the notion of 'secondary' meaning can be put to use have been discussed: the cases where a speaker feels compelled to use an expression in a highly idiosyncratic fashion, and those where the associated emotional dimension accounts for a word's characteristic 'ring' and expressiveness. However, an important third set of cases exists, which might even be the most interesting one from a philosophical point of view. There are certain expressions which, on the surface at least, seem to be unambiguous, since speakers can specify their meaning by citing one single lexical definition. The term 'calculating', which standardly refers to a process that results in the determination of a numerical value, is a case in point (cp. PPF §277).[119] In its 'secondary' sense, that is, when applied to a putative mental process ('calculating in the head'), the term is normatively inert. Moreover, 'outward' or public calculating is temporally prior to calculating in the head: pupils in elementary school first learn to apply the term to what is written on paper or on a blackboard, and only later extend it to mental operations. And if we want to teach someone the meaning of the word 'calculating' we cannot, so Wittgenstein avers, ask the learner to focus on what she mentally does when challenged to solve a mathematical problem.

This is the most crucial point, for it hints at a criterial difference between plain calculating and calculating in the head. Concerning the former, the expression is used in such a way that it directly latches on to what has been written on the paper: the marks on the paper just are the calculation and calculating simply amounts to jotting down those marks. The latter case, however, is subtler: here the term 'calculating' does not designate any action (let alone any mental action). Accordingly, the focus is not on what the putative agent has actually been doing in her mind. Rather, it lies on what she claims to have been doing and on further (typically antecedent) demonstrations of her capacity to calculate. Put differently, the conditions of correct use differ in the two scenarios. In the straightforward case, the term is applied correctly if what is on the paper is indeed a properly executed calculation. The use of the expression 'calculating in the head', on the other hand, is legitimate depending on what the putative agent can say about what she has been doing[120], on whether her utterances are (by and large) truthful[121], and on whether she is in typical cases able to

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[118] see e.g. LW §712 for a discussion of 'the words exchanged by lovers'. It is also noteworthy that the characteristic 'ring' of an expression, rather than its literal or 'primary' meaning, seems to assume a fundamental importance in certain religious rituals. It might even be possible to use expressions such as 'hallelujah' or 'hosanna' with a tone of voice that befits them without actually knowing what they mean.

[119] For a thorough and illuminating discussion of this case, see ter Hark (2007). Although Hanfling concedes that the locution 'calculating in the head' might indeed feature a secondary use of 'calculating', he insists that there are crucial disanalogies between this case and more central instances of secondary use; see Hanfling (2002), pp. 160 f. While it is true that mental and overt calculation have – in contrast to more central cases of secondary meaning – an important element in common, in that they essentially involve the deployment of mathematical concepts and techniques, there is no analogy or parallel concerning the concrete manner in which these are employed. The process of calculating e.g. with the help of an abacus has hardly anything substantial in common with mental calculation.

[120] This might explain why we are sometimes reluctant to say that so-called savants arrive at their results via calculating in the head. For the methods which they claim to have used in order to arrive at the correct solution often involve complex mnemonic tricks that do not correspond to any standard mathematical procedure.

[121] Given that truthfulness is crucial here, one could insist that the analogy between calculating on paper and calculating in the head is absolutely straightforward. While the former is used to describe the marks on the paper, the latter serves

perform correct calculations, but not depending on what has indeed been going on in her head or brain. Despite the fact that calculating in the head is thus semantically derivative (one cannot explain what it means to calculate by reference to it)[122] speakers typically do not reckon (a) that it is illegitimate to use the expression 'calculating' in such a manner, nor (b) that the term in question must be ambiguous.

Accordingly, the notion of 'secondary' sense seems to cover cases in which we extend the meaning of an expression without thereby descending into mere equivocation. For the discussion at hand, Wittgenstein's examination of the terms 'understanding' (see PI §§531-2) and 'meaning' (see PI §43, PPF §274) is particularly relevant. As has been mentioned, Wittgenstein closely links a word's 'primary' meaning to the norms that permeate its established use. There are, however, cases in which expressions are used in a meaningful manner despite the fact that the rules in question have been flouted. Take, for instance, the notorious assertion that Wednesdays are fat. Here one is inclined to either think that the speaker is quite randomly playing with words or that he has committed an egregious category mistake: fatness can only be attributed to objects that occupy a concrete position in space, and so his utterance must be nonsensical. Why does Wittgenstein still contend that it is legitimate to speak about the 'meaning' of such enigmatic affirmations, if every aspect that is deemed to be constitutive of meaning is inoperative here?

Wittgenstein's treatment of the parallel case of 'understanding' contains a partial answer to this pressing question. There he affirms, quite dogmatically, that he *wants* to apply the notion to seemingly disparate cases, i.e. that he feels compelled to use it in this manner (see PI §532). At first glance, and especially if one remains alive to the normative structure that undergirds our linguistic practice, this answer has the potential to leave one in utter despair. For there is no such thing as a legitimate use which cannot, in principle, be defended by reference to implicit but concrete rules. However, this is an oversimplification (cp. PI §289). Wittgenstein's will to apply the notion of understanding to two quite radically different phenomena is arguably based on his linguistic competence and can thereby be shared by other proficient speakers. More generally, statements which feature a term employed in a 'secondary' sense can be legitimised by the fact that there is a number of other speakers who (can be brought to) share one's inclinations. The scenario in which a synaesthete attributes a colour to a vowel is a case in point: other people with that neurological condition will have the disposition to use the term in precisely this manner. This kind of legitimisation is of course fairly weak and risks being defeasible. In this sense, it bears some analogies to the normativity that was shown to be characteristic of aspect perception: at least in more outrageous cases, a gradual and potentially abortive process of conversion is needed in order to convince one's interlocutor that using a specific word in a secondary sense is indeed legitimate and fruitful, and not just a piece of linguistic extravagance.

The points cited in the previous paragraph underlie Wittgenstein's examination of 'calculating in one's head' in (Part I of) *Philosophical Investigations*. In fact, there he explicitly voices the concern

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as description of what has been going on in the mind of the calculating person. This is plausible, but somewhat uninformative; for the criterial difference still subsists. The question 'How can an onlooker tell whether a calculation has indeed been performed?' does not receive the same answer in both cases.

[122] At first glance, this claim is either unpalpable or implausible. Consider the following scenario, which does not seem outlandish in any sense: [*A*: 'What is calculating?' B: 'Oh, that's what those children over there are doing' (pointing towards some pupils who are looking intently at mathematical exercises, scratching their heads, and finally jot down what they take to be the right solution).] Nonetheless, the learner *A* will only be able to correctly understand this ostensive definition if she has been shown how mathematical procedures work, and this cannot be done without actually having her perform some calculations on paper; compare Hanfling (2002), p. 160.

that secondary uses of the term 'calculating' might be illegitimate[123], as it is impossible to specify which precise parts of mental calculating correspond to the operations characteristic of calculating on paper. That is, if one assumes that the employment of the verb 'to calculate' is governed by a set of definite and cast-iron rules, the secondary use of such a notion becomes increasingly problematic. Given that such a use does not abide by those (allegedly) strictly binding rules, it seems to refer to an unreal kind or mere semblance of calculating. Similar arguments would apply to a plethora of other terms that can have a secondary meaning, such as 'understanding' and 'meaning'.

In the discussion concerning 'calculating in one's head', Wittgenstein suggests that the normativity of language is not exhausted by what is commonly called grammatical rules. In fact, such rules are often overly simplistic and unduly straitjacket actual linguistic practice. A toy example might help to illustrate this point. It seems evident at first blush that e.g. speaking is an activity which involves at least two people and aims at communication. Accordingly, the expression 'speaking to oneself' seems derivative at best and erroneous at worst. In a limited sense, this contention is correct: someone who does not know what the verb 'to speak' typically refers to would not be able to characterise, say, her rambling monologue as 'speaking to himself'. But although such a monologue does not aim at communication (even if construed very broadly[124]), as the distinction between the speaker and the listener collapses in this case, referring to it as 'speaking to oneself' is neither linguistically mistaken (say, a category mistake, or a contradiction in terms) nor deviant, and not even innovative. Similar considerations apply to other terms that, in their 'primary' and most commonly recognised sense, do not allow for a self-reflexive use, such as e.g. 'to legislate'.[125]

The examples of 'calculating in the head' and 'speaking to oneself' show that some secondary uses have gained widespread use (in fact, any competent speaker of the language would deem them to be perfectly intelligible). Accordingly, extravagance and opacity are not the hallmarks of secondary sense, although prominent parts of Wittgenstein's explicit discussion of the phenomenon might suggest otherwise. Rather, the secondary sense of such expressions is normatively dependent on their primary use (e.g. 'calculation (on paper, etc.)', 'speaking') in that a speaker can only understand and explain such seemingly derivative uses once he has mastered the standard, core ways of employing the terms in question. Moreover, she is only licensed to use opaque, gnomic secondary senses if her general use of the expression accords with established practices and thereby reveals an understanding of the standard meaning of the word.

Having delineated some of the characteristics of words used in their 'secondary' meaning, it is now expedient to examine in what sense these uses of language differ from 'figurative' or 'metaphorical' ones[126]. In fact, there are four respects in which the secondary uses of a term are different from metaphors as commonly conceived[127], which respectively concern legitimisation, paraphraseability, truth-aptness, and deliberateness. With regards to the first point, it is easiest to proceed *ex negativo*, by noting the salient contrast with metaphors. Whereas metaphors are deemed to feature an implicit comparison, which can be more or less pertinent and striking, the transition from a word used in its 'primary' meaning to 'secondary' uses is not licensed by any hidden analogies. Rather,

[123] Of course, he does not espouse this claim, but presents it with the aim of attacking an unduly narrow conception of meaning.
[124] Even wilfully deceptive and obfuscating speech has (very loosely speaking) a 'communicative' aim, in that the speaker strives to misguide his interlocutor by means of language.
[125] compare Diamond (1991), pp. 237 f.
[126] compare PPF §278, where Wittgenstein establishes a contrast between 'sekundäre' and 'übertragene Bedeutung'.
[127] It is worth keeping in mind that there are several alternative accounts of metaphors, which nonetheless all seem to pay heed to certain conceptual platitudes; for a helpful overview, see Hagberg (2013), *passim*.

the term is applied directly and with its original meaning, as is especially perspicuous in the case of widely used locutions such as 'calculating in the head' and 'speaking to oneself'. Also, the vowel *e* is not yellow because it bears some analogy to ordinary objects which have this colour. Secondly and relatedly, a word used in a secondary meaning is either not paraphraseable, in that there is no other way of bringing across the point that the speaker wanted to make by thus using this specific word, or such a paraphrase would be pointless, since the secondary use of the term is unproblematic and readily understandable. In contrast, although it is extremely difficult to render explicit the full significance of a metaphor, it is nonetheless possible to capture its gist or point by means of a fitting paraphrase, which frequently involves a reference to a salient *tertium comparationis*.[128] Moreover, metaphors often call for some sort of elucidation, unless they are overly dull or conventional, whereas secondary senses are deemed to be either inexplicable or intelligible even in the absence of such further explanations. In ideal cases, a given secondary meaning is transparent *ab initio*, thanks to the circumstance that the interlocutors share the same intuitions or inclinations. In the absence of these, it is virtually impossible to explain what one meant by stating, say, that the vowel *e* is yellow.

Thirdly, when taken literally, metaphors are typically jarring or plainly false, while they ideally establish important points about their objects when read appropriately, that is, when one notes the relevant similarities. To take a standard example, it is plainly obvious that, even for Romeo, Juliet is not a celestial body with a specific mass. Nonetheless, it is true that she is, say, the centre of Romeo's universe, that she is a source of light for him, and so on.[129] On the other hand, at least some secondary uses of words can feature in literally true sentences, the most salient examples again being 'calculating in the head' and 'speaking to oneself'. Other such uses seem to be primarily suggestive or expressive in nature, as is the case for, say, attributions of colour to days of the week. Importantly, in instances where the interlocutor fails to immediately understand what one means, one cannot provide any compelling evidence for accepting the use in question as legitimate (e.g. a set of pertinent similarities licensing the transition), and all one can do is start a tentative and piecemeal process of conversion. Lastly, employing a word in its secondary sense is not, as it were, a matter of choice. Rather, speakers in such cases feel impelled to use a specific term with its familiar meaning in an unexpected context. In contrast, when resorting to metaphors, a speaker often takes great care to devise or craft a new, unprecedented manner of speaking that serves to captivate her interlocutor's attention.

4. Why is 'secondary' meaning relevant?

Wittgenstein's discussion on secondary meaning bears a twofold relevance. On the one hand, it serves to corroborate a point already made with vigour in (Part I of) *Philosophical Investigations*, namely that the meaning of an expression is not (constitutively) tied to mental acts of *Meinen* or experiences of meaning. On the other hand, his investigation yields a more positive and arguably more substantial insight: certain instances of secondary meaning show how a term can be extended in a fruitful and unexpected manner without thereby becoming equivocal. In what follows, each of these two aspects will be discussed in more detail.

[128] compare Hanfling (2002), p. 155.

[129] Interestingly enough, a whole set of further metaphors – 'centre of the universe', 'source of light' – can be deployed (at least in this specific case) in order to capture the essence of the metaphor.

Wittgenstein is explicit about the fact that secondary meaning as such is not constitutive of language. In fact, there could be a language that is in perfect working order (i.e. fulfils all the practical purposes of its speakers) and does not feature any secondary senses. This conclusion is unsurprising in the light of the examples discussed at greatest length: a person who, for instance, does not feel impelled to attribute colour predicates to sounds does not thereby display a lack of linguistic competence (or any other impairment). On the contrary, there are sound semantic reasons for hesitating to apply colour terms in such a wild manner: in typical cases (barring e.g. figurative expressions such as 'feeling blue'), colours are attributed to *visible* objects.

Similarly, a speaker for whom the word 'hope' looks and feels utterly inconspicuous and bland does not *ipso facto* betray his unfamiliarity with the term (e.g. with how and when it is expected to be used). Indeed, her putative defect would only be discovered under highly specific circumstances. Perhaps more importantly, it is not entirely clear by what sort of impairment she is supposed to be affected. As such, it could be linguistic, psychological, or social in nature: a person who is unable to experience the specific 'ring' of a highly expressive word such as 'hope' might just have a pessimistic outlook on life, she might be incapable of empathising with the aspirations of other people, etc. This point becomes more salient if one tweaks Wittgenstein's example: the overuse of profane language goes in many cases hand in hand with the inability to experience the 'ring' of these expressions, by e.g. failing to realise just how offensive they sound. But the main issue in such a case is not the linguistic shortcoming of the foul-mouthed person; rather, her general indecency and tactlessness lie at the heart of the matter.

The examples of secondary meaning hitherto discussed aim to corroborate an important earlier idea, namely that the meaningful use of an expression can be neatly separated from the concurrent mental goings-on, and that the latter *a fortiori* are not constitutive of the former. Besides buttressing an important negative point, these somewhat extravagant instances of secondary sense are also indicative of positive insights. There are three main conclusions that can be drawn from Wittgenstein's investigation up to this point.

Firstly, the words we utter and hear in ordinary speech are already imbued with meaning. Barring exceptional cases, there is no need to closely scrutinise or interpret them. Relatedly, meaning is not infused into otherwise 'lifeless' words, and the fact that an expression has an established use within a community guarantees its meaningfulness. In this respect, the thrust of the discussion on secondary meaning jibes with familiar Wittgensteinian lore[130], which it tries to complement by further specifying what the 'life' of a word consists in. Relatedly, the discussion about secondary meaning is arguably meant to give succour to the contentious and somewhat puzzling claim, in *Philosophical Investigations* §527, that 'understanding a sentence in language is much more akin to understanding a theme in music' than one might initially be inclined to think.[131] In this context, Wittgenstein alludes both to the crucial importance of how a word sounds and to the circumstance that certain applications of words may strike a speaker as absolutely right or fitting, and thus irreplaceable.

Secondly, we are aware of the specific 'flavour' of a word (its ramifications with other terms, its connotations, etc.) even when it is uttered in isolation. This is particularly salient in cases in which we try to pronounce a homonym while having a specific meaning in mind. The fact that words are surrounded by a familiar 'ring' is also evinced by the loss of meaning an expression undergoes once it is pronounced excessively often: the word started out as a meaningful sound but gradually

[130] compare e.g. *Blue Book*, p. 4.
[131] For a more detailed exploration of these ideas, see Johnston (1993), pp. 100-132.

becomes a mere noise. Moreover, certain personal experiences or characterising trademarks may be epitomised by a specific word, e.g. a nickname, and people are typically offended when their names are being mispronounced or ridiculed (cp. Z §184). While it is arguable that a word is meaningful only inasmuch as it can be used in sentences, and although the meaning of an individual word does not enshrine all of its combinatorial possibilities (as Wittgenstein's conception of 'meaning-bodies' in the *Tractatus* intimated[132]), it can nonetheless absorb its meaning, and is thus, even in the absence of a relevant context, more than just a mere *flatus voci*. Moreover, in those cases which involve secondary uses that are genuinely unheard of and novel, a word's significance transcends, i.e. ceases to supervene upon, the uses in complete sentences that are deemed legitimate by competent speakers.

Thirdly and lastly, in contexts where there is a need to scrutinise and weigh our words, secondary meaning also plays a crucial role. For instance, the distinction can be used to account for the fact that in certain contexts the meaning of a sentence (or a phrase) cannot be separated from its form, as is the case in poetry and other kinds of artistic literature.[133] Furthermore, puns are characterised by the interaction between the different meanings of a homonym, each of which has been fully absorbed by the expression in question. In Wittgenstein's famous example ('A hairdresser curls up and dyes', cp. LW §711), especially in its oral form, the sound /daɪs/ simultaneously instantiates the meanings 'to apply artificial hair colour' and 'to pass away', shifting back and forth between them. Since both these meanings stand in a stark contrast – one describes the hairdresser's activity in a humdrum manner, while the other is highly unexpected and irreverent –, they create a comic effect. Relatedly, Wittgenstein's discussion on secondary meaning might shed some light on sylleptic ambiguity.[134] For the rhetorical and/or dramatic effect produced by a locution such as 'deep wells and sorrows' is arguably due to the interplay between the meanings 'deep in a measurable sense' (primary sense) and 'deep in that it concerns important matters, is abiding, etc.' (secondary sense).

In addition to these three important points, some of the examples that Wittgenstein (almost incidentally, one might be inclined to say) cites in the course of his remarks on secondary sense point to a more ambitious project. In fact, they provide an inchoate account of how the meaning of an expression can be broadened without becoming overly loose. In this context, it is expedient to examine the relationship between expressions displaying an additional, secondary meaning and family-resemblance terms.

There is an obvious analogy between the two categories: both serve to classify terms which cannot be defined analytically (that is, in terms of individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions) or need not be so defined in order to be mastered.[135] A first potential difference between the two kinds of terms is that family-resemblance terms are, as it were, multicentric expressions: there is no single core instance of e.g. a game. For example, chess and tennis are on a par, in that they are games in equal measure. This does not mean that there cannot in principle be activities which qualify as games in a derivative sense, thanks to their likeness to one of the core instances, though this idea is controversial from both an exegetical and a substantial perspective.[136] Be that as it may, in the case of secondary-meaning expressions talk about a single paradigm seems to be

[132] see Glock (1996), p. 376.
[133] see Mulligan (2012), p. 120.
[134] see Glock (1996), p. 40.
[135] On this reading, there are comparatively few (commonly used) expressions that are neither family-resemblance nor secondary-meaning terms, and most of them pertain to strictly regimented scientific theories.
[136] compare Glock (1996), p. 122 f.

legitimate.[137] For instance, 'calculating' refers primarily to complex yet (in principle) perspicuous step-by-step processes that end with the determination of a precise numerical value, and the prime instance of such a process would be a calculation on paper (or on a blackboard, etc.). Perhaps less controversially, the cases in which 'yellow' is used to characterise the colour of some middle-sized dry good serve as standard for how the term is to be used.

Moreover, what drives speakers to extend a term and the *post hoc* justifications that are available to them might be different for the two categories of terms. Concerning a family-resemblance expression, speakers can cite more or less obvious similarities between controversial instances and paradigm cases in order to justify their application of the term. For example, *xiangqi* must be a game, since it bears striking formal analogies to chess, which is an uncontroversial instance of a game.[138] In the case of expressions displaying a secondary meaning, this typically does not hold.[139] There is no relevant similarity between e.g. a sunflower (or any other paradigm of yellowness) and the spoken vowel *e*, and yet at least some competent speakers of English want to apply the predicate 'yellow' to both these instances. And in the case of mental calculating, the difference in criteria amounts to an important dissimilarity. The locution 'calculating in the head' is not meaningful because there is a sufficient likeness between the process that, in the case of straightforward calculating, took place on the paper and the one that (putatively) unfolded in the mind, head, or brain.[140] Rather, a similarity holds between the process captured on the paper and the way in which the mental calculator describes what he has been doing. In contrast to the case of family resemblances, the *relata* of the similarity relation thus belong to different ontological categories.

In general, Wittgenstein does not hold that there must be a similarity between the objects to which a term applies in its primary meaning and those which it serves to characterise in its secondary sense. In the case of secondary meaning, it is rather a basic agreement in judgement which guarantees that a rule remains malleable and allows for fruitful extensions without thereby becoming void or overly polysemous. This suggestion has had a profound impact in the philosophy of music[141], since the description of music seems to heavily rely upon words used in a secondary sense, as when one describes a section of a composition as the drawing of a conclusion (cp. Z §175), a melody as plaintive, or (say) a late quartet of Beethoven's as profound. In a literal

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[137] It is thus arguable that terms displaying a secondary meaning are a limiting case of family-resemblance expressions: the former are family-resemblance terms for which there exists a single 'centre of variation', a sole, relatively unified paradigm or prototype.

[138] This might seem derivative at best: what guides and justifies a speaker in applying the term 'game' to *xiangqi* is the fact that it conforms to a perfectly general definition of what a game is. But (a) it is hard to come up with such a definition and (b) speakers are typically unaware that there is such a definition, while they are alive to the similarities between one kind of activity and another.

[139] Hanfling maintains that in the case of family-resemblance concepts, any item to which the term is applicable shares features or has something in common with at least some other things that can be subsumed under the concept, although there is of course no single characteristic which, say, all games share; see Hanfling (2002), pp. 149 f. In the case of a word used with one or several secondary meanings – he mentions the adjective 'soft' and its equally legitimate application to pillows, voices, hearts, colours, and drinks –, the single instances subsumed under the term seem to have nothing in common, although we are inclined to think that there must be some such thing; see ibid., p. 153.

[140] Hanfling duly notices 'that in mental as in overt calculating, we proceed through a series of steps involving mathematical concepts, so as to arrive at the correct answer to a mathematical question' (ibid., p. 161). There is thus indeed an important similarity between the two cases, but the nature of the 'series of steps' is still starkly different in the two cases, as is evinced by the fact that it is easier to perform complex calculations on paper, if only because the individual steps remain more tractable and readily surveyable. It is tempting to argue, *pace* Wittgenstein and Hanfling, that there are certain mental or neurophysiological processes which are at play in both mental and overt calculation, such that the use of the same term in both contexts has a naturalistic basis and *post hoc* justification.

[141] see Tilghman (1984), pp. 176 ff.; Hanfling (2002), pp. 155-159; Sharpe (2004), *passim*.

sense, these utterances are not true, and ordinary grammatical ramifications are bracketed, such that we do not demand conclusive or cumulative evidence for a conclusion in music, find pleasure in a complaint expressed in music, and so on. Nonetheless, they are striking and often enable the listener to unravel further dimensions or aspects of the musical piece in question.[142]

[142] The contention that the appreciation of music constitutively involves aspect perception will be further examined in the first section of chapter III.

Chapter 5 (II. 3): Seeing-as and treating-as

In order to gain a better understanding of seeing-as (or aspect perception), it is helpful to examine both the connections and the dissimilarities between the locution 'to see *x* as *y*' and other verbal phrases of the form 'to φ *x* as *y*'. There are several phrases of this type that are widely used in ordinary language, prominent instances being 'to treat *x* as *y*', 'to regard *x* as *y*', and 'to consider *x* as *y*'. All these notions (and the activities they designate) share important conceptual features with aspect perception, to the extent that they are sometimes used interchangeably in everyday parlance. For instance, when a historian in a TV documentary explains that 'Chamberlain did not see Hitler as the danger he was', his words could be changed to 'Chamberlain did not treat Hitler as the danger he was' without (much) loss of either meaning or nuance. As is his wont, Wittgenstein tends to defer to ordinary usage in not drawing a fine technical distinction between these notions, although subtler differentiations are hinted at in parts of his discussion on aspect seeing and related phenomena.

In the first section of the present chapter, the conceptual core features of treating-as will be scrutinised, highlighting in particular those features which set it apart from aspect perception. In the two following sections, I examine two influential interpretations of Wittgenstein's remarks on aspect perception and assess their respective merits and shortcomings concerning substantial matters (and not so much their plausibility as readings of Wittgenstein). Both Cavell and Mulhall argue that seeing-as is only an instance of a more pervasive attitude, where that attitude essentially amounts to a form of treating-as. This claim can be read in at least two ways. Firstly, seeing-as might be reducible to treating-as. Secondly, the former might turn out to be an admittedly peculiar subtype of the latter. At the end of the discussion in these two sections, it will emerge that the former claim is incorrect, since treating-as is not a sufficient condition for seeing-as, while the latter contention is correct on a charitable reading (and with further qualifications), but misleading inasmuch as it glosses over several fine conceptual distinctions.

1. Conceptual connections and differences between treating-as and seeing-as

The term 'treating-as' and the three-place predicate '*a* treats *x* as *y*' are often used to specify the way or manner in which we engage with a specific object (or even a single property thereof), event, or state. In some special cases, these locutions can be replaced by adverbial specifications without loss of meaning. For instance, stylistic nuances aside, 'the authorities treat this incident as a serious event' is synonymous with 'the authorities treat this incident seriously'. However, these are arguably not the uses that Wittgenstein (and most of his commentators) are primarily interested in. For the term 'treating-as' can also be used to indicate that one handles a given object, event, etc. (or classes thereof) in the same manner in which one treats another kind of object, event, and so on. For instance, when saying that the authorities treat this incident as a terrorist attack, speakers indicate (among other things) that the authorities treat this incident in just the same way in which they typically treat terrorist attacks. There is thus a similarity to aspect-seeing: when saying that someone sees the rabbit-duck as a rabbit, speakers imply that the person in question visually engages with the puzzle picture in just the same manner in which she would engage with an unambiguous pictorial representation of a duck. For instance, when asking her what she sees, she would profess that she sees a (depicted) duck or even draw a picture of a duck in reply.

An important difference is that treating-as, in contrast to seeing-as, is not *per se* indicative of any objective traits of the object at which it is directed. In the case of puzzle pictures and works of art, the perceptual responses of the beholder play a crucial role in determining which properties and functional roles are attributable to the artefact. For instance, when one sees the schematic geometrical drawing as a mountain, then in one sense the drawing in question is a representation of a mountain. This claim does not amount to any deep metaphysical contention about the identity or essence of the drawing. Rather, since (pictorial, auditory, linguistic, etc.) representations are created by humans, once one concedes that there is a legitimate (e.g. widely shared) way of engaging with or using them as representations of a given thing, they thereby quite trivially become representations of said thing. This peculiar kind of objectivity is not present in all or even most cases of treating-as, in part because that locution has a wider scope: the class of things we treat-as comprises not only artefacts, but also objects and occurrences in the natural world.[143]

Moreover, in many cases of treating-as[144], there is an underlying reality or fact of the matter which determines whether the specific way of treating the object, event, etc. in question was adequate or not. Take again the example of the authorities treating a particular incident as a terrorist attack: after gathering and assessing all the relevant evidence (e.g. after a criminal investigation), it might turn out that the incident in question, however shocking, was just an accident, such that the authorities were mistaken in treating the incident in the way they did.[145] As such, there is an independent fact of the matter which determines whether a given way of treating-as was adequate, legitimate, or sound. This point seems to hold only for a specific subclass of aspect seeing, namely those cases where the picture is embedded into a fairly elaborate context: when someone sincerely claims with regards to a triangle used in a standard geometry textbook that she sees it as a mountain, her response would be deemed inappropriate, since she missed the point of the drawing within that specific setting. But this is a special case where the salient context precisely determines whether a visual response is adequate or not. In most cases of aspect perception, the context is just too indeterminate to narrow down the range of permissible interpretations, and in some instances no context is given at all.

Furthermore, seeing-as is essentially an occurrent state: the claim that a perceiver sees the triangle as a wedge is only correct as long as (a) a specific and salient *visibilium* is present and (b) the perceiver actually experiences the visual impression in question. This point is closely connected to Wittgenstein's contention that episodes of aspect perception *qua* mental states or experiences display a 'genuine duration' (cp. RPP I §144, Z §45), in that it is typically possible to specify when the relevant visual experience sets in and when it ends (cp. RPP I §388). Treating-as, which encompasses several fairly diverse ways of engaging with an object, is not *per se* an occurrent state, and neither does it necessarily display genuine duration.[146] For a large class of cases of treating-as, the handling of a specific object (event, etc.) is dependent on the way in which the agent in question

[143] Note that seeing-as ceases to reflect objective characteristics of its object once one allows for an extension of its scope: if one grants that natural objects (such as e.g. rock formations or clouds) can be seen as something, then there are obviously episodes of aspect perception which are purely projective. Whether episodes of pareidolia are legitimately characterised as instances of aspect seeing is a moot point on which Wittgenstein remains silent.

[144] Cases where (subjective) evaluation assumes a key role are perhaps to be excluded. But note that certain ways of treating-as which involve moral or aesthetic judgments can evidently turn out to be inappropriate or wrong.

[145] An additional complication arises here: from a prudential point of view, it might well have been correct or appropriate for the authorities to treat the incident in the manner in which they did. However, what is crucial here is that their treatment of the incident was mistaken from a purely intellectual and cognitive perspective.

[146] Strictly speaking, these are mutually independent conceptual features: the fact that a given instance of treating-as is an occurrent rather than a dispositional state is not to be identified with the circumstance that it possesses a genuine duration. But these features *de facto* go hand in hand in most cases.

treats objects (events, etc.) of that kind more generally. Given that the latter is typically based on fairly robust character traits and cultural factors (among other things), the former also cannot be adopted *ad libitum* and, relatedly, rarely changes instantaneously or abruptly. Accordingly, in some instances treating-as amounts to a dispositional state, that is, a state which can be attributed to the agent even at moments when it is not exercised or manifested. In other cases, e.g. when it denotes the way in which one responds to changing circumstances, a given manner of treating-as can be adopted more or less deliberately, and its duration is also measurable with relative precision.

Also, treating-as is a phenomenon that has an ineliminable practical dimension: it simply consists in engaging with or behaving towards objects, events, etc. in a specific manner. On the other hand, while seeing-as is typically evinced by the way in which the perceiver engages with e.g. a given pictorial representation, it cannot be identified with certain patterns of behaviour. Rather, aspect perception displays an irreducible experiential dimension, in that it is associated with a characteristic phenomenology. When aspects change, for instance, the perceiver experiences a change in her percept, which often gives rise to declarations of surprise or wonder and exclamations to the effect that one has spotted a novel aspect.

On a related note, avowals are of prime importance when assessing whether someone actually sees a given aspect, and they can hardly ever be overridden by purely behavioural evidence. The sincere claim that one has spotted a given aspect, in combination with an overall way of engaging with the picture that is compatible with that statement, vouches for the fact that a perceiver has indeed seen the aspect in question. The criterial basis for assessing whether someone is treating something in a particular manner is strikingly different: when a student professes that she treats an upcoming exam as a matter of utmost importance but fails to show any readiness to study hard (or any other behavioural sign of taking the exam seriously), an onlooker would be justified in saying that her statement betokens insincerity or delusion. Accordingly, in the case of treating-as, first-person declarations as to which state the agent is in can be easily overridden by more compelling behavioural evidence, such that the relevant attitude is not subject to first-person authority.

As a last preliminary, it is worth keeping in mind that there are at least three salient options for connecting treating-as and seeing-as. These three options (or at least the two last ones) are not mutually incompatible, and can in principle be combined to yield a more encompassing account. The first and most ambitious suggestion maintains that the two notions are extensionally equivalent, such that every case of seeing-as is an instance of treating-as and *vice versa*. Secondly, treating-as could be an umbrella term that encompasses all the specific ways in which human beings interact with objects, events, and so on. Seeing-as would count as a particular subtype of treating-as, in that it incorporates an irreducible and ineliminable sensuous dimension. Accordingly, every case of seeing-as would be an instance of treating-as, but not *vice versa*. A third and last option consists in arguing that the conceptual differences discussed above speak against subsuming seeing-as under the more general label of treating-as. This concession notwithstanding, it is striking that the capacity for seeing-as can only be attributed to creatures which also possess the ability to interact with objects, events, etc. in a particular manner, such that the former capacity is based upon the ability to treat something as something. One attempt to give succour to this last option consists in claiming that seeing-as supervenes on treating-as. According to this suggestion, every change in the way one handles a visual object is indicative of an alteration in the corresponding

experience of seeing-as, while there can be no change in the latter that is not thus manifested in one's treatment of the respective object.[147]

Nonetheless, in light of the pervasive conceptual differences between seeing-as and treating-as, it is difficult to see how the latter notion can be employed to shed light on the former one. There are, however, two influential interpretations of Wittgenstein's remarks on aspect seeing which argue that it is essentially tied to forms of treating-as. Both Stanley Cavell and Stephen Mulhall claim that one gains a better understanding of aspect perception only once one has placed it against the backdrop of the arguably more pervasive phenomenon that is treating-as. In the following two sections, I will outline their respective proposals in turn and assess their plausibility, given that these two authors have shaped the debate on treating-as (despite using different labels) by offering the most sustained discussions of the concept.

2. Cavell on 'myths' and 'treating-as'

In his stimulating if highly unorthodox discussion of the topic, Stanley Cavell points out that aspect seeing is closely connected to experiences of meaning and to ways of reading facial expressions and interpreting the personalities behind them. The notions of an attitude and of treating-as are elucidated at length in the context of our interaction with other persons. However, the reader should bear in mind that Cavell's remarks on these topics are all but systematic. In particular, he often introduces subtle distinctions which he then does not put to any (explicit) use. Moreover, it is difficult to attribute to him any of the three positions concerning the interplay between seeing-as and treating-as outlined above, although he seems to embrace the last option. The following is thus at best a rational reconstruction of his main line of thought – inevitably, the discussion has thereby been streamlined and pruned of some of its most striking (if obscure) digressions and asides.

In the passages where he examines the non-visual (or, more strictly speaking, non-sensuous) phenomena related to aspect perception, Cavell often resorts to the notion of a 'myth', used seemingly interchangeably with that of a 'picture'. Both these terms are not defined explicitly, but it is fairly easy to glean some of their main characteristics from the text. In fact, the notion bears some rather superficial (grammatical or conceptual) similarities to that of an aspect. More importantly, it is analogous to certain 'narrative' contexts which highlight a specific aspect or, more strongly, make an aspect visible. In the present context, the Cavellian notion of a myth is important because a given myth or picture encourages certain ways of engaging with or treating things and persons, which in turn indicate that certain knowledge claims[148] are made unproblematic and almost trivial or commonsensical by the myth itself.

In order to get a better grasp of what Cavell means by the term 'myth', it is expedient to indicate the similarities between myths and the 'narrative' contexts in which certain more abstract aspects become visible. While some aspects are fairly independent from contextual interferences, the

[147] Theorists who aver that there is an intimate connection between seeing-as and treating-as seem to revert to this default position once the more ambitious claims prove to be untenable or at least hard to substantiate. However, it is itself not entirely uncontroversial, since primarily 'optical' cases of aspect perception (e.g. the double cross) arguably do not presuppose a specific way of interacting with the drawing in question.

[148] Admittedly, these are knowledge claims of a rather peculiar kind, given that myths are projective in nature. Accordingly, they do not purport to mirror an independently given reality and are not founded upon accumulated evidence. In many respects, they are analogous to what Wittgenstein calls 'primitive certainties', in that they serve to provide orientation in our dealings with the world; the relevant similarities will be elucidated below.

paradigm cases being the rabbit-duck drawing and the double cross, other aspects become visible to an observer only once certain contextual cues have been given, as is the case for 'the aspects of a triangle' (PPF §162). For instance, when using the figure of the triangle in order to explain to someone how to best climb a mountain, by e.g. indicating that it is easier to ascend on the eastern flank, since it is less steep, it becomes natural for the interlocutor to see the triangle as a mountain. Even rudimentary cues can be sufficient to expose an aspect: in El Lissitzky's notorious Soviet propaganda poster *Beat the Whites with the Red Wedge*, the beholder tends to see the red triangle as a wedge hitting the white circle because the triangle is labelled 'wedge'.

There are thus certain aspects which become pertinent only once the drawing or figure in question has been placed into a specific context or once it has been embedded in a scenario. Accordingly, some aspects (and, relatedly, some experiences of aspect dawning and changing) are dependent on a context, in that they become available or accessible only once said context has been established.[149] And the analogy that implicitly undergirds Cavell's discussion of myths is the following: there are certain ways of treating her environment (certain manners of 'treating-as') that become open or natural to a subject only once she has converted to a given myth.[150] To render this point more plausible, it is essential to slightly adapt and discuss one of Cavell's own examples. Concerning the problem of other minds, there are at least two rivalling myths or pictures: the Cartesian one, according to which the mental states of others are epistemologically inaccessible from a third-person point of view, and Wittgenstein's alternative account, according to which the mental life of another person can be accessed on the basis of certain behavioural criteria. The former kind of view inevitably leads to scepticism concerning other minds, but (according to Cavell) also rids us of the burden of striving to communicate with another soul. The latter kind of account is, at least at first blush, comforting: in our interactions with other people, we start taking it for granted that they possess a soul or mind, that they can share our feelings, and that we can understand their aspirations, grudges, regrets, etc.; *in nuce*, it becomes natural for us to treat them as ensouled and as our equals inasmuch as mental states are concerned. Nonetheless, even this seemingly welcome shift of perspective can lead to exasperation: in cases where we fail to understand or sympathise with the mental life of other people, we can no longer exculpate our failure by pointing to an epistemological obstacle but have to face our own 'incapacity or unwillingness to interpret or to judge it [that is, the soul or mind of another] accurately'[151]. This is a crucial point for Cavell: the belief in a given myth does not free us from moral responsibility, and agents can be held accountable and answerable for the actions that they perform under the influence of a myth. In this sense, myths display an ineliminable normative dimension. For once such a narrative has been adopted by a member of a community, the myth provides internal standards against which the appropriateness of an action performed within that community is measured.[152]

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[149] Experiences of aspect dawning and shifting which are favoured by the acquisition of an entirely novel vocabulary (and which thus encourage what I have labelled 'aspect transformation') are an especially salient example.

[150] A similar point could be made regarding Kuhnian paradigm changes in science. Nonetheless, myths in Cavell's sense are different from scientific theories in that they are (typically) not based upon rational argument and rarely discussed or problematised explicitly. Moreover, they are deemed to provide orientation and guidance in our everyday interaction with things in the world, which is arguably not one of the standard or principal functions of theories in science (although there are philosophers of science who might question this assumption). As such, myths and scientific theories might thus have different directions of fit: while the latter are meant to reflect e.g. experimental data, the former are more projective in nature.

[151] Cavell (1979), p. 368.

[152] If the myth in question is deemed to be unjust or obscurantist given e.g. contemporary Western values and standards, it can thus be taken to condone or even command reprehensible or irrational deeds. Cartesian solipsism is arguably a case in point, in that it might encourage certain psychopathic tendencies when accepted as a guiding principle for one's interactions with other persons.

As a further preliminary, it is important to note that Cavell does not reckon that all kinds of treating-as are dependent on some kind of myth, although most of them are.[153] There are some ways of treating-as that permeate, for instance, all our interactions with other people, such as the attitude of treating them as persons or humans. According to Cavell, even the most brutal and debasing ways of interacting with human beings willy-nilly reveal this attitude: psychological warfare, for instance, only gains its cruel effectiveness because one knows that it is applied to human beings who are capable of high-level psychological reactions. If one accepts Cavell's admittedly controversial notion of a 'myth', analogies between context- or scenario-dependent aspects and myth- or picture-dependent ways of treating-as come into view. To gain a deeper appreciation of these analogies, it is helpful to first focus on the parallels between myths and aspect-altering contexts[154] and to then examine the similarities between seeing-as (and aspects) and treating-as (or manners of engaging with things and person, 'attitudes').

Firstly, both contexts and myths essentially consist of cues, that is, suggestions or hints as to how to take or interpret a given object. In the case of aspect perception, these cues can be succinct, as is evinced by the aforementioned Soviet propaganda poster, but in dialogical situations their length depends on the uptake of our interlocutor: as long as she professes that she is unable to see the aspect that we want her to spot, we attempt to provide further hints or construct a more elaborate scenario. The case of myths is slightly different, in that they require *ab ovo* a certain level of elaboration and articulation – an overly emaciated myth simply fails to capture our imagination and enthral us, thus never becoming a live option. If a context or scenario needs to accommodate *in principle* all or most of the salient features of a given figure or drawing in order to favour an aspect shift[155], a myth has to integrate *in fact* all crucial features of a specific realm of reality.

Secondly, there is no single authoritative or compelling context into which a potentially ambiguous picture or bit of reality is to be placed. In the case of aspect-altering contexts, this point is fairly evident, although it might strike one as *prima facie* unintuitive: in the case of the triangle, it is obvious that this is the kind of figure which we encounter in introductory geometry textbooks, and which serves to highlight certain characteristics of triangles. Interpreting the triangle as e.g. a wedge is an interesting second thought, but it does not capture the way in which an observer is supposed to react to the figure. However, the fact that one first sees the triangle as a mere geometrical figure is itself dependent on an implicit and easily overlooked context: one is simply habituated to the fact that such figures tend to be used predominantly in geometry textbooks and not e.g. to describe the shape of a mountain. More controversially, the same applies *mutatis mutandis* to myths, or so Cavell avers. Such ways of engaging with a specific realm of reality are embedded in a culture (or in the dominant *Zeitgeist*) and have typically been instilled into the minds of its subjects. In the case of other minds, for instance, there simply is no fact of the matter – to be established by philosophy, cognitive science, neuroscience and other disciplines – as to whether they are accessible and open

[153] This is, at least *prima facie*, a striking difference between Cavell's and Mulhall's account of treating-as. According to the latter interpretation, many ways of treating-as (Mulhall himself uses the even broader umbrella term 'continuous aspect seeing' to describe these sorts of attitudes) are gratuitous consequences of the fact that we feel at home in the world, that objects and their function are familiar to us, etc. Cavell is much more explicit about the fact that many ways of treating things and persons are dependent on upbringing, culture, epoch, and so on. On his account, there are few forms of treating-as that characterise the life of each and every person (his only example being 'treating persons as persons'), and they are situated at an abstract and comparatively uninformative level.

[154] For the sake of brevity, these will just be called 'contexts' in what follows.

[155] This is a fairly weak constraint. In the case of the triangle, for instance, it makes little sense to append the phrase 'gently sloping hill' to the figure, since that description does not accommodate the fact that the lines are straight rather than curved, etc. However, writing 'wedge' next to the figure is a context that, while being rather uninformative, can be spelled out in ways which do not gloss over any details of the figure.

to view or essentially hidden.[156] Nonetheless, this does not mean that any fanciful narration about the soul is just fine – there are certain features, e.g. concerning the way we speak about other minds and interact (sympathise or fail to sympathise) with other people – that are given or myth-transcendent and consequently need to be accommodated. Moreover, a myth needs to be elaborate and coherent. Lastly, such a narrative should be beneficial, at least in the long run, for the community which decided or was driven to adopt it.[157] In the end, however, these restrictions are not sufficient to guarantee its ultimate truth.

Thirdly and relatedly, if a myth is to be superseded by another one, rational argument is not enough (or sometimes even unavailable) and other forms of persuasion are needed.[158] The case of aspect-altering contexts is again fairly analogous: in the case of the triangle, it is hard though not necessarily impossible to prove that it is indeed (meant to be) e.g. a wedge.[159] It should, however, be noted that replacing a myth by another one is harder than simply citing another context for an ambiguous figure, and often proves to be impossible. In fact, the disanalogy runs even deeper. The contexts or narratives which enable someone to see a figure under a different aspect can be adopted more or less deliberately, provided that the person in question is sufficiently imaginative and takes up the relevant cues. Myths, on the other hand, are typically not subject to the will: whether someone adheres to a given myth is largely a function of her upbringing, her social status, her cultural background, etc., or so Cavell argues. Accordingly, such myths typically form a 'frame of mind'[160], an engrained backdrop against which one sees the world and the objects and persons that populate it. As such, myths – in contrast to aspect-altering context – cannot be changed *ad hoc*, but are subject to slow and incremental evolution. A given myth ceases to serve as guiding background, general principle of orientation, or 'horizon'[161], if it gradually 'dies out'[162] or if an opposing picture becomes widely accepted and eventually unquestioned within a community. Myths, in striking contrast to aspect-altering contexts, thus do not operate on an interpersonal, fairly intimate level, but are typically collective.

Let us briefly take stock. As has been mentioned, Cavell maintains that there is a significant parallel between certain kinds of aspects, namely those whose dawning and shifting is favoured by contextual cues, and specific ways of treating-as. Moreover, so-called 'myths', i.e. fairly comprehensive narratives which provide orientation to an agent as to how to engage with objects and persons, are reasonably similar to the contexts which favour or sometimes even induce a change of aspects. But regardless of the conceptual and/or structural similarities that have been

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[156] This claim is of course dubious and can be attacked on Wittgensteinian grounds: while it is perhaps true that there are no empirical facts which establish that other minds are indeed accessible from a third-person point of view, it is a conceptual truism (enshrined in ordinary language locutions such as 'to read someone's mind') that other minds are thus accessible.

[157] This is a fairly broad constraint: a myth is beneficial for a community if it favours smooth social interactions, if it strengthens features that are conducive to the survival of said community (e.g. resilience), etc.

[158] compare Cavell (1979), p. 366.

[159] The analogy is slightly awry because figures and drawings (a) have an author (or several authors) and (b) have typically been created for a purpose. Accordingly, and to just mention one important difference, one could hope to determine what the figure actually is (how it is actually to be seen) by uncovering the original author's intention. Although some of the myths that Cavell presents are about social practices that have arisen over the course of time (e.g. the State, abortion, slavery), it is virtually impossible to point out the original intention or purpose behind those practices, since (a) their original author(s) are unknown and (b) explaining their actual function or essence in terms of their original purpose might amount to a genetic fallacy, given that a social practice may well change its function in the course of time.

[160] ibid., p. 376.

[161] ibid., p. 365.

[162] ibid., p. 371.

pointed out in the previous paragraphs, the analogy risks remaining superficial and based on a strenuous effort to find an argumentative thread that runs through the whole of *Philosophy of Psychology – A Fragment*, and which is deemed to connect the remarks in the last third or so of that text with the discussion on aspect perception. To Cavell's defence, however, it should be noted that there is a further interesting, arguably functional parallel between seeing-as *simpliciter* and treating-as: just as certain cognitive or conceptual resources can have a direct impact upon (the contents of) our visual experiences, so these same resources can directly, that is, without the need of active and explicit reasoning, guide and structure our behaviour, our ways of engaging with the world. Put more succinctly, both seeing-as and treating-as are expressive of what Cavell somewhat misleadingly calls 'knowledge'[163], and which manifests itself in the unhesitating manner in which agents deal with certain facets of their life.

In this context, the notion of a myth assumes again a pivotal role. For the relevant knowledge is, at least in those cases of treating-as discussed at length by Cavell, founded upon a 'myth' that serves as backdrop for navigating the world. For instance, if someone started doubting whether her colleagues are indeed ensouled (e.g. because she became hooked by the Cartesian 'myth' of other souls), she would suffer a serious loss of orientation and guidance that would end up hampering her performance at work.[164] The pieces of (putative) knowledge prove to be analogous to what Wittgenstein calls 'primitive certainties' in one further respect, namely in that they are based on fundamental principles that can neither be outright rejected nor definitely demonstrated. However, some of the knowledge claims that are enacted by kinds of treating-as are not based on global and encompassing myths, but on subtle 'imponderable evidence'.[165] For example, when someone tries to cheer up a person who is apparently having a bad day, her way of engaging with and treating that person reflects the supposed knowledge that said person has a bad day without, in each and every of its constituent moves, being explicitly based on that knowledge *qua* abstract doxastic state (or, for that matter, on any other form of ratiocination). In this sense, treating-as is a kind of attitude in which knowledge and beliefs are operational or enacted without the mediation of reasoning or deliberation, just as seeing-as is a kind of visual perception in which, at least in some pertinent cases, concepts and contextual cues directly alter (the content of) our visual experience without requiring any conscious intellectual effort.

Cavell's interpretation of treating-as remains problematic, since it suggests that systematic and non-spontaneous forms of engaging with and handling an object, event, and so on only make sense against the backdrop of what he calls a 'myth'. For firstly, the communal standards which provide guidance for an agent as to how to treat an object, event, etc. of a specific kind are often implicit and fairly malleable. Secondly and more importantly, treating-as is not *per se* based upon the adoption of a myth. For instance, the facts that humans treat water as a basic commodity and that they treat meat and vegetables as sources of nutrition reveal something general about the kind of beings that they are without being based on any kind of myth. Rather, these two specific ways of treating-as are based upon fundamental biological necessities. Given the unduly strong emphasis

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[163] compare ibid., p. 357.

[164] In *Philosophical Investigations* §420, Wittgenstein presents just such a scenario and contends that it might induce 'some kind of uncanny feeling' in the person in question.

[165] Cavell thus seems to distinguish between two kinds of treating-as. The first, which he discusses at great length, is standardly based upon a 'myth', while the second, which he mentions only briefly, is underpinned by a more spontaneous gathering of 'imponderable evidence'. This dichotomy seems to correspond roughly to the abovementioned distinction between dispositional and spontaneous (or deliberate) manners of treating-as. In order to buttress the claim that seeing-as is identical to treating-as, Cavell would thus have to find a match between these two sorts of treating-as and two corresponding kinds of seeing-as.

on the narratives or 'myths' into which ways of treating-as are embedded, and taking into consideration that Cavell focuses on a particular subclass of experiences of aspect seeing (namely those in which contextual cues play a pivotal role), his overall interpretative approach willy-nilly turns out to be more modest than originally suggested.

In fact, there are two different interpretative proposals that emerge from Cavell's discussion. Firstly, he at times intimates that context-dependent aspects are identical to ways of treating-as anchored in a myth, such that the terms 'seeing-as' and 'treating-as' in these particular cases mark a distinction with no genuine difference. However, in the light of some of the grammatical features that have been discussed in the preceding section, this proposal is untenable: most forms of treating-as have no genuinely experiential dimension, and an agent's manner of treating an object or an event of a given kind is fairly robust and often grounded in a long-standing, firmly entrenched disposition, while episodes of aspect perception – even those highly dependent on a specific context – are more spontaneous and unpredictable in nature. Secondly, he suggests that context-dependent aspects presuppose a certain way of interacting with and treating the visual object in question that is eventually founded upon what he calls a 'myth'. In this sense, treating-as is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for seeing-as, at least inasmuch as these context-dependent instances of both phenomena are concerned. But while it is true that aspect seeing typically presupposes that the perceiver treats the (material[166]) object of sight in a given manner, this way of treating the object is not necessarily based upon a 'myth' in Cavell's sense, and it is also contentious whether treating-as incorporates the sensuous dimension that is definitive of seeing-as. While his discussion of myths and the specific forms of treating-as in which they become enacted is at times captivating, it fails to shed a decisive light on the connections between seeing-as and treating-as. The main insight that can be gathered from his text is that many forms of treating-as which intuitively strike one as natural and universal are indeed based upon convention, and the same might hold *mutatis mutandis* for those instances of aspect perception where contextual cues assume a fundamental importance. While it appears to be perfectly natural to see a triangle first and foremost as a specific geometrical figure, this seemingly direct response is mediated by an implicitly provided context, which in turn is rendered unobjectionable or even unassailable by the fact that spectators since Euclid's time have become used to see such figures in precisely this manner.

3. Mulhall on 'treating-as' and 'continuous aspect perception'

Mulhall's way of handling treating-as is much more systematic than Cavell's. In fact, this kind of attitude is of paramount importance in Mulhall's interpretation of the remarks on aspect perception, for he makes it out to be the unifying thread that links Wittgenstein's discussion of seeing-as to his examination of experiences of meaning and of our ability (or inability) to read facial expressions and to interpret the behaviour of other people. In order to get a better grip on what he characterises as 'continuous aspect perception' – this is the label he typically applies to the relevant attitude[167] – it is essential to first delineate its conceptual features. After thus specifying

[166] This qualification is needed because the term 'object of sight' is standardly deemed to be ambiguous, in that it can refer (a) to the external object which *qua* stimulus is one of the causes responsible for the perceiver's visual impression and (b) that visual impression itself. I use the term 'material' in order to characterise visual objects in the first sense, while I reserve the qualification 'intentional' to objects of the second kind.

[167] The term itself can be found in Wittgenstein's text (see PPF §118), but Mulhall uses it in a strikingly idiosyncratic manner.

what one might call the 'grammar' of the expression, its functional role will be examined in detail. Lastly, the plausibility of the claim that seeing-as is essentially tied to treating-as will be examined.

According to Mulhall, seeing is not simply a matter of visually perceiving or detecting what is in front of our eyes, just as perception more generally speaking is not a mere matter of discrimination by one or more senses. Rather, seeing is 'an attitude, a way of treating what is perceived'[168]. His reading here is based on PPF §193, where Wittgenstein insists that 'one meaning' of referring to an activity as 'seeing' lies in the way in which we treat ('behandeln') a picture, in our attitude ('Einstellung') towards it. The relevant attitude towards (material) objects of sight is disclosed most notably by two dimensions of our behaviour. Firstly, certain descriptions of what is seen[169] are immediately forthcoming and thus capture our intuitive reaction to it. Secondly and arguably more importantly, the attitude in question can be discerned by observing the manner in which an observer operates and engages with a figure or drawing.[170] For example, when a teacher in a classroom uses the figure of a triangle (cp. PPF §162) to illustrate the fact that the sum of all three interior angles in a triangle is 180 degrees, it is evident that she holds the relevant attitude towards the figure and that onlookers are thereby justified in saying that she sees the triangle in a specific way, as something (namely a triangle).[171] In sum, there are thus two criteria which allow us to determine whether someone is continuously seeing a given aspect, that is, whether she holds the relevant attitude towards the object in which the aspect is present: the manners in which the perceiver herself and onlookers are inclined to describe what is going on, and the relative ease or unease, dexterity or clumsiness (and so on) with which she handles the object in question.

Besides adumbrating both these criteria for continuous aspect perception, Mulhall also cites three (arguably conceptual or 'grammatical') features which distinguish it from 'mere knowing', that is, abstract knowledge about e.g. the identity of an object that lacks vivacity and is not *per se* enacted.[172] The first of these is correlated to the two criteria that have been delineated in the preceding paragraph. When one approaches an object while holding an attitude that is permeated by mere knowledge, one's descriptions of said object will not be immediately forthcoming, and often they will seem mechanical or stale. In the case of continuous aspect perception, the opposite is true, as has been noted above: the respective descriptions will be spontaneous and vivid. For example,

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[168] Mulhall (2001), p. 160. As will be noted below, the precise import of this claim is rather unclear, since 'attitudes' and 'seeing' are, at least inasmuch as their conceptual features are concerned, clearly different. Moreover, Mulhall does not specify the precise relation between those two ways of engaging with objects. It is thus unclear whether seeing is (a) to be identified with an attitude, (b) supervenes on such an attitude, or (c) is merely correlated with the relevant attitude.

[169] Note that the locution 'what is seen' is as ambiguous as the term 'object of sight'. For Wittgenstein, talk about description only makes sense as long as one is dealing with what has previously been dubbed the 'material' object of sight. Just as other mental or putatively inner objects, the intentional visual object is not subject to description(s), but falls within the purview of so-called avowals.

[170] The objects which the attitude is directed at have here been described in deliberately vague terms (first speaking generally about 'objects of sight', then more specifically about 'a figure or drawing') because Mulhall's account is rather unspecific about their precise nature.

[171] For Mulhall, both seeing-as and treating-as are ubiquitous, in that seeing *simpliciter* is seeing-as, while the adoption of an attitude always consists in a specific manner of treating-as. Both these claims are not supported by Wittgenstein's text; see PPF §§122 f., 203. Inasmuch as seeing-as presupposes the possibility of trying to see *x* as *y* (as well as the possibility of trying to refrain from seeing *x* as *y*), episodes of ordinary seeing, where this salient possibility typically does not arise, belong to a separate category. A structurally similar argument, insisting that the locution 'to treat *x* as *y*' can only be applied to cases where a change in one's relevant attitude is at least conceivable, can be mounted against the suggestion that treating-as is ubiquitous.

[172] The distinction between continuous aspect perception and 'mere knowing' is somewhat reminiscent of the more standard differentiation between 'knowledge by acquaintance' and 'knowledge by description' (or between perceptual and non-perceptual knowledge), especially inasmuch as vividness is considered to be a relevant parameter.

both an architect and a layperson may know equally well that a given blueprint represents, say, a five-storey building, but the former is undoubtedly able to describe the drawing with greater ease and accuracy, arguably because she continuously sees it as the representation of such a building. A second characteristic difference is that subjects who merely possess knowledge about the putative identity of a visual object (rather than continuously seeing it as *x*, or treating it as *x*) often withhold judgement, make hedging claims, or just provide a range of possible interpretations. To illustrate this point, it is helpful to again consider the case of the triangle (PPF §162). A person who is continuously seeing the figure as an illustration of certain geometrical principles, that is, a person who is simply treating it in that manner, might unhesitatingly use it to explain or illustrate, say, that the sum of the interior angles in a triangle is 180 degrees. On the other hand, a person who approaches the figure with the mere knowledge that it is meant to represent a triangular object will respond to it in a much more distanced and hedging fashion, by e.g. pointing out that it might be a triangular hole, or a solid, or a wedge, etc. The third and last point that differentiates continuous aspect perception from an attitude characterised by 'mere knowing' concerns the range of possible mistakes. According to Mulhall, a person who holds the latter sort of attitude is bound to make fairly basic mistakes, and in general she makes an unconventional or even outlandish use of the figure. She might, for instance, insist that the face in PPF §119 just is a geometrical drawing meant to illustrate certain properties of circles, while what most perceivers see as eyes, brows, nose, and mouth are reckoned to be insignificant scribbles. On the other hand, a person who continuously sees the drawing as a face can only make comparatively fine-grained errors. For example, she might identify the expression on the face in a manner that seems implausible to most other perceivers, she might take the lines above the eyes to be wrinkles, and so on. Put in a perhaps overly technical way, Mulhall's point seems to be that the attitude of continuously seeing *x* as *y* immunises the beholder against the possibility of misidentifying *y*, while she may still be mistaken in attributing certain more specific properties to *y*.

In the preceding two paragraphs, the defining conceptual characteristics of 'continuous aspect perception' have been outlined, and it has emerged that Mulhall does not consider it to be (primarily) a mode of sense perception, but rather an attitude which enables us to interact with objects and people, that is, a kind of treating-as. Inasmuch as its function is concerned, this attitude fulfils a crucial role in our daily lives. It is in this context that Mulhall further insists that continuous aspect perception is ubiquitous, and the import of this claim is extremely far-reaching. For firstly, it implies that seeing-as is not a peculiar and relatively rare subtype of visual perception. On the contrary, even mundane episodes of seeing – such as seeing the mug on the table that has been my companion for several hours – involve aspect perception: in the case at hand, the mug is an affordance, and I could decide to smoothly interact with it should the need to do so arise. Secondly, continuous aspect perception, which consists of a general attitude, informs even activities that are not purely perceptual and which lack a decidedly sensuous dimension. In fact, Mulhall contends that linguistic competence is underpinned by an attitude closely linked to continuous aspect perception. When listening to or reading meaningful sentences, one does not first perceive mere sounds or marks which are then infused with meaning. Rather, from the beginning the sentences strike a competent speaker as being filled with meaning. According to Mulhall, the fact that one, as it were, directly accesses the meaning of a word or sentence is grounded in the relation which native speakers typically bear to their mother tongues and which he labels 'continuous meaning perception'.[173] Apart from linguistic communication, the daily interactions between people are also

[173] While it is true (at least according to Wittgenstein, as has been shown in the chapter on secondary meaning) that words are *per se* and even in isolation meaningful, this does not in itself imply that speakers perceive their meaning whenever they use them (as Mulhall intimates). A substantial argument would indeed be needed to substantiate this

guided and shaped by continuous aspect perception, provided that they are embedded in a sufficiently familiar cultural context. At least in typical cases, one does not scrutinise and interpret the facial expression of one's best friend. Rather, one immediately perceives what is on her mind, and the fact that one does so is indicated by subtle changes in one's subsequent behaviour. As in Cavell, continuous aspect perception is here based on an engrained attitude that has been acquired in the course of enculturation.

Mulhall's interpretation of the relation between seeing-as and treating-as (what he refers to as 'continuous aspect perception') has merits from both an exegetical and a substantial point of view. For there are indeed passages in Wittgenstein's text that suggest that Mulhall has uncovered an important strand in the argument, most notably §193. Moreover, his account indicates that *Philosophy of Psychology – A Fragment* might turn out to be unexpectedly unified and coherent, thereby buttressing the claim that it is a refined text of primordial philosophical significance. These benefits notwithstanding, Mulhall's argumentation has arguably decisive shortcomings. From an exegetical standpoint, it is highly dubious whether Wittgenstein attributes such a prominent role to continuous aspect perception, and it is even less evident that he introduces the term to denote an attitude or a general manner of treating things. Moreover, Mulhall fails to specify the relation between seeing-as and the relevant attitude in sufficient detail. As such, it is not clear whether the former is identical to the latter, or whether it merely supervenes on it. Lastly, seeing-as and other forms of perception are, at least on the face of it, strikingly different from attitudes, in that the former display, among other things, an irreducibly sensuous character.

It is worthwhile discussing this last criticism in more detail, since the conceptual differences between seeing-as and attitudes such as treating-as reveal why it is difficult for Mulhall to specify the relationship between the two. In the case of aspect seeing, a perceiver can determine with relative precision the moment when she spotted an aspect, she can tell for how long she has been seeing it, and so on. Firm or dispositional attitudes of the type mainly discussed by Mulhall typically do not have a duration, at least not in the sense that one can exactly indicate when someone started or ended holding a given attitude.

Moreover, the change of a visual aspect occurs instantaneously and can, as it were, overcome us all of a sudden. A change in one's attitude and in the correlated way of treating someone or something, however, is typically gradual and thus takes some time. Seeing an aspect is also, at least in some cases, subject to the will: once one knows what the aspects to be spotted in e.g. a drawing are, or if one has previously already seen them, one is in a position to make them shift back and forth at will. Holding or changing an attitude, on the other hand, is not as directly subject to the will, as it often requires a radical transformation of one's circumstances, frame of mind, and so on. These last two claims concerning the incremental nature of changes in one's way of treating-as and their non-voluntary character, however, need to qualified in one respect. For there are situations in which agents do not merely analyse the function of an object and, in doing so, pick up which ways of treating it are called for. In some cases, most notably in instances of make-believe, agents either invent the function that is to be fulfilled by the object or merely pretend that is has a specific function. Consider the example of children's play: a child can spontaneously decide to treat a wooden block as a car, by e.g. moving it in a swift manner while imitating noises typically associated with traffic. However, the concession that there are some cases of treating-as where the parallel to

latter contention. Indeed, it can be criticised on grounds inspired by Wittgenstein, since he attacks the idea that meaningful uses of a word are accompanied throughout by specific feelings in section vi of *Philosophy of Psychology – A Fragment*, most notably §§39-43, and in some later passages (e.g. PPF §272); for an illuminating discussion of Wittgenstein's animadversions against this suggestion of James's, see Child (2011), pp. 177-180.

aspect seeing runs deeper than initially admitted does not provide much grist to Mulhall's mill. For the dissimilarities are still important enough to disallow any reduction of seeing-as to treating-as.

Let us summarise the upshot of this critical examination of Mulhall's views on treating-as. Given the important differences between seeing-as and treating-as, his attempt to account for the former in terms of the latter is uncompelling. There are of course contexts in which the locutions 'to see *x* as *y*' and 'to treat *x* as *y*' are virtually interchangeable. But at least in those remarks where Wittgenstein explicitly discusses aspect seeing, his interest lies not in elucidating all possible uses of the phrase 'to see *x* as *y*', but in coming to grips with a narrower range of phenomena, namely experiences of aspect dawning and shifting, which are typically accompanied by expressions of surprise. And in those specific cases, the sense of being overcome by an experience is lost if one replaces 'to see' with 'to treat': 'Now I treat it as a rabbit' is not an expression of astonishment at the sudden change of one's experience, but a simple declaration of intent or resolution. Accordingly, while Mulhall's account features some valuable insights concerning both secondary meaning and our interaction with other people, it fails to chime with an important number of remarks in *Philosophy of Psychology – A Fragment*. And inasmuch as substantial matters are concerned, it is hard to see how aspect perception could be reduced to (or at least explained in terms of) continuous aspect perception, given that there are wide-ranging differences between these two kinds of phenomena.

Part III: *The pertinence of aspect perception in contemporary debates*

Chapter 6 (III. 1): Aspect Perception in Art

1. By way of introduction: two strands of Wittgensteinianism in the philosophy of art

Wittgenstein's *Nachlass* contains texts that explicitly discuss issues in the philosophy of art, most notably the lecture notes published as *Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief*. Moreover, some of the posthumously published works, such as for instance the collection of miscellaneous remarks printed under the title *Culture and Value*, abound with remarks on specific works of art. But Wittgenstein's influence in the philosophy of art is not exhausted by a reception of these writings. Rather, two crucial notions from his *Philosophical Investigations*, namely those of family-resemblance and seeing an aspect, have inspired a number of philosophers of art.

The lectures on aesthetics mainly attack the idea that words such as 'beautiful' occupy a central position in our discourse about art, and his remarks in that text have an anti-essentialist thrust, in that they favour the conclusion that such terms of aesthetic evaluation denote family-resemblance concepts.[174] However, the moot question in this context is whether Wittgenstein was indeed an anti-essentialist concerning all the key concepts featured in talk about art (and terms such as 'art' and 'work of art' in particular).[175] Shortly after the publication of the *Philosophical Investigations*, and mainly influenced by the remarks on family-resemblance terms such as 'game' in §§65-75, Morris Weitz[176] and William Kennick[177] contended that there are no individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for the application of the term 'art', and that this would have devastating consequences for aesthetics as traditionally conceived. More specifically, Kennick claimed that there are no benefits to be gained from an essentialist definition of art, given that it would in no way change our ordinary practice of talking about art. As a matter of fact, Kennick maintained, proficient speakers of English (and *mutatis mutandis* of other natural languages) know perfectly well how to apply a contested term such as 'art', so that no necessary and sufficient conditions licensing its application are required.[178] While the claim that the concept 'art' cannot be defined in terms of such conditions has become received wisdom, the Wittgenstein-inspired claim that it is a family-resemblance concept has been rejected as uninformative, unless it is complemented by a more substantive characterisation of what the relevant resemblances consist in.[179]

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[174] compare Glock (1996), pp. 32 f.
[175] see Diffey (2004), pp. 44 and 49 f.
[176] see Weitz (1956).
[177] see Kennick (1958).
[178] To drive home this point, Kennick introduces his (in-)famous 'warehouse test' thought experiment. There are at least three observations which render his argument implausible. Firstly, the putative language game devised by Kennick has no obvious point or purpose, and it is not clear under what circumstances speakers would feel inclined to engage in it; compare Diffey (2004), pp. 46-49. Secondly and perhaps relatedly, the term 'work of art' is seldom used in a purely classificatory (rather than evaluative) manner; see Tilghman (1984), pp. 50 f. Thirdly and most crucially, it is not the case that ordinary speakers of English are in a position to separate works of art from other artefacts, and there are borderline cases which even experts fail to classify definitely; see Tilghman (1984), pp. 49 f. and Davies (2016), pp. 42 f. These points notwithstanding, it is widely accepted that no narrowly defined set of rules is needed in order to correctly apply the concept 'art' (and related notions), and this conclusion is standardly deemed to follow from Wittgenstein's remarks about rule following; compare Walton (1990), pp. 185 f.
[179] compare Davies (2013), p. 214.

The influence of Wittgenstein's philosophy on aesthetics is not limited to his anti-essentialism. In fact, philosophers have employed his notion of aspect seeing or seeing-as in order to examine the workings of the imagination[180], which were deemed to assume a pivotal role in the creation and appreciation of art. Moreover, Richard Wollheim has provided an account of pictorial representation in terms of seeing-as[181] and, later, seeing-in[182]. These discussions reached a high level of sophistication, and it is arguable (and hopefully will become evident) that they extend Wittgenstein's discussion into interesting and often fruitful directions. In the present part of my thesis, the theories offered by Scruton and Wollheim will be presented, and their respective merits and shortcomings examined. This will enable us to get a better grasp of both the scope and the conceptual characteristics of aspect perception.

2. Scruton's examination of the role of imagination in aesthetic experience

In *Art and Imagination* (1974), Roger Scruton offers a very dense and somewhat protracted discussion of aspect perception and its close relation to the imagination, which he takes to play a pivotal role in the experience and appreciation of art. His aim in doing so is at least twofold. On the one hand, he wants to account for the fact that art critics often make seemingly incompatible and yet equally sensible claims as to what is expressed in a given work. As a striking illustration of this problem, he cites the falling phrase starting in the seventh bar of the *Andantino* movement of Schubert's penultimate piano sonata (in A major), which 'could equally be described as dance-like or stumbling, as tenderly melancholy or heavily sad'[183]. On the other hand, he hopes to alleviate qualms about affective theories of aesthetic description, which liken the emotions experienced in front of an artistic representation of an object to those experienced vis-à-vis the object itself. Such theories are faced with an obvious difficulty, given that in many cases the presence of the actual object (say, a lion) triggers emotions and desires that are starkly different from those aroused by a mere representation of that object (say, the depiction of a lion).[184]

Scruton tackles the phenomenon of aspect perception indirectly, in that he primarily discusses the various notions bundled under the concept of imagination.[185] In order to make his examination more perspicuous, he draws a series of distinctions that are worth heeding if one is to navigate this

[180] see Ishiguro (1967), Scruton (1974), Warnock (1976).
[181] see Wollheim (1975).
[182] see Wollheim (1980). It should be noted that Wittgenstein's impact on Wollheim's aesthetics was quite pervasive, in that it did not only inspire his account of pictorial experience or perception, but also influenced e.g. his later distinction between the 'conditions of application' (spelled out in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions) and the potentially defeasible 'assumptions of applicability' of notions such as 'art'; see Wollheim (1993) and Matravers (2013), pp. 201 f.
[183] Scruton (1974), p. 125. It is a moot question whether these qualifications are mutually incompatible in a strong sense or merely hint at fairly mild tensions concerning e.g. the degree to which the phrase expresses sadness. In this context, it is of little avail to point out that a work taken as a whole can display similar ambiguities, since the incompatible characterisations typically apply to different parts of the work, and thus not to one single determinable. The suggestion that the last movement of, say, Shostakovich's Symphony No. 5 in D minor is both triumphant and bitterly ironic is not paradoxical in any sense, since the mood or emotion expressed might just change from one section to another.
[184] compare ibid., pp. 128 f.
[185] He does not think that the term 'imagination' is therefore ambiguous, since 'there are links of an important kind between the various phenomena grouped under the heading of imagination' (ibid., p. 91). It is thus arguable that the term denotes a family-resemblance concept. Nonetheless, in order to disentangle his discussion, it is helpful to keep in mind the relatively coarse but often overlooked distinction between imagination as an intellectual capacity to entertain and explore certain thoughts and imagination as a fairly vivid mode of (quasi-)perceptually presenting an object that is currently absent; Scruton calls the latter 'imaging'.

conceptual thicket. Firstly, imagination is subject to comparatively restrictive criteria of adequacy and thereby different (in degree, though arguably not in kind) from mere fantasy or whim.[186] Secondly, the verb 'to imagine' has three different uses, namely as a two-place predicate ('x imagines y'), as a three-place predicate ('x imagines y to be z'), or followed by a that-clause ('x imagines that *p*'). In addition to these, there are adverbial locutions (such as 'with imagination' and 'imaginatively') that need to be kept apart, since they only specify the way or mode in which an independently characterised activity is pursued. Thirdly, imagination and imagining are to be distinguished from imagery and imaging, although Scruton avers that these are intimately linked, in that imaging shares all the fundamental features of imagination.[187]

In his discussion, Scruton strives to set imagination apart from belief and judgement, and in order to do so, he draws on Frege's distinction between asserted and unasserted content. It is easiest to bring out the difference between the two by means of an illustration:

(1) Frege was born in Wismar.
(2) If Frege was born in Wismar, then he was born in what was then the Grand-Duchy of Mecklenburg-Schwerin.

In (1), we find an asserted occurrence of the content that remains unasserted (and is merely supposed) in the if-clause of (2). When one utters the declarative sentence (1) and speaks sincerely, one thereby reveals that one judges or believes it to be true. By contrast, when tokening (2), one is only committed to the correctness of the whole conditional and to the accuracy of the underlying claim about the history of Wismar. Nevertheless, the content or thought expressed in (1) is identical to that expressed in the if-clause of (2). More generally, it is expedient to distinguish the content of a potential linguistic utterance from its function and mode of assertion. Both sentences (1) and (2), inasmuch as they are presented as statements of fact, display what Frege called 'assertoric force' and thus aim at capturing the truth. However, the if-clause in (2) does not possess such force, given that it is not even a self-standing, complete sentence.

Scruton contends that this distinction between two kinds of tokening an utterance is mirrored by a parallel difference between two kinds of thought, namely belief on the one hand and the entertaining of a proposition or mere thinking on the other.[188] In fact, all the different varieties of imagination share a set of at least three features[189] with the mere entertaining of a thought. Hence, they are clearly distinct from belief and judgement, that is, from those states and activities of mind that are assertive, and thus affirmative rather than explorative, in nature. First of all, acts of imagination are typically subject to the will. Accordingly, it makes sense for a given agent to try to imagine a certain thing (as it makes sense to try to suppose something), and the corresponding order to imagine that thing is meaningful, which suggests that it can be executed in many cases.[190] Note that believing is not subject to the will in this sense: we can hardly select the things we want to believe, and the order to believe a given thing in the absence of compelling evidence is, if not completely deprived of meaning, at least nearly impossible to follow.[191] Secondly, both the

[186] see ibid., p. 98.
[187] For a list of all the relevant notions in the vicinity of the term 'imagination', see ibid., pp. 91 f. The last distinction between 'imagination' and 'imaging' corresponds to the dichotomy (cited above in fn. 185) between two kinds of imagination, namely an intellectual and a quasi-perceptual capacity.
[188] see ibid., pp. 88 ff.
[189] While Scruton does not provide such a rigid list of what differentiates beliefs from mere thinking, all the points cited in what follows can be found in his text.
[190] see ibid., pp. 94 f.
[191] Cases in which a speaker begs his interlocutor(s) to believe her are arguably marginal, in that the interlocutor typically does not just believe the speaker (a) unless she provides good independent reasons for supposing that what

entertaining of thoughts and the activities of imagination sometimes display a characteristic volatility, in that they do not necessarily built upon what has been thought or imagined in the immediately preceding moments.[192] On a related note, the verbs denoting them can be characterised as durative or atelic[193], given that these kinds of mental act neither aim at nor result in a settled state. These two characteristics set them apart from acts of judgement, which strictly elaborate on previously entertained or supposed thoughts and give way to (relatively) permanent states such as believing or knowing. Lastly, in the case of thoughts crossing one's mind, the reasons one might provide for their occurrence are typically not justificatory in nature, and it is arguable that the same holds for imaginings. Since Wittgenstein draws an important distinction between reasons and causes, and given that the debate about various kinds of reasons is becoming ever more sophisticated, this last point deserves further attention and elaboration. It is important to notice right from the start that Scruton appears to lump together two things that are best kept apart (inasmuch as normative or justificatory factors are concerned), namely the thought itself with its determinate content and epistemic status and the fact that that thought crosses someone's mind at a specific moment in time.

As a preliminary, it is crucial to pay heed to the distinction between reasons for action and epistemic reasons, though this division might not be exhaustive. While the former occupy centre stage in contemporary debates, Wittgenstein deploys his distinction between reasons and causes primarily to illuminate the manner in which thinkers arrive at specific conclusions via certain mental acts (such as thinking, inferring, and so on).[194] In this context, he repeatedly admonishes philosophers against studying the causes of such acts. According to Wittgenstein, reasons display three distinctive features that set them apart from causes.[195] Firstly, they are by definition transparent to the agent, such that it makes little sense to conjecture or form hypotheses about one's own reasons for doing or thinking something.[196] Relatedly, an agent's reason for doing something or for engaging in a particular type of activity is typically disclosed by her sincere avowals. Secondly, although it is in principle possible to always cite a reason that would further justify a specific act, the actual chain of reasons is finite and, in most cases, readily surveyable. Accordingly, at some point justificatory rock-bottom is reached, and the chain of reasons peters out.[197] Thirdly and perhaps most crucially, reasons for Wittgenstein are distinctively normative in

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she says is true, or (b) unless deferring to her is generally deemed to be a reliable way of obtaining information. Anyway, the locution 'believe you me' might be synonymous with 'trust you me'; compare ibid., pp. 95 f. (This analysis threatens Scruton's interpretation of voluntariness, given that in this last case the meaningfulness of the order arguably fails to indicate that trust is subject to the will.)

[192] The thinking and imagining in question thus do not essentially possess a history, i.e. their contents would still be meaningful or transparent to the agent if isolated from what went on in her mind previously; compare Hacker (1996), p. 437.

[193] A simple test serves to establish this point. In the case of terminative or telic verbs such as 'to understand', it is possible to append the adverbial locution 'within [such-and-such an amount of time]' (or some equivalent expression referring to a precise time span) without any distortion of sense, as in 'I understood what she meant *in a split-second*'. In contrast, using an adverbial phrase such as 'for [such-and-such an amount of time]' yields a semantically deviant or at least infelicitous sentence, e.g. ?'I understood what she meant *for thirty seconds*'. In the case of atelic verbs such as 'to run', the exact opposite applies. Whereas the sentence 'I was running for fifty minutes' is perfectly meaningful, the phrase 'to run within fifty minutes' sounds awkward unless complemented by a more specific expression (e.g. 'to run to town', 'to run a marathon'). A structurally similar test was devised by Vendler (1967), pp. 100 f.; using his terminology, 'running', 'thinking' and 'imagining' would be labelled 'activity terms' (in contrast to 'accomplishment terms').

[194] This is most evident in his *Blue Book*, pp. 14 f. For an elucidation of some of his suggestions concerning reasons for action, see Alvarez (2017), *passim*.

[195] These three points are also listed in Glock (1996), p. 75, though in a different order.

[196] see *Blue Book*, p. 15: '[…] the statement of your reason is not a hypothesis.'

[197] See PI §217 and the beautiful exemplification in PI §381.

nature, and they essentially serve as justifications.[198] Given this last constraint, the claim that the reasons one might cite for a thought crossing one's mind (and, similarly, for imagining something) are not justificatory appears to involve a contradiction in terms. In order to give succour to this idea of Scruton's, it is thus necessary to avail oneself of the finer distinctions deployed in the ongoing debate about reasons for actions.

In contemporary discussions in the philosophy of action, it has become standard to distinguish between three kinds of reasons.[199] The *motivating reason* specifies what drives or impels an agent to perform a certain action. As such, it is the consideration that occurred to the agent in advance of her action and which counted in favour of its performance. The *normative reason* specifies why it is just, correct, adequate, good, desirable, etc. to accomplish the action in question, and it thus furnishes considerations that indicate (objectively) why the action ought to be performed. Lastly, the *explanatory reason* makes the action of an agent transparent or intelligible from a third-person perspective, and often features a reconstruction as to what might have driven the agent in the situation at hand.

In order to get a grip on the non-assertive and atelic mental acts discussed by Scruton, these distinctions require careful elaboration. For clarificatory purposes, consider the notion of 'embracing a belief', which designates a mental act that is terminative, in that it instates a readiness to make certain affirmations and stand by one's belief, among other things. Embracing a belief and the direct consequences thereof are subject to all three kinds of reasons. The belief may, for instance, be based upon considerations which weighed with the agent and rendered it plausible, such that she had motivating reasons for espousing it. Moreover, it might have been instilled into her in early childhood, a circumstance which makes her embracing it intelligible for an onlooker and thus serves as explanatory reason. Lastly, it might just be based on sound evidence and correct reasoning. All these considerations can, with varying plausibility, be said to make her endorsing of the belief reasonable. With respect to the case discussed by Scruton, namely that of a thought crossing someone's mind, these points do not apply as straightforwardly. Since the notion of a motivating reason presupposes that the mental act in question is subject to at least a minimal degree of deliberateness (and thus at least partially under the subject's control), there are cases of a thought crossing one's mind on which the notion does not get any hold. Similar considerations apply to cases in which the mind wanders off in imagination, though imagining is arguably subject to more control and deliberateness. Nonetheless, in some cases there are certain objective and fairly systematic connections which make the transition from thought *a* at t_1 to thought *b* at t_2 both permissible and intelligible. When trying to recall how Wittgenstein finally managed to get the *Tractatus* published, one's mind might drift off and engage in ruminations concerning his hardships as a prisoner of war, one might inadvertently picture Monte Cassino, and so on. The connection between the publication of the *Tractatus* and Monte Cassino is not purely arbitrary, and indeed it is not even overly strenuous. Accordingly, pointing out this relation makes the crossing of that particular thought intelligible from both a first- and a third-person point of view, and an explanatory reason for this indeliberate mental act is thus available. Moreover, the cited connection provides the thinker with an excuse (if needed) for having entertained a particular thought and,

[198] compare *Blue Book*, p. 14, though Wittgenstein appears to be working there with an embryonic version of the distinction between motivating reasons ('telling the way which one has gone oneself') and normative reasons ('describing a way which leads there and is in accordance with certain accepted rules'). It is at least conceivable that the former might turn out to be non-justificatory in certain cases.
[199] see Alvarez (2016), *passim*.

depending on the specifics of the situation and on what was at stake, shields her from unduly harsh criticism.

The fact that explanatory and perhaps even normative reasons can be provided in cases of a thought crossing one's mind sheds some light on imaginings as well, for the two cases run parallel to a certain extent. Scruton suggests that imaginings display what one might call a 'non-epistemic' character, in that the reasons which sometimes underpin one's imaginings do not give license to beliefs or judgements. This much seems correct: since the imagination is not an epistemic faculty (though it might nonetheless qualify as an intellectual capacity), it is not in the business of providing a foundation for epistemic states. However, he also avers that the things one imagines, though they might draw on what one is acquainted with, are not directly based upon what one knows or believes.[200] Accordingly, he contends that the realm of the imagination transcends what is known or believed to be true and, strictly speaking, 'one cannot [even] imagine *X* to be as one knows or has good reason to think it to be'[201]. This second conclusion – the step from maintaining that imaginings are non-epistemic in the sense defined above to the claim that they lie completely outside of the purview of justificatory concerns – is unwarranted, or at least stands in need of qualification. As was the case for thoughts crossing one's mind, certain associations and reminiscences, for instance, can be cited to make an imagining intelligible, such that there are explanatory reasons for one's imaginings being as they are. Moreover, certain imaginings are more apt than others, in that they reflect certain inherent traits or characteristics of the subject(s) that they are about. When I imagine, say, Donald Trump paying a state visit to Germany[202], I may imagine that he makes, against all odds, certain concessions concerning military spending and car exports. However, imagining him to be completely different in that situation, e.g. dignified, tame, and receptive in his overall demeanour, would be a stretch, and might amount to pure whim or fancy.

Inasmuch as imagining is to be differentiated from believing, it counts as a subtype of what Scruton tends to call 'thinking' (that is, the entertaining of thoughts), in that it does not give rise to any assertions. But despite the striking similarities between the two phenomena, imagination is not simply to be identified with thinking in this wide sense, since the latter is not subject to any restraints or adequacy conditions besides those set by logic.[203] More specifically, what distinguishes object-bound imagination[204] from thinking and sets it apart from mere fancy as well is the fact that it is bounded by certain criteria of adequacy. Firstly, the description of the object brought forward

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[200] This is not to deny that certain beliefs form the backdrop for what is imagined and are kept constant across various imaginings. As a matter of fact, it is impossible to think up scenarios which differ in every detail from reality.

[201] Scruton (1974), p. 98. This overly general claim needs to be qualified. Firstly, there are locutions in which the verb 'to imagine' is used to give voice to plausible suggestions underpinned by good (though not compelling) reasons, as in e.g. 'I imagine that she is done with her paper by now'. The *Concise Oxford English Dictionary* duly notices that 'to imagine' is synonymous with 'believe to be so; suppose' in these cases. Secondly, the quasi-perceptual variety of imagination ('imaging' in Scruton's terminology) ideally latches on to how a thing indeed looks, sounds, tastes, etc. When I imagine what the Red Square looks like (without ever having been there), I draw on all the available evidence (photographs, descriptions in travel guides, etc.) suggesting what it *actually* looks like.

[202] Evidently, he has not yet visited the country at the moment of writing (September 2019).

[203] Scruton does not put the point this way, but rather argues that "thinking of' is […] indifferent to truth' (ibid., p. 90), which is hardly informative given the non-assertoric character of thinking (in contrast to belief). Strictly speaking, imaginings are also 'indifferent to truth', in that they are not evaluated according to their truth or falsity (again, in contrast to beliefs). Rather, they are assessed according to their appropriateness or inappropriateness (compare ibid., p. 98), though it is rather unclear how this assessment is to be effected.

[204] This is the type of imagination that grounds the uses of the three-place predicate 'x imagines y to be z', where 'y' holds place for an object given either by acquaintance or through description and 'z' stands in for an appropriate imagined description. (In this case, 'imagined' is a specifying adjective that roughly means 'furnished by the imagination', and which is to be differentiated from the modifying adjective synonymous with 'imaginary'.)

by the imagination must chime well with the overall characteristics of that object, in that it integrates those features into a tight and coherent narrative.[205] As such, the imagination rarely produces one single, isolated description of the object, but rather offers an integral descriptive account of each of its particularities (this is especially true if the object in question is a work of art).[206] Secondly and relatedly, the producer of such a description must be able to give reasons for what she said (and not just for her saying it). That is, instead of naming causes for her providing a certain description (she might here cite specific associations, the fact that she has taken a hallucinogenic drug, etc.), she must elaborate on what impelled her to describe the object in the particular manner in which she did. In this sense, the producer of an imagined description is held accountable for it: its cogency may be questioned, and in certain cases it might even be subject to correction.

Let us briefly take stock. In the preceding paragraphs, (a) the characteristic features of the core concept of imagination (that is, the trademarks found in any variety of imagination, e.g. object-bound imagination, imagery, etc.) have been delineated and (b) the distinctive normativity of object-bound imagination has been examined. The fact that this kind of imagination is subject to normative constraints is evinced by two circumstances. Firstly, in contrast to pure whim and also differently from mere thinking, object-bound imaginings aim to unravel features of the object at which they are directed or, perhaps more plausibly, they strive to make at least sensible attributions of such features. Secondly, a person who voices such an imagining can under normal circumstances be held responsible for it, such that she may be criticised for e.g. distorting or otherwise misrepresenting the object in question. Both these features are meant to capture essential characteristics of aesthetic appreciations, namely that they aim at being correct or at least plausible and that they are defeasible and can be criticised in a rational manner. Nonetheless, they sit uneasily with the alleged non-epistemic character of the imagination.

It is noteworthy that seeing-as shares all the relevant characteristics of object-bound imagination, and that these two phenomena are thus intimately linked. For aspect seeing is arguably subject to the will, volatile (in that the observer does not settle on one aspect being exclusively definitive of what is seen), non-epistemic in character and nonetheless subject to certain normative constraints, most notably restrictions on the range of what is to be seen in a picture. These striking analogies notwithstanding, it would be mistaken to simply equate seeing-as to object-directed imagination, since the former possesses an essentially sensuous or experiential nature which links it closer to imagery.

Imagery, which according to Scruton underpins our capacity to imagine what certain things would feel, look, taste (etc.) like[207], possesses the characteristics that were deemed to be definitive of mere thinking.[208] However, it transcends both the mere entertaining of a thought and the core concept

[205] see ibid., pp. 98 f. The scenarios featured in these narratives are neither supposed to be literally true (for otherwise they could be asserted) nor likely. Given these restrictions, it is far from clear how the range of permissible descriptions is fixed. Quite generally, this is a problem with which accounts that insist on the crucial role of imagination in aesthetic appreciation have to wrestle; compare Walton (1990), pp. 138-187.
[206] see Scruton (1974), pp. 124 f.
[207] compare ibid., pp. 105 f. This is not to say that imagery is employed only in pure acts of imagination, as it also plays a crucial role in recalling what has been experienced in the past (e.g. the look of one's grandmother's face; see ibid., p. 104). Moreover, the term 'imagery' is arguably a misnomer, since the phenomenon is not limited to one specific sense modality.
[208] see ibid., p. 118.

of imagination[209] in at least three respects, which are attributable to its likeness to actual sense-impressions. As such, 'images can be more or less vivid or intense, while remaining constant in respect of detail'. Moreover, the deployment of imagery (that is, the presence of a specific image in one's mind) has a precise duration that can in principle be measured.[210] Accordingly, one is typically able to determine with relative precision when an image has faded from one's mind, and it is impossible to interrupt and then continue an episode of imaging (whereas the opposite holds in the case of both thinking and imagining).[211] Lastly, imaging is internally or conceptually related to the senses[212], in that the description of imagery in terms of the different sense modalities forces itself upon us: as such, imagining what, say, a dragon would look and sound like cannot be exhaustively described by citing the thoughts that would be entertained in such a case.

It should be relatively obvious that Scruton's analysis of the core concept of imagination and of the characteristics of imagery sheds light on aspect perception as well. For seeing-as displays all the main features of acts of the imagination discussed above. Firstly, it is subject to the will, at least in the relatively narrow sense that the order to see an aspect (or, less strongly put, the order to try to see an aspect) is meaningful. Secondly, episodes of aspect perception are characteristically volatile, in that typical cases feature at least one shift of aspect; what is seen in such an episode is thus unstable. Thirdly, the spontaneous detection of a hitherto unseen aspect is not motivated or guided by reasons, although it can typically be made intelligible from both a first- and a third-person perspective. Since episodes of aspect perception do not feature any conscious ruminations or inferences on the part of the observer, there are *a fortiori* no motivating reasons that weigh with her. Moreover, the similarities between object-bound imagination and seeing-as are not exhausted by a merely formal property, namely by the fact that both are expressed by the use of three-place predicates ('x imagines y to be z' and 'x sees y as z', respectively). Rather, aspect perception is itself subject to conditions of appropriateness, which nonetheless are fairly malleable and can become subject to negotiation.

The last two characteristics ascribed to the phenomenon, however, need to be elucidated in more detail, since it is not clear how the citing of appropriateness conditions differs from the providing of reasons for one's seeing an aspect.[213] Scruton indeed underestimates the fact that these appropriateness conditions can be cited if one wishes to make one's experience intelligible for another person. Moreover, in some cases they assume a genuinely normative role, in that they e.g. serve to stave off certain criticisms. Accordingly, the appropriateness conditions function, at least on some occasions, as explanatory and/or normative reasons. The difference that Scruton has in mind arguably amounts to the following: while the reasons one might give for one's seeing an aspect must precede that seeing if they are to motivate it, the respective appropriateness conditions are only established once the relevant aspect has been seen and indeed described.[214]

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[209] The term 'core concept of imagination' is used as shorthand for those conceptual features which are displayed by every specific subtype of imagination (most notably, object-bound imagination and imagery); in this respect, it is an abstraction.

[210] see ibid., pp. 101 f.

[211] see ibid., p. 102.

[212] see ibid., p. 110.

[213] These elaborations, while remaining faithful to the spirit of Scruton's work, are essentially my own.

[214] In fact, Scruton might insist that such appropriateness conditions are necessarily disclosed in aesthetic experience and not pre-given. When he speaks about 'reasons', he seems to have in mind considerations that can serve as premises for judgements of taste, and since aesthetic experience is arguably autonomous and not based upon such judgements, reasons *a fortiori* do not get a grip on the aesthetic realm. This admittedly tentative line of reasoning chimes well with Wittgenstein insistence, in *Lectures and Conversations*, on the fundamental importance of 'aesthetic reactions'.

It is tempting to merge these two normative constraints, given that the same form of words can be used to provide an explanatory reason (or a *post hoc* justification) on one occasion and function as an appropriateness condition on another. For instance, in the case of the duck-rabbit, in order to reveal what justifies or motivates one's exclamation 'It's a rabbit!', one might further elaborate: 'These two elongated shapes looked to me like a rabbit's ears!'. Another perceiver (or the same subject on another occasion), when prompted to explain in what sense the drawing could be of a rabbit, might provide the following narrative: 'Well, the elongated shapes are the rabbit's ear, the dot is its eye, on the right-hand side you can see its mouth.' In the second scenario, no reference is made to the perceiving subject, while such reference is arguably more than just optional in the first case. A similar point applies to aesthetic experiences guided by imagination. In typical cases, a subject engaged in aesthetic appreciation does not describe or express these experiences from a first-person perspective, but rather takes them to be indicative of intrinsic features of the respective work of art. Indeed, expressing one's aesthetic experiences from an explicitly first-person perspective often serves to flag that they are contentious: though the subject concedes that she has not the competence or authority to genuinely assess the work, she insists that how she experiences the work is perfectly transparent to her.

Nevertheless, the main characteristics of aspect perception are not exhausted by its similarities to imagination *simpliciter*.[215] Rather, Scruton contends that seeing-as also possesses the features that he deemed to be definitive of the sensuous character of imagery, namely vividness, precise duration, and an inextricable conceptual relation to the senses. With regards to the first respect, he maintains that in the case of aspect perception the dimension of vividness amounts to the following: 'it is possible to have the sense of some detail suddenly 'coming at' one, and then receding once more into the background'[216]. The second characteristic is revealed by the fact that a perceiver is able to specify the precise moment at which an aspect has dawned or shifted. Concerning the last feature, Scruton maintains that the connection between aspect seeing and ordinary seeing is a conceptual one. As such, it is impossible to determine, for instance by means of introspection or phenomenology, 'in *what* way the seeing of an aspect is like the seeing of the thing itself'[217]. Relatedly, except in a conceptual sense, the alleged components of an episode of aspect seeing, namely its imaginative and its sensuous characteristics, cannot be untied.

As was pointed out in the opening paragraph of this section, Scruton's objective in discussing aspect seeing was to account for two crucial features of our engagement with works of art. In fact, he is now in a position to offer a principled defence of affective theories of aesthetic descriptions. More broadly speaking, the elaborations on seeing-as are meant to account for the fact that we constantly ascribe features to works of art which they cannot possess, at least literally speaking. Except for marginal cases, framed canvasses cannot be terrifying or awe-inspiring, a succession of sounds cannot be sad, and so on. While it is indeed true that a painting of a lion, however realistic it might be, does not arouse in us fear and terror, when reacting to the painting we nonetheless entertain *simulacra* of these emotions in our mind.[218] And this licenses us to say, for example, that

[215] In one passage, Scruton suggests that aspect perception is indeed a fusion of imagining and seeing: 'in 'seeing as' it is as though I imagined an object and simultaneously saw it in something else' (ibid., p. 112).

[216] ibid., p. 111. The analogy is arguably awry, since episodes of aspect seeing are not gradable according to their vividness. It makes no sense to say 'I see the rabbit aspect faintly' (with the possible exception of those cases where one tries to recollect what the duck-rabbit drawing looked like), while this is supposed to be perfectly in order in the case of images in one's mind (an utterance such as 'I have a faint image of a dragon in my head' is deemed to be meaningful by most empiricists, including Scruton).

[217] ibid., p. 110.

[218] One might object that this reference to 'as if' emotions, that is, to emotions that are not enacted, is not just unilluminating, but obscurantist. While this worry cannot be alleviated completely, it can arguably be attenuated by

the picture features the *terrifying* gape of a wild beast. In his efforts to buttress affective theories of aesthetic descriptions, Scruton relies on what one might call the hypothetical or suggestive aspect of imaginings. Rather than yielding assertions and firm conclusions, the imagination here allows us to entertain certain possibilities: when standing in front of a painting featuring a lion, for instance, one might explore how one might react to the actual presence of such a beast, what the terror induced by its presence would feel like, and so on.

Moreover, by further stressing the non-assertive character of aesthetic descriptions underpinned by imagination, Scruton can account for the fact that often strikingly different interpretations of one and the same work of art do not exclude each other, in that the adequacy of one description does not preclude alternative, seemingly incompatible descriptions from being sensible as well. Given that object-bound imagination (and aspect seeing as a related phenomenon) is subject to appropriateness conditions, a given description is legitimate if and only if it can be embedded into a coherent overall narrative that accommodates all the salient features of the work of art in question. This enables Scruton to defend a subtle account of interpretation: while starkly different descriptions of a specific part of a work of art might still be deemed incompatible, it is difficult to identify the precise *loci* of disagreement and/or incompatibility, since the respective descriptions are typically integrated into wider narratives that are hardly *globally* incompatible. These merits notwithstanding, the normative dimension of aesthetic appreciations that is readily noticed by Scruton remains hard to reconcile with his insistence on their non-assertoric character. Indeed, it is difficult to see how genuine disagreements as to e.g. the worth and significance of a specific work can arise if none of its interpreters espouses and asserts (rather than merely entertains) claims concerning its meaning, significance, message, and implications.

3. Wollheim's account of seeing-as and seeing-in

In the first edition of *Art and its Objects* (1968), Richard Wollheim offers an examination of pictorial perception in terms of seeing-as. At first blush, the problem he strives to resolve appears to be structurally similar to the second question tackled by Scruton. While the latter draws on the notion of seeing-as in order to provide an account as to why the attribution of emotions and, more generally, expressive features to artefacts is legitimate, Wollheim addresses the *prima facie* puzzle that the representational properties ascribed to works of art, and paintings in particular, are often incompatible with their purely material properties.[219] As such, the thesis that such works are physical objects, which he wants to defend with some qualifications, is prone to an obvious criticism: although beholders are licensed to describe, for instance, Donatello's statue of St George as 'being instinct with life', the statue *qua* material object is inanimate and thus fails to display that

presenting convincing examples. For instance, the *Largo* movement of Shostakovich's Symphony No. 5 in D minor can be heard as guiding us through various layers of despondency, and we can be under the impression of grasping something of the essence of that emotion by listening to this piece, although the music does not typically make us feel despondent. Moreover, at least in some quarters, one can even be criticised for experiencing genuine emotions (rather than sublimated *simulacra*) in response to a work of art. For instance, when one is moved to tears at the end of a film, one might be scolded for being overly 'sentimental'.

[219] This is not to say that Wollheim does not tackle the former conundrum as well. But his account of the expressive properties of works of art makes no use of the notion of aspect perception. Rather, he presents an analogy- or similarity-based account (see Wollheim (1975), pp. 38-50 (sections 15-19)) that arguably fails to be as refined as Scruton's analysis: '[w]hen we endow a natural object or an artifact with expressive meaning, we tend to see it corporeally: that is, we tend to credit it with a particular look which bears *a marked analogy* to some look that the human body wears and that is constantly conjoined with an inner state.' (ibid., pp. 48 f. (sect. 18), emphasis added). It is not evident how this account can be extended so as to apply to music as well.

particular property.[220] In order to further highlight the importance of the problem, Wollheim insists upon the fact that representational attributions are extremely widespread. For such attributions are not just applicable in the domain of figurative art: in fact, it is impossible to give a purely formalist description of any work of art, given that the description of a work is only adequate once it features terms such as 'depth', 'dynamicity', 'diagonal recession', etc., all of which already pertain to the representational idiom. Even when an observer strives to characterise the content of, say, a painting in abstract form terms, she willy-nilly resorts to vocabulary which indicates that she has perceived meaningful forms or *Gestalt* shapes in the work. Accordingly, it is the hallmark of the representational idiom to present such *Gestalthaftigkeit*, and this idiom is indispensable even for the description of non-figurative modernist art.[221]

Wollheim's solution to the aforementioned problem is appealingly simple: our tendency to attribute representational properties to material objects is underpinned by the pervasiveness of representational seeing, which he initially equates to seeing-as. He thus submits that in contemplating a work of art, the beholder comes to see a material object (say, a framed canvas) as a representation of a given object or situation.[222] Unfortunately, he fails to give an informative characterisation of seeing-as, and he mainly argues *ex negativo* for the claim that representation (and descriptions in terms of representational properties) are based upon this perceptual capacity. On the one hand, he attacks theories which try to ground representation in some sort of objective similarity.[223] For firstly, the notion of similarity is both context-dependent and non-universal, in that it is anchored in specific social practices and institutions. Secondly, Wollheim contends that in order to specify the range of 'x' in 'x resembles y' (where 'x' denotes an artefact), one already relies upon the representational idiom.[224] And thirdly, 'x representing y' cannot simply amount to 'x resembles y', since the latter denotes a symmetric relation, while the former stands for an asymmetric one.

On the other hand, Wollheim also criticises accounts that draw on an unduly inflated conception of intention.[225] For theories that aim to explain representation only in terms of the artist's intention do not put enough emphasis on what the artist actually does after forming the intention in question and, more importantly, they fail to even consider the importance of what a beholder might see in a given painting. In his early work, Wollheim in fact contends that representational seeing or seeing-as is, as far as an explanation of representation is concerned, more fundamental than the artist's intention(s): '[…] it would certainly seem that whether a thought does express the intention behind that act of, say, drawing which it accompanies is not independent of what the result of the

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[220] see ibid., p. 28 (sect. 11).

[221] compare ibid., p. 30 (sect. 11). One might wonder whether the so-construed representational idiom encroaches too heavily on purely formal vocabulary, in a manner which precludes formalist accounts of art *ab initio* from being plausible.

[222] With the benefit of hindsight, it is fairly obvious that this is a non-starter, at least if one wants to pay heed to Wollheim's own later suggestion that pictorial perception is characterised by a simultaneous and bifocal attention to both the representational medium (e.g. the paint on the canvas) and the represented scene. Equating representational seeing and seeing-as is only viable if one concurs with Gombrich that this sort of dual attention is indeed impossible, such that pictorial perception involves a switching back and forth from the medium to the content.

[223] see ibid., pp. 33 f. (sect. 13).

[224] Again, the claim seems to rely on the contentious assumption that the representational idiom (and thus the representational seeing that it is meant to capture) is virtually ubiquitous. Indeed, it is not clear what a formalist or, to borrow a term that Wollheim later employs, 'configurational' idiom would look like. The underlying idea of the train of thought here seems to be that it is possible to perceive a resemblance or similarity if and only if the two *relata* strike the observer *ab ovo* as being imbued with meaning. The argument is of course uncompelling, since some similarities can be characterised in terms of e.g. a purely geometrical sameness of outline shape.

[225] see ibid., pp. 35 f. (sect. 13).

action, in this case the drawing itself, can be seen as'[226]. He even goes so far as to claim that the intention in question is based upon the capacity to see representationally, in that only an artist who can anticipate what the final drawing can be seen as will be able to form the relevant intention.[227] Both these points are radically revised in the fifth addendum to the second edition of *Art and its Objects*, in which he also criticises his previous account of seeing-as (or what he took to be essential to it[228]).

In the supplementary essay entitled 'Seeing-as, seeing-in, and pictorial representation', Wollheim not only offers a renewed discussion of seeing-as, but also introduces the rival notion of seeing-in. Before setting out to illuminate the differences between these two notions, it is expedient to first examine what he now means by seeing-as, since his understanding of that term has changed quite dramatically. This also serves as an illustration of the problems faced by any interpreter of section ix of *Philosophy of Psychology – A Fragment*: since Wittgenstein there discusses a host of different though interrelated phenomena, it is hard to fathom (a) what seeing-as or aspect perception actually amounts to and (b) how encompassing a phenomenon it is. In the first edition of *Art and Its Objects*, Wollheim suggested that seeing-as is definitive of our engagement with representational artefacts, while remaining unspecific as to its precise nature. In the additional essay, he offers a more elaborate account of the characteristics of seeing-as, but advances a radical claim as to its purview: in fact, he avers that all seeing is seeing-as, given that the latter effects the conceptualisation of what is given in straightforward perception.[229] However, the conceptual content is not simply grafted onto an independently describable experience; rather, both the experiential and conceptual component coalesce in an episode of aspect seeing, and can only change as one.[230]

Wollheim's argument in favour of the thesis that seeing-as is ubiquitous, and that seeing *simpliciter* is thus to be equated with it, seems to have the following structure:

(P1) Episodes of seeing *per se* feature concepts.
(*auxiliary consideration*) What is seen is *ab initio* imbued with meaning, in that perceivers are cognisant of *Gestalt* shapes and patterns; such *Gestalt* perception is based upon the conceptualisation of what impinges on our senses.
(P2) This conceptualisation of ordinary perception can only be brought about by seeing-as.
(C) Seeing-as is involved in all episodes of ordinary seeing.

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[226] ibid., p. 36 (sect. 13).
[227] compare ibid.
[228] In this later work, he also attributes many features to seeing-as that were not mentioned in the first edition, and so it is controversial whether he even discusses the same phenomenon; see Heinrich (2016), pp. 174 f. This problem is due to a fundamental change of opinion: whereas he used to identify representational seeing with seeing-as (see Wollheim (1975), p. 32 (sect. 13)), he now considers the former to be a broader genus which encompasses the latter as one of its subcategories (compare Wollheim (1980), p. 205).
[229] see ibid., p. 219: 'Whenever I straightforwardly perceive something, which *ex hypothesi* is present to the senses, my perception of it is mediated by a concept, or in perceiving it I subsume it under a concept. For any *x*, whenever I perceive *x*, there is always some *f* such that I perceive *x* as *f*.' Wollheim thus embraces the view that the contents of perception are conceptual and avers that seeing-as is ubiquitous, in that seeing *simpliciter* amounts to seeing-as. Wollheim appears to (implicitly) endorse the ubiquity thesis already in the first edition of *Art and its Objects*, given his insistence on what he calls the 'representational idiom', which is ultimately based upon the capacity to see representationally (i.e. seeing-as as initially conceived).
[230] see ibid., p. 220. It is not entirely clear whether Wollheim takes this to be a purely conceptual or indeed a phenomenological characteristic of such experiences. It is noteworthy that the claim that perception and concept application cannot be separated, which is still hotly debated in contemporary philosophy of perception in the wake of McDowell's seminal *Mind and World*, has become a core tenet in aesthetics, and is taken to hold for pictorial perception quite generally; see e.g. Walton (1990), p. 295.

Though not explicitly advocated in Wollheim's text, the auxiliary consideration is meant to make (P1), itself an ambitious and contentious claim, more readily intelligible. The consideration squares with his insistence on the (near-)ubiquity of what he dubs the 'representational idiom', whose employment is in turn underpinned by the capacity to see representationally.

In most cases of ordinary perception, the respective concept is instantaneously integrated with the perception, but this need not be the case. In other, not completely peripheral cases, the fact that the concept latches onto the perception might have been favoured by various auxiliary circumstances, such as some relevant prior belief(s), the prompting by another person, or an antecedent close scrutiny of the object.[231] In all these cases, seeing-as has a normative dimension and typically results in perceptual beliefs and the corresponding assertions. Accordingly, purely projective episodes of seeing-as, which require extensive efforts of the will and imagination, are deemed to be marginal and virtually incoherent.[232] While there might be cases in which one succeeds in forcing a concept onto a perception[233], situations in which one 'tr[ies] out on an object an appearance that [one] know[s] it does not really wear' are borderline cases, in that "as' [here] approximates to 'as if it were".[234]

While Wollheim thus contends that seeing-as is involved in every act of ordinary (visual) perception, he no longer thinks that it sheds light on pictorial representation. He offers three reasons for this claim, the last of which is arguably the strongest one. Firstly, '[g]iven that the something seen is a particular […], all we may see it as is a particular' and, accordingly, the second variable in the three-place predicate 'x sees y as z' can be replaced only by names and descriptions, that is, expressions which stand for a single object.[235] However, many works of art depict complex scenes and situations, which can only be specified by using more complex expressions, such as complement clauses starting with 'that' or (possibly) 'how'. Secondly, in episodes of seeing-as, the beholder must be capable of precisely determining which part of an object she is seeing as z.[236] Consequently, seeing-as is subject to a requirement of localisation. But in the case of representational works of art, such as e.g. paintings and, arguably, musical compositions, what one detects in them is not necessarily located on the canvas or contained in the sounds: Wollheim

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[231] see ibid., p. 221.

[232] *Prima facie* Wollheim seems to be in strong disagreement with Scruton on this matter, since the latter frequently insists on the voluntary nature of seeing-as. Nonetheless, the supposed normative character of both aspect perception and certain instances of imagination is, even in Scruton's account, incompatible with their being purely or even significantly projective in nature. For an extensive discussion of the uneasy role of aspect perception within the (arguably) false dichotomy of perception and projection, see Hagberg (2016), pp. 118-126.

[233] This might seem to be controversial at least, and Wollheim's example does not do much to alleviate these doubts: 'I need or desire to see the tree as an oak, and my efforts are rewarded' (ibid.). If such a situation is deemed possible, then a criterion needs to be provided which separates cases of this type from those cases of seeing-as that are constitutive of straightforward veridical seeing, since the latter is not subject to the will. It is worth keeping in mind that Wittgenstein's discussion in *Philosophy of Psychology – A Fragment* focusses on cases in which there is a genuine change in phenomenology, in what things look like, or – in a more Wittgensteinian manner – in which there is an alteration in the verbal and behavioural reactions to a picture that is indicative of a change in how the subject experienced it. Such a change in experience, which e.g. cannot be deliberately stopped, is hardly compatible with pure projection.

[234] see Wollheim (1980), pp. 221 f.

[235] see ibid., p. 210. Wollheim seems to presuppose that the two variables *y* and *z* must range over exactly the same set of entities (which is deemed to comprise only individual objects). Given that he does not provide any reason for this claim, it is hardly convincing. For even in elementary cases such as the rabbit-duck drawing, the second variable *z* is replaced by a general term such as 'a duck' or 'a rabbit' (which expresses a universal but admittedly applies to individuals).

[236] see ibid., p. 211. Accordingly, in the case of seeing-as, one must be able to cite the features of the object that sustain one's experience; compare ibid., p. 212.

notes, for instance, that some paintings feature an implicit observer which is cut off by the frame.[237] Thirdly, he reckons that seeing-as is limited to those cases where there is a neat disjunction between the aspects to be spotted, such that one cannot see both aspects at the same time. However, it is a 'normative constraint' for the reception of works of representational art that one must be able to focus on several of its aspects at the same time, and that one must be in a position to seamlessly criss-cross between the configurational and the representational idiom.[238] Given these restrictions, seeing-as cannot be the main perceptual capacity deployed in the appreciation of art. Although aspect perception arguably puts the spectator in a position to be cognisant of and swiftly switch between the configurational and representational levels, it does not allow for *simultaneous* bifocal or distributed attention.

In his later discussion of seeing-as, Wollheim thus draws attention to three crucial features of a spectator's engagement with a work of pictorial art. Firstly, not only individual objects can be seen in a picture, but also highly articulated (sequences of) events and complex states of affairs. Secondly, the representational content of a painting may transcend what is explicitly present in the marks on the canvas, in that some works feature e.g. an implicit observer from whose point of view the scene is depicted.[239] Thirdly and lastly, the appreciation of art calls for a perceptual capacity which allows for simultaneous bifocal attention being directed both at the representational medium and at what is represented in it.

In order to account for these three salient characteristics of our engagement with works of art, Wollheim introduces the notion of seeing-in, which he takes to '[derive] from a special perceptual capacity' which transcends the capacity for straightforward perception and seeing-as[240] and is exclusive to human beings. In fact, seeing-in gives rise to a 'cultivated experience', that is, to a sort of visual experience that is comparatively dissociated from what one is immediately aware of in straightforward seeing.[241] As such, it enables the beholder to see scenes and events in a particular and explains why she is not necessarily in a position to precisely locate what she sees in the painting. Most importantly, seeing-in allows for twofold attention, in that it permits the person engaging with a work to pay simultaneous attention to the representational device and to what is represented.

In a further step, Wollheim invokes the artist's intention in order to prevent seeing-in from becoming completely dissociated from the medium of representation and thus arbitrary. But while he used to think of representational seeing as prior, he now suggests that the intentions of the artist delimit the range of permissible viewings of a given painting. Accordingly, there exists a standard of correctness which seeing-in must conform to, although an experienced spectator typically does not explicitly consult or scrutinise that standard.[242] In fact, people well-versed in the

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[237] compare Walton (1990), pp. 140-144 for an extensive and illuminating account of how what is represented in pictures (and other works of what Walton labels 'fiction') transcends what is actually depicted in them.

[238] see Wollheim (1980), p. 216, where Wollheim also provides a convincing illustration of this constraint: 'in Titian, in Vermeer, in Manet we are led to marvel endlessly at the way in which line or brushstroke or expanse of colour is exploited to render effects or establish analogies that can only be identified representationally […].'

[239] As a striking example, consider Pieter Bruegel the Elder's *Peasant and Nestrobber*, where the implicit observer seems to almost interact with the depicted peasant (otherwise the peasant's indicative gesture would make little to no sense).

[240] see ibid., p. 217. As has been noted, Wollheim contends that seeing-as is a prerequisite for the conceptualisation of ordinary visual content and that seeing-as is thus an integral part of the capacity 'of perceiving things present to the senses' (ibid.)

[241] see ibid., 223 f.

[242] see pp. 205 ff. Wollheim's frequent insistence on experience, sensitiveness, cultivation, expertise, and connoisseurship (duly noticed by Hagberg (2016), p. 140) risks rendering his account circular. Becoming well-versed in the practice of assessing works of art is only possible if one becomes steeped in a tradition whose characteristic aesthetic judgements are (ideally) not purely arbitrary, but based upon some normative principle. But if

arts are capable of detecting what is to be seen in a painting without drawing upon any external resources. Moreover, as was noted already in the first edition of *Art and its Objects*, the artist cannot enact his intentions *ad libitum*; rather, she needs to possess a sufficient degree of artistic prowess and dispose of a certain knowledge pertaining e.g. to iconographic conventions.[243] In any event, there are certain causal constraints that must be fulfilled if the artist's intention is to serve as standard of correctness for representational seeing. If, due to a lack of capability or unfortunate external circumstances, the intention is thwarted or only executed in a rudimentary form, it cannot serve as such a standard. Consider the infamous case of the botched restoration of the *Ecce Homo* fresco in a church in Borja (Spain). Although the elderly untrained amateur who took a stab at restoring the picture had, if her own statements are to be believed, the intention to safeguard the pictorial content, she sorely failed to carry out that intention, such that many spectators mock-ironically claim that 'Ecce Mono' would be a more fitting title for the finished product.

In contrast to what Wollheim called 'seeing-as' in his early account, seeing-in is no longer a self-regulating capacity, that is, it does not set itself its own standard of correctness. Rather, it is subject to external norms and conventions pertaining to the artist's intention(s) and, possibly, the artistic tradition that she is steeped in. Unfortunately, his account of how seeing-in becomes attuned to these factors is sketchy and incomplete at best, such that it remains unclear how seeing-in can become bounded by normative constraints. For the case of aesthetic appreciation is only superficially analogous to that of language learning and the mastery of basic rules of, say, arithmetic, so that Wittgenstein's rule-following considerations do not fully apply to it. In learning a first language by becoming immersed in the practice of using it, one cottons on to principles that, though not rendered explicit, can be applied to an open-ended range of new cases. The same does not apply in the case of artistic appreciation. Although one might be deeply steeped in a certain musical tradition, and thereby *ex hypothesi* grasp the aesthetic standard(s) inherent in it, one might nonetheless fail to understand important works emanating from that very tradition.[244]

4. Lessons to be learned: quandaries concerning aspect perception

Both Scruton and Wollheim invoke seeing-as in order to account for certain features of our engagement with and discourse about art. However, this superficial parallel does not conceal their disagreement concerning the nature and modalities of aspect perception. Moreover, they invoke aspect perception in order to explain fairly different and independent features of the discourse about art. Both Scruton and Wittgenstein investigate how what is represented by e.g. a picture allows for various seemingly incompatible 'readings' that can nonetheless be grasped, entertained, and even voiced by one and the same spectator without obvious contradiction. Wollheim, on the other hand, originally deployed the notion of seeing-as to shed light on the nature of pictorial perception, and to eventually explain depiction in terms of such perception. His later introduction of seeing-in is to be seen as a reaction to shortcomings of his early account, most notably the fact

connoisseurship is already needed to cotton on to and track that principle, it is hard to see how the principle *qua* standard of correctness can serve as a guiding factor in the process of learning how to form apt aesthetic judgements. In Wollheim's early account, this tension can also be felt: representational seeing (that is, seeing-as) is there deemed to be a primitive perceptual capacity that *somehow* – the question is, how exactly? – puts spectators in a position to unravel and properly assess a work's significance. The case of language learning is not exactly parallel, for here at least some fairly general principles can be cited as to why one uses a word in a particular fashion (before reaching explanatory bedrock).

[243] compare Wollheim (1980), p. 206.

[244] Wittgenstein's failure to appreciate the greatness of Mahler's music is a case in point.

that seeing-as does not allow for twofold attention being simultaneously directed at the representational medium and its content.

Ontologically speaking, seeing-as is, analogously to perceptual abilities such as vision and hearing, a capacity that gives rise to particular experiences. A first moot question in this context is whether it is indeed impossible for the perceiver to focus her attention simultaneously on the configurational details and on the representational properties of the object displaying an aspect ambiguity, as Wollheim maintains in his later account. Although the beholder is barred from seeing e.g. both the rabbit- and the duck-aspect at the same time, there is no reason to claim that it is *thereby* also impossible for her to focus simultaneously on both the configuration of lines on the page and *one* of these two picture-objects. For two mutually independent determinables are at play, namely the vehicle of pictorial representation on the one hand and what it represents on the other.

Even if one grants that aspect perception is a genuine capacity of the mind, there are at least two different ways to proceed. On the one hand, one could maintain that seeing-as is an independent faculty of the mind which in turn grounds other capacities, such as e.g. that of ordinary seeing.[245] As has been shown in the preceding section, this claim is implicit in Wollheim's early account and rendered explicit in the supplementary essay to the second edition of *Art and its Objects*. On the other, it might turn out that seeing-as interacts in complex ways with other mental abilities, such as e.g. straightforward seeing or imagination.[246] In this second case, it would consequently be amenable to reduction. Given the later Wittgenstein's decidedly anti-reductionist bent, such questions concerning the reducibility of aspect perception would have struck him as misguided at best. However, related issues arise at the purely exegetical level: in order to give an accurate overview of the vocabulary used to describe mental phenomena, one needs to determine, among other things, whether seeing-as is in some sense (verbally characterised as being) akin to imagining and/or ordinary seeing. It is precisely this task that Scruton pursues in *Art and Imagination*, where he investigates the conceptual links between seeing-as and the imagination in great detail. Both Wollheim and Scruton can thus be taken to follow threads that remain sketchy and underdeveloped in *Philosophy of Psychology – A Fragment*.

Besides addressing issues concerning its conceptual status, one might examine the principles which underlie seeing-as. In this context, the debate on aspect perception has sometimes been linked to that on conceptual content, a move which has arguably been pioneered by Wollheim. In order to establish this connection, one needs to substantiate two *prima facie* independent contentions. On the one hand, it needs to be shown that all seeing involves the subsumption of what is seen under a concept.[247] On the other, a case for the claim that aspect perception features conceptualisation is to be made.[248] Since the application of a concept to a given *visibilium* typically results in a perceptual belief, seeing-as would then give rise to two competing and often incompatible beliefs. On this view, disagreements concerning an aspect thus lead to conflicting judgements, at least in

[245] A disadvantage of this so-called ubiquity thesis is that theorists who espouse it (such as the later Wollheim) deprive themselves of a narrower notion of seeing-as that may help account for the fairly rare but striking visual experiences which perceivers undergo when confronted with puzzle pictures or instances of pareidolia.
[246] Scruton opts for an account of the second type, though with some qualifications. Aspect perception transcends the core concept of imagination, in that it has a sensuous dimension (similarly to imagery).
[247] compare Glock (2016), p. 91.
[248] As has been mentioned above, Wollheim suggests that the objects of ordinary seeing are *per se* imbued with meaning, in that they display certain *Gestalt* features. He further intimates that the perception of such *Gestalt* traits proceeds via the deployment of concepts. What he has in mind seems to be a sort of transcendental argument: the circumstance that perception displays *ab initio* certain *Gestalt* properties, itself taken to amount to a simple phenomenological fact, is rendered possible by (or can only be explained by resorting to the notion of) conceptualisation.

sufficiently complex situations where at least one spectator is unable to spot an aspect claimed to be there by another observer.

There is, however, an alternative account according to which aspect perception is not in the business of effecting conceptualisation, but rather in that of subjecting what is seen to tentative descriptions that need not be asserted. On this view, the seemingly conflicting observations might not be incompatible, since they manage to accommodate all the salient features of the work in question.[249] An example renders the differences between those two conceptions of aspect perception more conspicuous: in the case of the phrase from the *Andantino* movement of Schubert's penultimate piano sonata, it is paradoxical and all but self-refuting to affirm that it is both tenderly melancholy and heavily sad at the same time, although the phrase might strike the listener as oscillating between those two moods.[250] However, merely considering these two alternative classifications and appreciating their respective merits is not just sound, but may even be a precondition for properly understanding the work in question.

Apart from these two basic options, there is arguably a third one: seeing-as does not boil down to a mere conceptualisation of what is seen (though concepts are arguably deployed in it), but central cases of aspect perception give rise to diverging interpretations that are impossible to square with each other. However, in increasingly complex situations, the overall interpretation of a work of art is underpinned by a wealth of interpretations concerning specific parts, such that it is virtually impossible to locate the origin of the disagreement. In such cases, one is either under the impression that there is no conflict after all (since one cannot precisely capture the nature of it), or one might submit that local disagreements do not *ipso facto* result in global incompatibility. In fact, it is expedient to keep in mind the whole range of phenomena to which the notion of seeing-as is applicable. In the fairly basic case of ambiguous drawings such as the rabbit-duck, the phenomenon might indeed be taken to reside in a clash between two incompatible but equally readily effected conceptualisations.[251] However, the perception and appreciation of works of art is a much more complex phenomenon, if only becomes it involves a much higher number of subtle and largely implicit concept applications.

A last conundrum highlighted by the discussions of aspect seeing in the philosophy of art concerns the conditions of adequacy for aspect perception. In all but the simplest cases, the number of aspects claimed to be perceptible is abundant. For instance, depending on the context into which it is embedded, a simple triangle can be seen as a variety of different things (see PPF §162). There is an appealingly straightforward solution to this problem: the intentions of the creator of a given depiction delimit the range of aspects to be spotted. But although this account has some plausibility when the depiction in question is a work of art[252], it is not evident that the rabbit-duck displays

[249] This is arguably Scruton's view. It might strike one as being overly conciliatory, in that it cannot account for the paradox to which aspect perception (supposedly) gives rise; for a brief outline of that paradox, see Glock (2016), pp. 85 ff.

[250] Since exactly one determinable, namely mood or emotional impact, is at play here, the case seems to be analogous to that of the rabbit-duck drawing. It is of course perfectly conceivable that the phrase strikes different listeners (or the same listener at different times) differently, and the attribution of a mood to a musical composition might be relative or response-dependent.

[251] Given the undeniably sensuous nature of aspect perception, any attempted reduction to conceptualisation nonetheless seems hopeless.

[252] In such a case, the artist's intention might be determined by studying her biography, scrutinising her correspondence and (more controversially, since this might involve some circularity) examining the rest of her oeuvre as well as the iconographic tradition in which she is rooted. But notice that artists can fail to fully carry out their intention(s) under unfortunate circumstances, as has been illustrated above.

two aspects because its creator intended it to do so.[253] As an alternative, one could contend that an aspect is there to be seen in a given drawing if (and only if?) the drawing in question can be integrated into a coherent narrative that ascribes the relevant aspect to it and also accommodates all the remaining salient features of the work. On this account, whether an aspect is present in a given work is not directly dependent on the beholder's visual experience itself, but rather on the way in which she (sincerely) describes both the work in question and her perceptual experience of it. In the case of complex works of art, these two options need not exclude each other. Whether a given perceptual experience reflects actual features of the work in question might thus depend on whether said experience is attuned to the artist's original intention(s) *and* can be described in a coherent manner that integrates all of the work's central characteristics. Lastly, in order to demarcate genuine perception from projection, it might be expedient to invoke Wittgenstein's notorious notion of an 'agreement in judgements' (cp. PI §242), such that an aspect or other putatively perceptual feature counts as perceptible only if a sufficient number of perceivers can discriminate it.

[253] As a matter of fact, perspectival ambiguities such as those playfully exploited in William Hogarth's *False Perspective* are typically deemed to indicate a lack of painterly skill(s) and a concurring inability to carry out one's original artistic intention.

Chapter 7 (III. 2): (Non-)Conceptual Content and Aspect Perception

1. Preliminary remarks on 'content' and 'concepts'

As with many hotly contested debates in contemporary philosophy, the difficulty of the question as to whether perceptual content is conceptual or not partly resides in terminological unclarities and infelicities. Before genuinely assessing the state of the discussion and bringing into focus the main issues, it is thus expedient to clear the ground by offering in turn a few clarifications and distinctions concerning the key terms, namely 'content', 'concepts', and 'conceptual content'. In the present section, the first two notions will be scrutinised and clarified, while the last term, which stands at the centre of the debate, will be the subject of the next section.

It is important to keep in mind that talk about the 'content' of a mental episode or state gives rise to misgivings in some quarters, especially among philosophers critical of representationalist approaches to the mind. The widespread and unquestioned use of locutions such as 'representational content' and 'mental content', so the criticism goes, has encouraged a tacit acceptance of the hypothesis that mental states, including perceptual ones, are first and foremost directed at or about contents as reified mental or abstract entities and latch onto reality only indirectly. While it is perhaps true that the terms in question are slightly unfortunate and misleading, they are not used primarily or necessarily as a means to sneak in otherwise unargued for assumptions about the nature of mental states. In fact, it is important to distinguish between substantial or, negatively put, hypostasising conceptions of content and more deflationary approaches. On the former kind of reading, the content of, say, a perceptual experience is what it is directed at, which is supposed to be an entity that mediates between the experience itself and external reality. Consequently, perceptual contents are conceived to be analogues of sense data, and it is hard to see how they could bear a truth value, since they risk ending up true by default or stipulation.[254]

On the latter, deflationary interpretation, the term 'content' is meant to capture two important and fairly uncontroversial ideas.[255] Firstly, it reflects the intuitive difference between a mental state as such, which often displays a certain phenomenal character, and the intentional object or (potentially counterfactual) state of affairs that it is directed at.[256] Secondly and most importantly, the fact that a cognitive mental state[257] has a content simply boils down to the fact that it has accuracy conditions: such an intentional state is not just causally related to the world (as e.g. smoke is related to fire), but it presents the world as being a certain way, and because it does the latter it has satisfaction (accuracy, correctness, truth) conditions. In this sense, the content of a mental state is analogous to the contents of a newspaper story: just as such a story presents things as being thus-and-so (and takes an affirmative stance on them indeed being so) and thereby lays down

[254] The content in this substantial sense could only be faulty in that it does not reflect the character or phenomenology of the relevant perceptual experience.
[255] compare Siegel (2010), pp. 28-33 and Nanay (2015), *passim*.
[256] In this sense, the distinction runs parallel to that between so-called propositional attitudes (e.g. believing) and propositions (e.g. what is believed). But note that propositions *qua* supposed analogues of contents are commonly supposed to be abstract objects that persist independently of whether any propositional attitudes are directed at them. The analogous claim with respect to mental contents – that they subsist even if no one were ever in a mental state that is directed at them – is much more controversial and not widely accepted. Also, note that the phrasing in the main text remains neutral on the contested issue as to whether all mental states possess distinctive phenomenal qualities.
[257] Further complications arise when it comes to conative mental states such as wishes and desires, but these can be bracketed here.

conditions on when it is correct or incorrect (i.e. it is correct if and only if things stand as it presents them to stand), a belief or a perception (etc.) indicate what it takes for them to be correct or adequate.[258]

Matters become even trickier when one turns to the second relevant notion, namely 'concept'. In fact, most overview articles about conceptual content, wisely enough, avoid broaching this thorny issue. Alas, without providing at least a cursory gloss on the notion of a concept, it remains unclear what is at stake in the debate about the conceptual character of the contents of perceptual experiences (and other mental states). As a preliminary, it is crucial to distinguish between two fundamental queries about concepts[259], namely the question as to what concepts are on the one hand and the question as to what it means to possess them on the other. Each of these can be addressed separately, at least to some extent.

The first question, or rather syndrome of questions, concerns ontological matters, in that it asks, among other things, what kind of entities concepts are and how finely they are to be individuated. With regards to the ontological status of concepts, two general options can be distinguished.[260] On the one hand, philosophers of mind and cognitive scientists influenced mainly by Fodor advocate a subjectivist position according to which concepts are to be identified with certain states or occurrences in the mind or brain of individual subjects.[261] This conception of concepts has its origins in classical empiricism, where concepts were constitutively tied to the presence of certain images or representations in the mind of the thinker. As even present-day proponents of subjectivism acknowledge, such a mentalist view is untenable, since it is possible to entertain a thought, hold a belief, and so on, without having a succession of mental images parade before one's mental eye.[262] But the symbolic version of subjectivism espoused by Fodor fares no better, since it conflicts with both common sense and the standard usage of terms such as 'thinking' and 'concept'. Firstly, the idea that representational mental states invariably involve the tokening of certain expressions in a 'language of thought' seems to be a metaphor at best. Secondly, it is unclear how the constitutive tie between the presence of a token-expression in mentalese and the activation and exercise of a single, determinate concept is effected.[263] Thirdly, the subjectivist view struggles to do justice to certain apparent truisms, most notably the fact that concepts are shareable, i.e. the idea that they can be grasped and explained by a wealth of people often from diverse linguistic backgrounds. Given these difficulties, and since subjectivist accounts of concepts are hardly ever appealed to in debates about (non-)conceptual content[264], discussing them in any further detail would be beyond the remit of the present chapter.

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[258] see Siegel (2010), pp. 30 ff.

[259] Glock (2010a), p. 93 in fact lists five such questions, but the two discussed in what follows are the most pertinent ones when it comes to issues about conceptual content.

[260] compare ibid., p. 92.

[261] see Fodor (1998) and (2003), *passim*.

[262] Wittgenstein's remarks on thinking and understanding in *Philosophical Investigations* vigorously attack the imagist tradition; for a helpful overview, see Schroeder (2006), pp. 181-201. Wittgenstein's main argument is succinctly stated on p. 183: 'one can understand without having any mental image, and no mental image guarantees understanding.'

[263] In particular, it has been argued that such a view regarding concepts (and the more general language of thought hypothesis of which it is an integral part) provides no or at best a highly implausible account of first-language acquisition; see Rescorla (2019), section 6.1.

[264] This is certainly not a coincidence. For conceptual contents are deemed to be shareable among rational creatures, in that e.g. two different people can entertain a thought with exactly the same content. In addition, the objectivity of content(s) also plays a pivotal role in McDowell's account of how a perception can serve as rational basis for the corresponding perceptual belief.

Objectivist accounts of concepts, on the other hand, fall into two broad subcategories.[265] According to what one might call a broadly pragmatist account, concepts are identified or, less radically, essentially tied to the conceptual abilities deployed in activities of classification and inferences (among other things). While it is trivial that concepts are put to use when someone exercises a conceptual ability, the identification of concepts with abilities is far from self-evident and indeed faces decisive problems. Firstly, in many cases it is fallacious to identify what is put to use when exercising a particular skill or ability with the capacity itself. While the Italian word *menefreghismo* is in a sense drawn upon or deployed in my ability to more or less skilfully use that word, it is nonsensical to identify the word itself and the aforementioned ability. Secondly, concepts are directed at or about objects in the world (broadly conceived so as to include abstract entities), while abilities are not. The concept WHALE, and by implication thoughts and beliefs (and so on) in which that concept is put to proper use, are about a natural kind that comprises large sea-dwelling mammals. But the ability to operate with the concept WHALE does not display such intentionality or aboutness, or it does so derivatively at best. Thirdly, concepts are standardly deemed to serve as constituents of either propositions or statements, while it is not clear whether and how an ability could be a component of anything other than a further, perhaps more encompassing ability.[266] Given these striking disanalogies between conceptual abilities and the concepts deployed in exercising them, it is legitimate to wonder whether the ability account is not mischaracterised as a view on what concepts are rather than on how they function, or on what it means to possess them. In fact, the ability conception of concepts (or, perhaps more properly, concept possession) is not *ab initio* incompatible with what is standardly considered to be the second subtype of objectivist theories, namely an account along broadly Fregean lines.

On such an alternative objectivist account of concepts, concepts are abstract objects that serve as the constituents of propositions (or *Gedanken* in Frege's terminology). Just as the ability account of concepts, a position inspired by Frege can readily explain the common-sensical view that different thinkers can acquire and possess the same concept, although the salient epistemological details are notoriously hard to spell out. For instance, it is not obvious that subjects can enter into contact or latch onto abstract objects that lie outside of the causal realm. However, once granted that thinkers display the cognitive capacity to access such objects, shareability seems to follow. Moreover, the Fregean proposal pays heed to further important intuitions about concepts. It thus allows for the fact that different concepts can have the same extension or refer to exactly the same entities while still carrying different information. Lastly, a Fregean account of concepts is often tacitly assumed in order to account for the compositional structure of propositions, that is, for the fact that concepts can be recombined so as to produce a potentially open-ended number of sentences or thoughts, conceived as the concrete correlates of propositions. As will become evident in what follows, this conception of concepts also underpins one of the queries that motivates the debate about conceptual content, namely the question as to how such content is structured.

As has been mentioned above, there is a second set of fundamental questions about concepts besides ontological queries, and it concerns the possession or mastery of concepts. It is important to note that these two issues are often conflated: in fact, while the ability view is simply implausible as an account of what concepts are (for the reasons cited above), it is a good explanation of what the possession of concepts amounts to. For it is indeed evident that concept possession is

[265] compare Margolis and Laurence (2005/2019), sections 1.2 and 1.3.

[266] These three points reflect, though with some shift of emphasis, the differences between concepts and conceptual abilities highlighted by Glock (2010a), p. 102.

intimately connected, and might even simply boil down to, the possession of specific abilities concerning the discrimination, classification, and recognition of objects in one's environment[267] combined with a mastery of certain inferential techniques. But since concept possession is thus associated with a motley of diverse abilities rather than with just one generic capacity, several vital questions remain unanswered. In fact, mere discrimination, e.g. telling apart two similar shades of blue when one sees them side by side, is arguably less demanding from a cognitive point of view than the identification or recognition of precisely those shades of blue when presented on separate occasions. There are two crude or, positively put, unadulterated positions that reflect these gradations in the cognitive resourcefulness sufficient for the attribution of conceptual abilities, and these stances lie at the extreme ends of a spectrum of more subtle options. On the one hand, it has been maintained that the behaviour of higher animals, most notably primates, indicates that they possess certain concepts.[268] It is, for instance, evident that animals are capable of discriminating features of their environment, and e.g. foraging behaviour clearly suggests that animals possess certain mnemonic skills, which in turn are founded upon recognitional and arguably conceptual capacities. On the other hand, there are theorists who insist on the decisive role that conceptual abilities assume in the drawing of inferences.[269] While it is arguable that some higher animals are in a position to draw basic inferences, the wealth of often complex and abstract inferences that permeate a human being's life are inaccessible to them. Inferentialists, who closely link or even identify conceptual and inferential capacities, thus put the bar for concept possession considerably higher. Typically, they also share sympathies with the even larger number of philosophers who argue or presuppose that conceptual abilities can only be acquired by creatures that possess a language.[270] Specifying the criteria for concept possession is a prerequisite for shedding light on a second aspect salient in the debate about conceptual content, which precisely concerns the conditions that must be fulfilled by a subject in order to access such content.

Let us briefly take stock before getting a firmer grip on the two questions that are typically run together both by advocates and by detractors of the view that perceptual experiences display conceptual content. In the present section, it has been argued that the term 'content' allows both for a substantial, representationalist and for what one might call a deflationist interpretation. According to contemporary subjectivist theories, concepts are constitutively tied to tokenings of expressions in a language of thought, which may be realised by sub-personal, consciously inaccessible states of the brain. However, most participants in the debate on the (non-)conceptuality of mental content grant, at least implicitly, that such content is shareable. Accordingly, they must be taken to reject subjectivist accounts of concepts (and of the vehicles that are supposed to carry non-conceptual information), inasmuch as such a view struggles to accommodate the shareability of mental content. While a Frege-inspired position, according to which the representational vehicles are abstract entities, can account for shareability, it brings epistemological quandaries in its wake. In light of these complications, it is safest not to commit oneself to any of the existing theories, especially since the debate about (non-)conceptual content can be retraced while leaving these ontological questions open. This concession notwithstanding, it is expedient to separate ontological queries about the nature of concepts (about what they are)

[267] At later stages of cognitive development, these capacities can of course also be deployed in more abstract realms, e.g. in order to operate with numbers.
[268] see Glock (2010b), pp. 27 ff.
[269] The most prominent proponents of this view are perhaps Brandom and McDowell; see *inter alia* Brandom (1994) and McDowell (1996).
[270] Figures as diverse as Dummett, Davidson, and Hacker embrace the claim that concept possession is tied to the mastery of a language; for representative statements of their views, see Dummett (1993), Davidson (1997), and Hacker (2007).

from an examination of the criteria for possessing a concept. This distinction has immediate repercussions on the debate about conceptual content, or so I will argue in the next section, where two strands in that debate will be disentangled.

2. Two strands in the debate about (non-)conceptual content

As the debate about the (non-)conceptual content of mental states (most notably perceptual experiences) became ever more sophisticated, it has become customary to distinguish between two separate though interrelated questions about such content. As is the case for the different queries about concepts, these issues cannot be kept apart with complete rigour. In fact, in the pioneering accounts of both conceptualism and non-conceptualism, the questions are tackled together and just form two strands of an otherwise seamless discussion.[271] Nonetheless, just as it is expedient to differentiate between a propositional attitude (say, believing) and what it is directed at (say, the belief *qua* content, i.e. what is believed), it is indispensable to distinguish between (non-)conceptualism concerning the former and (non-)conceptualism concerning the latter.[272] *Content* (non-)conceptualism concerns the question as to whether the content of certain representational mental states is structured in such a manner that it can be consecutively drawn upon to underpin those cognitive states standardly deemed to display conceptual content. *State* (non-)conceptualism, on the other hand, addresses the question as to whether it is a precondition for entering and being in certain mental states that the subject possesses such-and-such concepts.

According to content conceptualism, the content of various types of mental state, spanning the whole range from justified beliefs to perceptual experiences, is formed by or comprised of concepts. Advocates of the view typically start off by highlighting the widespread intuition that both knowledge and belief are essentially propositional and feature contents that are composed of concepts. They then insist that what is seen can also be believed and known, or that what is presented to a subject in perceptual experience can serve as a reason or evidence for a perceptual belief and (ideally) for an item of perceptual knowledge. In the light of this close link between perception and belief, proponents of the conceptuality thesis conclude (in a sort of transcendental argument) that both these mental states must bear some fundamental structural similarities, and that these are best explained by the hypothesis that both share the same kind of content. Put more formally, the argument advanced in favour of content conceptualism has the following structure:

(P1) It is a fact that perceptual episodes can ground, justify, or rationalise perceptual beliefs.
(P2, *transcendental consideration*) Such a relation of grounding, justification, or rationalisation can obtain iff the contents of both beliefs and perception are structurally or compositionally similar.
(P3) As a matter of fact, the contents of beliefs are composed of concepts.

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[271] To make matters worse, there are not only these two strands in the debate about (non-)conceptual content, but also disagreements about the character of the perceptual states that display them. The debate was originally about conscious, introspectively accessible mental states. Nonetheless, philosophers influenced by cognitive science contend that potential results of the discussion also have repercussions on how to theorise about visual processing; see e.g. Wright (2015), pp. 191-5. They maintain, for instance, that the early stages of such processing feature (informational vehicles realised by the brain that carry) non-conceptual contents, while later stages involve conceptualisations. These later stages are partially accessible to consciousness, but they also encompass the computational data that is responsible for subconscious priming effects. It is noteworthy that it is not perspicuous how concept possession and deployment could be ascribed to sub-personal processes in the mind or brain. Since the original debate was about conscious mental states, and given that aspect perception is evidently a conscious phenomenon, I will bracket the aforementioned issues in what follows.

[272] The terminological distinction was first introduced by Heck (2000). For a discussion of what the relevant difference consists in, see Schmidt (2015), chapter 3.

(C) The contents of perception are composed of concepts.

According to content non-conceptualism, on the other hand, at least some mental states display a content that is not comprised of concepts. There are at least two forceful (groups of) arguments which indicate that the content of some mental states, most notably perceptual experiences, might be non-conceptual, and these arguments concern, respectively, content itself and the way it is codified. Firstly, it has been maintained that episodes of perception can feature contents which could not possibly be displayed by e.g. beliefs.[273] For example, a visual experience can be directed at or about an evidently incongruous object, such as the Penrose stairs in M. C. Escher's famous lithograph *Ascending and Descending*, which seem to lead upstairs and downstairs at the same time. Thoughts and beliefs, on the other hand, cannot take obviously contradictory, inconsistent, or otherwise self-defeating states of affairs as contents. Secondly, the informational coding of perception is different from that of e.g. beliefs, in that it displays not just one specific and isolated item of information, but also collateral information. For example, seeing that the cat is on the mat transmits additional data about the precise look of the cat, e.g. about the colour and texture of its fur. The belief that the cat is on the mat, on the other hand, seems to be directed at and pin down exactly one aspect of the situation, namely the cat's lying on the mat, without any further specifications.[274] Borrowing terminology from Dretske, one may conclude that perception features 'analogue' content, while beliefs and thoughts are instances of mental states that display 'digital' content.[275] As a further corollary of the 'analogue' character of perception, a perceptual experience can represent perfectly determinate lengths, distances, and so on without featuring units of measurement, while a belief needs to specify such a unit in order to report lengths, etc. with accuracy.[276] Inasmuch as ontological and epistemological matters are concerned, content non-conceptualism is less parsimonious than its conceptualist alternative and asks for a greater amount of elaboration. In particular, proponents of the thesis need to specify what non-conceptual contents precisely are, which mental state-types display them[277], and how these states can interact with other states in complex cognitive operations such as reasoning. Nonetheless, content non-conceptualism points to several striking and important disanalogies between the contents of perceptual experiences and those of e.g. beliefs. In particular, it shows that the former present states of affairs in a way that is strikingly different from the manner in which paradigmatically concept-involving states do so. These differences cannot simply be ignored or explained away by advocates of content conceptualism.

As content non-conceptualism focusses upon a phenomenological and/or conceptual investigation of the characteristics of perceptual contents, it is not primarily intended to be a doctrine about the abstract structure and composition of mental states, in neat contrast to content conceptualism, which was driven by ontological-cum-epistemological considerations. Given their inclination to concentrate upon the character of perceptual experiences, advocates of the non-

[273] see Crane (1992).

[274] Note that it is impossible to just see the cat lying on its mat without seeing any further details of the scene (concerning e.g. the colour of the cat's fur), while it is perfectly possible and even common to just believe, e.g. on the basis of testimony, that some unspecified cat is lying on a mat.

[275] compare Dretske (1981), ch. 6, *passim*; he uses the specifications 'analog' and 'digital' to characterise different types of representations, but they can be applied equally well to contents in an ontologically non-committal or deflationist sense.

[276] see Peacocke (1986), p. 1.

[277] Both imagination and memory seem to be fascinating borderline cases: while memories about episodes from one's personal past can be quasi-perceptual (and thereby directed at non-conceptual contents?), in that they involve e.g. vivid imagery, other instances of memory feature purely propositional contents, e.g. me remembering that Basel is called 'Bâle' in French.

conceptualism further insist that such experiences (and possibly other mental state-types as well) present us with contents whose richness and level of detail transcend our conceptual resources.[278] The label 'state non-conceptualism' is used to refer to precisely this thesis, according to which a subject can be in an experiential state even without possessing the concepts required *inter alia* for offering a precise linguistic characterisation of that state's content. Advocates of this hypothesis maintain, among other things, that there are certain perceptual experiences which present very fine-grained details (e.g. extremely subtle differences between various shades of a single colour) that the perceiver can discriminate or single out by means of vision, but for which she lacks concepts allowing for, say, a recognition or re-identification of the relevant details on separate occasions. Moreover, state non-conceptualism strives to pay heed to the intuitions that perception is the prime source of information about one's environment and that both non-human animals and human infants must have access to such information, as is illustrated e.g. by their capacity to navigate their environment. While some non-conceptualists concede that animals and infants do not possess concepts or conceptual abilities, they typically go on to argue that the range of content-bearing mental states that a subject can find itself in is not limited or defined by its conceptual abilities. They are thus in a position to stave off the unwanted differentialist consequences that typically go hand in hand with the denial that animals and human infants possess conceptual capacities.

It is fairly obvious that these two strands in the debate about (non-)conceptual content – the question about content (non-)conceptualism and that about state (non-)conceptualism – are each closely linked to one of the two queries about concepts distinguished in the preceding section. A precise conception or definition of what concepts are is needed in order to provide a substantive answer to the question, asked forcefully by McDowell, how beliefs and perceptions can share content in such a manner that the former can be rationally based upon the latter. This is primarily a query about how the contents of perceptual states must be structured in order to allow for the seamless transition to beliefs. As such, an illuminating answer is only available once the nature of the constituents that lend these contents their structure, i.e. concepts, has been scrutinised.

On the other hand, an elucidation of the conditions for possessing a concept facilitates the task of determining which contents of perceptual experience, and accordingly which perceptual beliefs, are accessible to a given subject. The importance of this second correlation has been underappreciated in the current debate. State non-conceptualists maintain that it is evident that some perceptual experiences, e.g. those concerning very subtle chromatic differences in the visual scene that one is currently presented with, are accessible even in the absence of corresponding extremely fine-grained concepts. The formation of the beliefs based on such experiences *a fortiori* does not presuppose the antecedent possession of the relevant concepts, but only the ability to coin the required demonstrative concepts on that specific occasion. As an alternative to embracing state non-conceptualism, one could maintain that the aforementioned demonstrative concepts are already deployed or operative in perception, as long as it is guaranteed that those concepts are attributed to the perceiver on the basis of how she engages with and reacts to the visual scene. Indeed, by thus lowering the bar for concept possession, one could avoid both the epistemological quandaries that non-conceptualism brings in its wake and the differentialist pitfalls that mar McDowell's original account. Moreover, if one grants that higher animals possess only those concepts which allow them to discriminate and re-identify the most salient features of their

[278] This claim has first been advanced by Evans, though in a different context; see Evans (1982), p. 229.

environment, one still makes room for quantitative (rather than qualitative) differences in human and animal perception.

Of course, complications arise if one examines the respective accounts in more details, for state non-conceptualists and exponents of lenient criteria for concept possession tackle the same problem from radically different angles. Non-conceptualists quite generally take the phenomenological and subjective character of experience as their starting point. According to them, concepts remain uninvolved at the level of discrimination, which might involve the parsing of the visual scene into separate areas and objects, background and foreground, etc. and the singling out of and differentiating between properties. This claim is primarily based on the contention that the detailedness and subtlety of what is presented in perceptual experience surpasses what concepts are able to capture. Theorists who lower the bar for concept possession, on the other hand, reflect on e.g. etiological evidence which suggests that higher animals possess fairly complex behavioural skills that presuppose discriminatory and classificatory abilities. They then go on to argue that the development and exercise of these abilities presupposes the presence of fairly basic, primitive, and coarse-grained concepts.[279]

While assessing in full detail the respective merits of each of these two more permissive conceptions of perceptual experience would be beyond the scope of the present thesis, it is noteworthy that state non-conceptualism is plausible with regards to vision, but perhaps less so when it comes to other sense modalities. Consider the case of a succession of sounds of similar pitch. Inasmuch as a person's sense of hearing is intact, it is correct to say that these sounds e.g. causally impact on her eardrums, such that all people without a hearing impairment have the same auditory experience (based exclusively on their receptivity for such stimuli). However, while it is intuitive that all perceivers can effect subtle discriminations of various shades of a colour, it is less clear that they can do the same in the case of sounds. Relatedly, the states of hearing that an expert in music or a trained musician can enter might differ from those accessible to a layman with a more limited repertoire of concepts pertaining to music. Such doubts can also be put forward *mutatis mutandis* in the case of olfactory and gustatory perception. For it is plausible that various layers of smell and flavour can only be discriminated (i.e. told apart) once a specific conceptual repertory has been acquired, as is evinced by the putative differences in perception between laypeople and connoisseurs. Accordingly, subtle discriminations concerning the contents of one's perceptual experience are rarely simply given[280], but rather depend in some crucial respects upon training and enculturation.[281] The ability to tell apart various chromatic features of a perceptual

[279] This does not *ipso facto* imply that there are really two sorts of concepts, primitive concepts ('concepts$_1$') ascribable to non- and pre-linguistic subjects and concepts in the proper sense of the term ('concepts$_2$'), since both can in principle be operationalised in the same cognitive processes, e.g. discrimination, classification, recognition, and inference.

[280] In this context, it should also be kept in mind that the phenomenological or introspective evidence cited by proponents of state non-conceptualism is not unassailable from a methodological point of view, since it consists in intuitions that can hardly be corroborated experimentally. It is safe to say that Wittgenstein would not grant that such evidence establishes anything of substance.

[281] This chimes well with admittedly anecdotal evidence. For instance, after participating in a wine tasting course, one (ideally) manages to discriminate further subtleties of flavour in a wine that one has tasted previously. Also, acquiring a set of new expressions from a foreign language (and thereby familiarising oneself with the relevant concepts) can have a similar effect: German has no exact equivalents for English expressions such as 'tangy' or 'zesty', and most European languages require verbose circumlocutions to capture what is meant by the common Korean adjective 'gosohada' (which is used to describe the slightly nutty taste of e.g. milk, tofu, roasted cereals, beans, and sesame oil). Learning these expressions and thereby enlarging one's conceptual repertory arguably helps in discerning further characteristics of gustatory experiences that one is otherwise perfectly familiar with. Lastly, the employment of words in their secondary sense, a practice which itself requires a thorough absorption and refined understanding of their

input may thus indeed be quite extraordinary. Advocates of lenient criteria for concept possession are *prima facie* in a better position to accommodate such cases from other sense modalities, since they can insist that concepts can be differentiated according to the demands that they put on the cognitive resources of the subject, and e.g. depending on their primitiveness and fineness of grain. In the case of hearing, for instance, there are certain discriminatory abilities concerning e.g. the relative closeness of a sound source relative to one's body that are more fundamental than others, and which give rise to primitive conceptual capacities. On this reading, a fairly coarse-grained concept of relative closeness can be ascribed to many animals that are capable to act or behave in a manner that presupposes that they can roughly classify sounds according to their spatial origin.[282]

3. The link between the debate about (non-)conceptual content and aspect perception

In the previous section, two questions underlying the discussion about (non-)conceptual content have been disentangled. Although it is implicitly deemed to apply more generally to the contents of other mental states, that debate focusses primarily on the contents of perceptual, and especially visual experiences. It thus has immediate repercussions upon the analysis of aspect perception. Given that the latter is not as pervasive and fundamental a phenomenon as ordinary perception is, the stakes in this case are not as high. This has the welcome advantage that intuitions concerning e.g. the phenomenology of the experience in question, but also (non-)differentialist proclivities, play less of a role, so that one can survey the phenomenon with greater detachment and neutrality.

It is worth considering whether content conceptualism applies to aspect perception. If it did not, that would be an argument against the claim that the contents of perception in general are conceptual. However, it should be noted that the main epistemological worry that motivated content conceptualism (succinctly, 'How can someone literally believe what he sees?') is not pressing in the case of aspect perception. For episodes of such perception rarely (if at all) give rise to full-blooded beliefs or, more mildly, to beliefs that serve a specific and important cognitive purpose. Consider the standard case of seeing the rabbit-duck drawing: at moment t_1 a subject sees the duck aspect, while she spots the rabbit aspect only at a later moment t_2. Does she on seeing the drawing consecutively form the belief that first there is a duck in front of here and then the belief that it is indeed a rabbit? And does this lead to her entertaining (and embracing, since perception is typically a reliable source of information) the seemingly contradictory belief that there is a single animal in front of her that is both a duck and a rabbit? There are two reasons that speak against this straightforward epistemological connection between episodes of aspect perception and the formation of beliefs. In many cases, such perception is directed at pictures, such that the relevant beliefs are about pictorial entities rather than features of the world. In the abovementioned scenario, the perceiver in all likelihood merely believes that there is a picture in front of her that represents a duck at t_1 and a rabbit at t_2, or that there is a picture in front of her that represents both a duck and a rabbit. Moreover, on occasions where aspect perception is about non-pictorial objects (that is, in cases of pareidolia), it wears its conjectural or projective character on its sleeves. When someone, for instance, claims to see a face in a rock formation on the moon, she does not

primary meaning, might well be indispensable for bringing into view such subtle facets of one's perceptual experience, as Hanfling has suggested; see Hanfling (2002), p. 155: 'Descriptions of wines are largely dependent on secondary sense, sometimes intelligible only to connoisseurs.'

[282] Such an account is congenial to the Wittgensteinian idea that differences in perception can only be attributed on the basis of differences in behaviour or, more mildly, behavioural abilities.

thereby literally subscribe to the belief that there is a face on the moon.[283] Given that belief-formation is thus at best of marginal interest in the case of aspect perception, it leaves the question about content conceptualism untouched. Supposing or even conceding that episodes of such perception feature non-conceptual contents, even if this implied that this kind of perception cannot serve as rational ground for beliefs, would not have any devastating consequences from an epistemological point of view.

State conceptualism concerning the contents of episodes of aspect perception is a more pertinent and philosophically interesting thesis. The fundamental question in this respect is whether creatures must possess certain concepts in order to be capable of perceiving aspects. An affirmative answer could point to a mental capacity that, while not playing a key role in our interaction with the world, still constitutes an important respect in which human adults and older children might be different from human infants and non-human animals. There are two circumstances which indicate that Wittgenstein espoused state conceptualism with regards to some core instances of aspect perception. Firstly, he draws a distinction between cases that are fairly demanding from a cognitive perspective and others that are less so. In the course of his discussion in *Philosophy of Psychology – A Fragment*, he emphasises that the capacity to operate with images is in central cases a prerequisite for aspect seeing, which then amounts to a practical ability underpinned by imagination (see PPF §§217, 254), thinking (cp. PPF §235), and certain acquired cognitive resources (cp. PPF §§221-4 *inter alia*). In all likelihood, this kind of cognitive prowess encompasses the acquisition and mastery of concepts. As is his wont, Wittgenstein does not advance any general thesis about the nature of aspect perception, and he concedes that there might be instances of the phenomenon which only require the deployment of purely perceptual abilities (see PPF §212). Nonetheless, instances that involve fairly complex and articulate contents (as opposed to e.g. a mere segmentation of what is seen into foreground and background) presuppose conceptual capacities on the part of the perceiver.

Secondly and relatedly, Wittgenstein avers that the ascription of episodes of aspect perception is intimately connected to how a subject reacts to and interacts with a given image. In fact, what a person does in reaction to being shown a picture serves as a criterion or reliable indication for how she perceives the image and what she takes to be its content. In the present case, the relevant reactions comprise both non-linguistic and linguistic behaviour, most notably the perceiver's specific way of operating with the picture, e.g. when asked to perform a specific task, and her explicit avowals. As a matter of fact, the perception of an aspect is typically ascribed to a person on the basis of what she professes upon being shown, say, an ambiguous drawing. Since language plays such a crucial role for the ascription of this type of perceptual experience, and given that linguistic abilities and conceptual capacities are intimately connected (though perhaps not mutually dependent)[284], the range of episodes of aspect perception that can reasonably be ascribed to a subject is to a large extent determined by the fineness of grain and richness of the concepts that she possesses.

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[283] If one ties representation to intention, she also does not subscribe to the belief that there is something on the moon that represents a face, in contrast to more central cases of aspect perception, where subjects do indeed form such a belief about the representational characteristics of the picture in question. Seeing a face in a rock formation on the moon merely gives rise to the belief that there is something on the moon that *looks like* a face, a belief which itself contains perceptual vocabulary and is thus strikingly less substantial than ordinary perceptual beliefs.

[284] As has been argued above, the mastery of a language may not be a necessary condition for possessing certain fairly elementary concepts. Familiarity with a 'primitive language' such as that of Wittgenstein's builders (cp. PI §2) is sufficient for having certain elementary concepts, but mastery of a natural language is required to possess the full gamut of concepts (excluding highly technical ones, which presuppose the study of specialist vocabularies).

Wittgenstein was aware that this espousal of state conceptualism with respect to most instances of aspect perception leads to the *prima facie* puzzling consequence that experience (in some cases) does not simply impose itself upon subjects, but is in an important sense informed by their cognitive capacities (cp. PPF §§222-3), which encompass conceptual skills.[285] Nonetheless, as has been adumbrated above, there are fairly non-controversial cases in which the acquisition of new concepts decisively shapes perceptual experiences, and the idea that the perceptual contents available to experts are different from those accessible by laypeople is not *per se* absurd or counterintuitive. In fact, participants in the ongoing debate about perceptual learning strive to provide an account of precisely these kinds of cases.

It is tempting to refer to Wittgenstein's contention that state conceptualism holds for a large class of instances of aspect perception in order to argue that perception *simpliciter* is subject to the same constraint. In fact, if ordinary seeing could be identified with seeing-as, a straightforward argument establishing that seeing is subject to state conceptualism could be constructed:

(P1) All seeing is seeing-as.
(P2) Seeing-as is a sufficient condition for conceptualisation.
(C) Seeing *per se* involves the subsumption of what is seen under concepts.

As has been argued above, the minor premise (P2) seems to follow from Wittgenstein's remarks on seeing-as, though with some reservations regarding mainly 'optical' instances of the phenomenon (which will be bracketed for the sake of argument). When a spectator claims that she sees, say, a given drawing as (a depiction of) a mountain, she has *ipso facto* deployed the concept of a mountain (among others) or, formulated more carefully, that concept has been operative in her perceiving of the drawing. As has been indicated in the first chapter of this part of the thesis, the notion of seeing-as can also be fruitfully extended to cover cases of pictorial perception and representation. However, the moot question in the present context is whether the major premise (P1) is plausible, that is, whether seeing-as encompasses common-and-garden visual perception. The crucial premise (P1) can perhaps be defended by pointing out that its rejection risks committing one to the myth of the given, i.e. to the view that perception presents us with a pure, unadulterated 'given' that does not require any interpretation or scrutiny from the part of the spectator. The defence of premise (P1) is in turn grounded on the somewhat contentious assumption that perception is the result of an active engagement with the world and not based upon pure passivity or receptivity. More problematically still, it remains unclear what the relevant seeing-as amounts to in the case of ordinary visual perception.

There are two options for making (P1) more perspicuous, none of which is particularly promising. Firstly, one could argue that the relevant seeing-as simply consists in applying certain (in most cases fairly general) sortal concepts to what is seen. A first decisive shortcoming of this strategy is that it renders the abovementioned argument patently circular, in that it relies upon a version of the conclusion to establish the soundness of the major premise. Moreover, in many instances of common-and-garden perception, spectators fail to effect a specific conceptual classification, mainly because they did not have the time, willingness, or need to consider whether the object in their visual field indeed falls under such-and-such a concept.[286] Accordingly, being visually aware

[285] Opponents of McDowell's account of perceptual justification in *Mind and World* tend to attack precisely this aspect of conceptualism. Note that non-conceptualists who point to the richness and high level of fine-grained detail of some perceptual experiences (e.g. those directed at different shades of a single colour) presuppose that such experiences impose themselves on the subject in question.

[286] see Glock (2016), p. 91. McDowell's contention that concepts are *ab initio* operative in perception is not platitudinous, but rather calls for careful elaboration. In fact, concept application is typically a cognitive achievement that requires efforts on the part of the perceiver.

of, say, the dandelion on my front lawn is to be differentiated from considering and answering in the affirmative the question as to whether the object on my lawn is a dandelion. Secondly, advocates of the ubiquity thesis (P1) may contend that ordinary perception involves aspect perception by citing the putative fact that both these visual experiences are essentially recognitional, where recognition is deemed to be a more primitive capacity than the application of concepts. Alas, seeing-as does not *per se* involve recognition, as is evinced by two circumstances. Firstly, it is strange and somewhat unidiomatic to speak of recognition in cases where there is a constitutive ambiguity, perhaps because recognition implies that a univocal classification has been effected. Secondly and more importantly, while seeing-as is at best factive in the special sense elucidated towards the end of the first chapter of Part 2 of the present thesis, recognition and recognising-as are factive notions in the standard sense of the term: if I recognise the flower on my front lawn as a dandelion, this indeed implies that it is a dandelion.[287] Seeing-as may thus be a wider notion than recognising-as, and only some cases of seeing-as involve recognition. Since it is difficult to substantiate the ubiquity thesis (P1), the argument sketched above does not give succour to state conceptualism as a thesis about perception *tout court*.

[287] see ibid., p. 92.

Chapter 8 (III. 3): Aspect Perception Within the Debate about Cognitive Penetrability

1. An intuitive understanding of cognitive penetrability

Almost four decades ago, Jerry Fodor started the debate concerning cognitive penetrability and argued that vision and, more broadly speaking, perception is not influenced by cognitive states. His aim was primarily philosophical, in that he strived to safeguard observational data from what he reckoned to be the undue encroachment of theories, thereby defending a staunch form of scientific realism.[288] As the debate became more and more refined in the intervening years, many contributors lost interest in issues concerning the epistemic relation between theory and observation and instead focussed exclusively on an examination of the cognitive architecture of the human brain and/or mind.[289] This shift in focus makes it harder to appreciate the overall philosophical importance of the topic, especially since cognitive scientists now typically agree that the later stages of vision (which roughly correspond to what is called 'visual perception' in ordinary parlance) are penetrated by cognition.[290] These theorists are primarily interested in determining the precise point at which cognitive states influence vision (and, *mutatis mutandis*, the other sense modalities): for instance, they ask whether the allocation of attention, which in some cases precedes the onset of the stimulus and is commonly reckoned to be driven by cognition, has repercussions on the processing of the incoming stimulus. In the sections to follow, the current debate about cognitive penetrability will be outlined in four steps. Firstly, I will introduce a series of examples that seemingly speak in favour of cognitive penetrability, and others that cast doubt upon the hypothesis. Secondly, some of the crucial distinctions that have shaped the contemporary debate will be presented, though without any claim to comprehensiveness. Thirdly, I will provide a critical assessment of the results that have been reached thus far. Finally, I will close the discussion with a tentative proposal: Wittgenstein's remarks on aspect perception might buttress the thesis that perception is cognitively penetrable, but not the stronger claim that it is indeed in each single instance thus penetrated.

Reading has been cited as a prime example of cognitive penetrability (and, in fact, penetration) *avant la lettre*.[291] When looking at a text in a language that one is proficient in, the experience differs in accordance with the cognitive resources that are being accessed. On the one hand, when scanning a text for typographical errors and thus drawing on one's knowledge as to how a word is supposed to be written, a speaker is able to quickly discriminate, by means of vision, between words that are spelled correctly and words that are not. On the other hand, once the speaker focusses on the text's meaning and accesses her semantic knowledge, her perception of the marks on the page is arguably altered: experiments have shown that she is less likely to quickly spot typographical irregularities. Somewhat relatedly, the manner in which the visual system of, say, a native speaker of Cantonese processes a text written in that language is intuitively different from the way in which a person who is unfamiliar with Chinese characters perceives the same text. The latter will, for instance, find it difficult to determine how often a given character has shown up in a paragraph, whereas the native speaker can do this quickly and with ease.[292]

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[288] see Fodor (1983) and (1988).
[289] Of course, Fodor was also interested in this question, but he placed it into a broader philosophical context.
[290] For a representative example, see Vetter and Newen (2014).
[291] see Brewer (1972) and Brewer and Loschky (2005), pp. 34 f.
[292] Notice that this case is different from the two previous ones in that the native speaker is neither drawing on (a) knowledge as to how a word is supposed to be written nor on (b) knowledge concerning the meaning of a given word.

There are further putative instances of cognitive penetrability. Several studies have shown that the processing of vague visual stimuli (e.g. of blurred images, of seemingly random black patches on a white background, etc.) is facilitated by hints or cuing (which might activate certain pieces of background knowledge).[293] In a study by Robert I. Reynolds, a seemingly random array of black and white patches that could be integrated to form a 'meaningful object' (such as e.g. an elephant) was shown to three different sets of observers. The first group was not told that the blots could be integrated and only 9% reported that they spotted a familiar object in the jumble of patches. Members of the second group were informed that the marks could be integrated and 55% declared that they saw an object of a specific kind. The last group of observers was further told that the object that could be detected in the array of patches was an animal and the picture identification rate rose to 74%, although the time it took them to integrate the picture did not decrease. It is arguable that Reynolds's study does not only indicate that object identification and recognition qua purely classificatory tasks are significantly facilitated by prior information. Rather, by showing that antecedent knowledge also influences the way in which a stimulus is integrated and (re-)organised according to Gestalt principles, the experiment reveals that cognition also operates on a more fundamental level, namely that of visual processing itself.[294]

Ambiguous figures, that is, figures which can be seen in more than one way, are also often cited as evidence for the cognitive penetrability of vision.[295] There are several empirical studies that appear to support Wittgenstein's contention that seeing-as, the type of experience characteristic of our engagement with dual-aspect pictures, occupies a middle position between seeing and thinking and shares important properties with both these mental processes. Two experiments in particular suggest that our perception of an ambiguous figure changes depending on what kind of information we have received about the picture prior to actually looking at it. For instance, observers who were shown various depictions of animals (not including that of a rat) were more likely to first spot the rat aspect of the rat-man drawing than were people who did not dispose of any such preliminary information.[296] Similarly, a group of observers who heard a story about rats before taking a look at the figure were twice as likely to detect the rat aspect than were the members of a control group who did not receive any prior information.[297]

It would of course be overly rash to judge, on the sole basis of these examples, that visual perception is cognitively penetrable. For although there are relatively uncontentious cases in which what we are seeing (that is, the content of one's perception) is influenced by cognitive states including antecedent knowledge, there are also types of visual perception that point in the opposite direction. While some cognitive scientists and philosophers surmise that illusions such as the Müller-Lyer occur precisely because the visual system disposes of an implicit theory about the laws of optics[298], it is noteworthy that such illusions cannot be overridden by one's knowing better.[299]

She could still perform the same task (that is, counting how often a given character occurs) when given a text written in a language with which she is unfamiliar (say Hakka Chinese).

[293] see the experiment in Bruner and Potter (1964), improved and replicated by Luo and Snodgrass (1994), and that in Reynolds (1985).

[294] This is essentially the assessment of Reynolds's experiment given by Brewer and Loschky (2005), pp. 36 f. They contend that the background knowledge even alters the phenomenological experience of the observers, although such a claim is of course hard to corroborate. For a strikingly different evaluation of Reynolds's study, see Pylyshyn (2003), pp. 76-82.

[295] For a helpful discussion of the relevance of ambiguous figures for cognitive (im-)penetrability, see Raftopoulos (2009), pp. 277-290.

[296] see Bugelski and Alampay (1961).

[297] see Liu (1976).

[298] see Rock (1983), Churchland (1988).

[299] see Robbins (2009).

Even when an observer knows that both lines are actually of equal length (someone could have told her so, or she might have measured their respective length), this bit of information will not allow her to cancel out the impression that the line with the arrows pointing outwards is shorter than the one with the arrows pointing inwards. A similar point holds for the perception of illusory contours: although one can become cognisant of the fact that the so-called Kanizsa triangle does not feature a white triangle, but rather a configuration of three arrows and three circles with triangular indentations, it is difficult if not impossible to consistently see it as such.

Still more important than these alleged counterexamples is the fact that discussions about cognitive penetrability often fail to rest on a sound conceptual basis, in that some of the key terminology remains either completely undefined or at least underspecified. Early participants in the debate suppose that there is a broad analogy between scientific theories and observational data on the one hand and cognitive resources and perception on the other. This putative similarity, which is based upon a somewhat naïve reading of the extensive literature on the relationship between theories and empirical data, gave them the impression of having a firm grasp on the issues involved, without the need to specify what 'cognition' and 'penetrability' amount to. In the last two decades or so, cognitive scientists and philosophers dealing with the problem have introduced a plethora of fine-grained distinctions which rendered the debate more conspicuous. In the following section, I will examine some of these differentiations. As I will argue there as well, the gradual arrival of new terms did not lead to a univocal definition of the basic terminology, so that some contributors to the debate continue to talk past each other.

2. Terminological distinctions

The distinctions that have shaped the contemporary debate about the cognitive penetrability of vision concern three dimensions, namely vision itself, cognition, and penetrability.[300] Firstly, it is crucial to appreciate the nature of vision, which depending on one's position in the debate is deemed to function as *penetrandum* or not. In this context, it is standard to differentiate between the initial processing of visual inputs (so-called 'early vision', which is taken to yield a precept that is specified as to its orientation, texture, shape, brightness, movement, etc.) and later stages of vision (bundled under the heading 'late vision'). Secondly, there are some terminological distinctions which concern cognition, which is the putative vehicle or agent of cognitive penetration ('*penetrans*' for the sake of brevity). Thirdly, there are various ways of specifying what penetrability amounts to, the most prominent being the semantic and the causal account, respectively.

With regards to vision, there are at least three different but mutually compatible ways of specifying the distinction between 'early' and 'late vision'. First of all, these two types of vision can be characterised in terms of what is being processed, how that processing takes places, and which outcome it brings about. According to the visual scientist David Marr, who employed the terms in his seminal account of vision[301], the visual system first extracts information about the contours of an object by examining how the scene reflects light. Using a set of optical procedures (most notably stereopsis and parallax) as well as some inborn mathematical principles, the visual system

[300] While it is arguable that insights from the debate about cognitive penetrability can be applied *mutatis mutandis* to other sense modalities, the extant literature focusses almost exclusively upon visual perception. Given the extensive reliance on specific neuropsychological findings that characterises the contemporary discussion, such adaptations are likely to require careful refinements and reassessments.

[301] see Marr (1982), *passim*.

constructs a representation of the volumes and depth relations in the scene. This so-called 2½D sketch is egocentric, in that it represents the scene from the limited viewpoint of the observer and does not feature the invisible parts of objects.[302] It is thus arguable that early vision, by determining the outlines and shapes of what is featured in the scene, effects some sort of preliminary discrimination between objects. However, such a coarse-grained differentiation does not imply the classification of these objects under sortals, and *a fortiori* it does not allow for the specification of precise criteria of identity for them.[303] As such, early vision is a purely bottom-up process, in that the visual signals impinging on the retina are converted by the visual nerves into information that is then simply fed forward to higher visual centres. Secondly, early vision can be defined in terms of latencies, that is, in terms of how long it takes the visual system to elaborate a 2½D sketch. Empirical investigations suggest that this initial 'feedforward sweep' lasts for about 100 ms after stimulus onset and transmits signals to the inferior temporal cortex. After this, until about 150 ms, there is some limited activation of both recurrent and lateral connections between neurons, which means that some top-down information is fed back to areas located downstream in the visual processing hierarchy. However, this higher-order information is typically taken to be purely visual, so that it still pertains to early vision.[304] Thirdly and lastly, the epistemology of early vision is characterised mainly in negative terms. Given its nature, it is subpersonal, that is, it is a process which is effected by a subpart (or a 'module' in Fodor's terminology) of the thinking subject. More specifically, it is brought about by the visual centres of the mind or brain. Being a subpersonal process, it is not accessible to conscious awareness and does not bear any distinctive phenomenological traits (i.e. there is no characteristic way that early vision feels like).

Late vision on the other hand, being the full-fledged kind of vision that we are familiar with, is defined much less explicitly. On Marr's influential account, late vision features a 3D model of the visual scene that supplements the 2½D sketch with a representation of those sides of the seen object that are not directly visible to the observer. As such, it is formatted in a way that allows for the comparison with object representations stored in visual memory. Accordingly, the classification of an object under a sortal, which is a first step towards determining its criteria of identity, is only possible once the 3D model has been established. Late vision is also subject to top-down influences that are not purely visual in nature, but rather presuppose access to both conceptual resources and cognitive states. Empirical studies suggest, for instance, that information stored in long-term memory is activated 200 ms after the onset of the visual stimulus at the latest.[305] It is a moot point whether late vision is effected by a sub-personal module of the human mind, or whether it is the result of an interaction of various faculties. However, it is uncontroversial that this stage of vision is consciously accessible, and that subjects are typically aware of what they are seeing.[306]

For relatively obvious reasons, the distinction between early and late vision has often been put to use by advocates of cognitive impenetrability: given its very definition, it is patent that early vision cannot be influenced by cognitive states. This claim typically goes hand in hand with the

[302] see Raftopoulos and Zeimbekis (2016), pp. 10 f.
[303] compare Lowe (2016), pp. 364 ff.
[304] These results were first presented by Lamme and Roelfsema (2000) and are recapitulated by Raftopoulos and Zeimbekis (2016), pp. 12 f.
[305] see the results of Lamme (2003, 2005), summarised in Raftopoulos and Zeimbekis (2016), p. 13.
[306] This does not mean that subjects are in a position to fully capture what they are seeing by purely verbal means. Nonetheless, they are typically able to come up with a relatively detailed reproduction of what they perceive (e.g. a drawing). This last qualification is a concession to externalist theories of visual content, which claim that what one sees transcends in many cases what one is consciously aware of.

concession that late vision, while (possibly) not being penetrated by cognitive information in each and every case, can still be subject to such influences. However, it is likely that this is just a Pyrrhic victory for the proponents of cognitive impenetrability. For the differentiation between early and late vision gives rise to various conundrums, for example concerning the precise cut-off point between these two kinds of vision. More importantly, it is unclear why anyone (except for strategic purposes) would be tempted to categorise early vision as a genuine type of vision, rather than just as an episode or constituent part of visual processing. For instance, it does not yield a stable percept that is, at least in principle, subject to awareness and conscious access, and it is in general unclear how and in what sense perceivers 'see' the 2½D sketch provided by early vision. As such, the supposedly conceptual tie between seeing something (e.g. observing a scene) and believing that what is seen is the case is also severed, since episodes of early vision do not give rise to any perceptual beliefs, not even implicitly held ones.

Lastly, it should be pointed out that this easy solution to the problem of cognitive penetrability renders the debate overly technical and all but trivial. In this context, it is important to keep in mind the principal philosophical import of the whole debate. Early discussions about cognitive penetrability were guided by the assumption that there is an analogy between scientific observation and theories on the one hand and visual perception and background knowledge on the other. Accordingly, the cognitive penetrability of vision (and, *mutatis mutandis*, of the other perceptual modalities) was considered to have pernicious consequences for its justificatory status. If our cognitive states indeed influenced what we are able to perceive, then it would in some cases be illicit to ground knowledge claims in perceptual observation. In order to show that perception can nonetheless serve as justification for beliefs, participants in the discussion have either argued that the former is *in toto* cognitively impenetrable or that the influence of cognition on perception is innocuous (in that it leads neither to circularity nor to relativism). Advocates of the thesis that only early vision is cognitively impenetrable typically surmise that this is enough to safeguard the justificatory status of perceptual states, but they fail to appreciate the fact that it is difficult to see how a sub-personal, introspectively inaccessible state can serve as rational foundation and justification for a consciously entertained state. Accordingly, the data that are genuinely 'unsoiled' risk being insufficient for providing a solid epistemic foundation to theories.

The crucial term 'cognition' is also often left unspecified in contemporary discussions about cognitive penetrability. In this context, it is expedient to get a grip on what distinguishes cognitive mental phenomena from other mental states and abilities. Firstly, it is important to differentiate cognitive from conative states, which may in some cases also have an impact upon what is perceived. The main difference concerns their direction of fit: while cognitive states have a mind-to-world direction of fit, in that they are directed at the world and aim to represent it correctly, conative states are characterised by a world-to-mind direction of fit. Furthermore, cognitive and conative states of mind need to be kept apart from affective states, which indeed seem to straddle the border between perception and cognition. There is a burgeoning literature on the effects that the emotions can have upon perception, but it is unclear whether such 'affective penetration' is indeed a sub-variety of cognitive penetration or a separate phenomenon.[307]

Secondly, it is crucial to appreciate which cognitive resources can serve as penetrating vehicles or *penetrantia*, for there is an abundance of positions on this matter that have been sketched (rather than explicitly discussed and endorsed) in the contemporary debate. A first salient option is to aver

[307] For a short discussion of 'affective penetration', see Vetter and Newen (2014), p. 69. Such penetration is in some instances the perceptual analogue of wishful thinking, when e.g. the feelings that I have for a person make me see her face as expressive of sympathy.

that the penetrating vehicles are specific mental *states* in which the perceiving subject finds itself. As such, these states are typically reckoned to be affirmative rather than suggestive in nature, in that they present their contents as being true or correct. Relatedly, they are sometimes qualified as 'knowledge' (e.g. by Fodor), and they can be combined to form fairly complex 'theories'. A second fundamental option consists in maintaining that cognitive *capacities* have a decisive impact upon what a perceiver sees. Theorists who thus argue that cognitive abilities serve as penetrating agents typically insist that recognition and identification, which both presuppose such capacities, are part and parcel of ordinary visual perception rather than operations performed on an independently given perceptual datum.

Furthermore, both cognitive states and abilities allow for distinctions which pertain to their origin and relative stability. Some theorists, such as Paul Churchland, deny that any stage of visual processing is cognitively impenetrable and argue that the mind or brain uses certain cognitive principles (e.g. geometric and topological ones) that have been acquired in the course of evolution to construct what Marr called the 2½D sketch. The view that there are endogenous, hard-wired and innate cognitive states (and abilities) that enable visual processing is contentious. In most cases, it is granted that the cognitive states and capacities which are considered to influence perception are exogenous, that is, acquired through experience. The acquisition of some cognitive abilities might require considerable efforts on the part of the perceiver, as Churchland also aimed to show. For instance, when wearing inverting lenses, it takes the subject several weeks to gather the relevant information and adopt cognitive principles which allow her to override the impression, provided by the visual system, that the world is upside down.[308] Or, to take another example, it takes a considerable amount of time to learn how to read, i.e. to acquire a cognitive skill that seems to influence our visual perception of certain marks on paper (e.g. certain series of letters are seen as belonging together). Moreover, extensive processes of enculturation and socialisation are required in order to acquire the recognitional skills that underpin certain cognitive capacities putatively functioning as penetrating vehicles.[309] Lastly, in some instances the penetrating vehicle is an individual cognitive state (e.g. a particular belief) which is formed on a specific occasion and subject to introspective access and conscious evaluation. For instance, in the abovementioned example of the rat-man drawing the belief that, say, there is a rodent to be spotted in the picture (whose espousal has been favoured by certain contextual cues) can decisively shape one's perception of the drawing.

With regards to impenetrability itself, the current debate is also often vague, in that it remains underspecified what it means for a perceptual state not to be penetrated by a cognitive one. On the one hand, there is a strong version of impenetrability, sometimes called 'causal impenetrability', according to which the cognitive states or abilities of an observer can have no impact whatsoever upon her visual experience. In addition to not affecting the content of the percept, cognitive resources also fail to alter the phenomenology of the perceptual episode. For instance, if my having seen pictures of Queen Elizabeth II before (that is, my having stored information about her in my visual memory) and my antecedent beliefs about her did not in the slightest affect what she looks like or what it feels like to see a picture of her, vision would be causally impenetrable by cognition. As a consequence, this account of impenetrability affirms that perception is completely impervious to cognitive states and abilities: it thus also denies that the Queen's face looks familiar because of

[308] see Churchland (1988), pp. 174 f.

[309] This is especially true if one takes – as e.g. Vetter and Newen (2014), p. 66 seem to do – certain striking phenomena, such as putative instances of linguistic relativity and the acquisition of cross-racial face recognition skills, to be illustrative and indicative of cognitive penetration.

some cognitive influence. Rather, the familiarity of her facial traits that the perceiver experiences would be a mere causal by-product of the fact that the perceiver in question has frequently processed the same or at least similar inputs.

However, proponents of cognitive impenetrability tend to argue for a weaker conclusion, namely the claim that perception is semantically impenetrable. Advocates of this view assume that both perceptual and cognitive states can be construed as relations towards a propositional content. They go on to maintain that a given perceptual state is semantically impenetrable if and only if there is no strict logical relation (such as implication or entailment) between that state's content and the content of a cognitive state *that is due to an influence of the latter state on the former state*. The (italicised) proviso is arguably amenable to an interpretation in causal terms[310]: even if a subject had no antecedent knowledge, belief, or supposition about the whereabouts of the cat, she would still be in a position to enter into a relation to the content *that the cat is on the mat* by means of perception alone.

3. An Idle Debate?

As has been noticed in the previous section, the most compelling case for cognitive impenetrability refers to the fact that so-called early vision seems to be impervious to the influence of cognitive states. However, even this claim is not entirely uncontroversial. Some philosophers, most notably Churchland, have indeed argued that every stage of visual processing is permeated by cognition: since early vision draws upon certain geometric and topological principles (and the corresponding innate cognitive capacities) in order to elaborate a 2½D sketch of the visual scene, it is cognitively penetrated. In order to block this move, proponents of cognitive impenetrability have advanced at least two arguments. On the one hand, advocates of cognitive impenetrability typically adopt a semantic or logical reading of the claim, such that a cognitive state must stand in specific inferential relations to the perceptual states that the subject finds itself in if it is to penetrate them. The capacities cited by Churchland (as well as the principles which they underpin) are just not the sort of thing that can enter such relations, and ergo they cannot be a source of cognitive penetration.[311] On the other hand, it has been maintained that it is a necessary condition for a penetrating state that it be represented by either the subject or a sub-personal module of the subject's mind or brain. And the mathematical principles which allow for the establishment of the 2½D sketch, the story goes, are not represented by the mind.[312] A related point can also be expressed by borrowing terminology from Wittgenstein, although he would of course have been reluctant to apply it to mental modules: while visual processing is bound to conform to certain regularities, it cannot follow any rules. States that can penetrate vision must bear a surface similarity to rules rather than mere regularities, in that they must be the kind of thing that can be considered and examined at least in principle.

Even if one is ready to grant all these points, they are not yet sufficient proof of the cognitive impenetrability of vision: all that has been established is that the initial stages of visual processing are not influenced by cognitive states and capacities. But this is hardly a substantial conclusion.

[310] Nonetheless, it is difficult to see how such a *causal* relation between two states of the subject could possibly instate a *logical* relation between the respective contents of those states. In this sense, semantic penetrability is *ab initio* (even in the absence of any positive arguments for semantic impenetrability) a problematic view.

[311] This argument was first advanced by Davies (1989) and is recapitulated by Raftopoulos and Zeimbekis (2016), p. 15.

[312] A similar point is made by Burge (2010), p. 95, cited in Raftopoulos and Zeimbekis (2016), p. 15.

For the contention that vision (and *mutatis mutandis* the other sense modalities) are *ab initio* penetrated by cognition is implausible and rarely advocated in the current debate.[313] In fact, this unduly strong claim would lead to the conclusion that perception is a peculiar subtype of cognition[314], although they are arguably different from both a functional and a conceptual point of view. More importantly, if cognitive impenetrability simply boiled down to the impenetrability of early vision, not much of philosophical value would have been established. Proponents of the view that (early) vision is impervious to cognition often surmise that it provides a straightforward argument against (scientific) relativism. More specifically, they tend to argue that scientific observation is free from the undue encroachment of theories, since vision is in general safe from cognitive interferences. As the debate grew more sophisticated, this claim has of course been refined. But one of the central objectives for advocates of cognitive impenetrability still is to establish that perceptual states can serve as genuine justifications for beliefs.[315] However, in order to substantiate this claim, it must be granted that the question about penetrability concerns vision *tout court* (i.e. the entire process of obtaining visual information) and not just some initial stage of visual processing, since it is the former which serves as rational basis for belief and knowledge.

Given the overall weakness of the case for cognitive impenetrability (not to mention the fact that some of the distinctions it effects might strike one as sleights of hand), it seems safe to say that vision can be penetrated by cognitive states. However, there are certain substantial assumptions about vision that are incompatible with its cognitive penetrability. For instance, if one supposes that the mind in general conforms to a behaviouristic picture, or if one adheres to an externalist account of perceptual content, it becomes difficult to see how vision could possibly be subject to influences from cognition.

In order to separate the sensory core of a perceptual experience from intruding cognitive states, Dretske, who is an externalist about perceptual content, has devised an elegantly simple test (which he has dubbed the 'Goldilocks Test').[316] Whenever an observer (let us call him, for the sake of simplicity, 'A') sees something in a visual scene which another observer ('B') fails to perceive, A should ask B to paint what he sees. Granting that B has the required artistic prowess to capture what he is seeing, A has (according to Dretske) precisely three options to evaluate B's painting:

(1) *Too little.* A claims that the painting lacks some decisive details, although he himself is unable to add them.
(2) *Too much.* A complains that B's depiction of the visual scene is too specific; he has added details that are in fact absent from the visual scene.
(3) *Just right.* A concedes that B has produced a perfectly faithful depiction of the scene.

Dretske's test relies on the *prima facie* plausible idea that whenever someone claims to see something, she should be able to precisely convey what she is seeing by some suitable means of externalisation

[313] Historically, the claim was espoused by some *New Look* psychologists, most prominently Jerome Bruner; see Bruner and Goodman (1947), and Bruner and Postman (1949). Vetter and Newen (2014) indeed show that certain psychological findings are best interpreted as manifestations of cognitive penetration, but their much more radical conclusion that 'cognitive penetration always takes place' (ibid., p. 73) remains uncorroborated by their arguments.
[314] There is a venerable tradition in philosophy which (roughly) defines cognition as the intake and processing of information, such that perception would by definition count as a form of cognition. Nonetheless, it is evident that participants in the contemporary debate about cognitive (im-)penetrability use the term in a more restricted fashion, so as to encompass only those states and capacities that have traditionally been characterised as 'intellectual' or 'cogitative'.
[315] Similarly, proponents of the cognitive penetrability of perception strive to defuse the worry that such penetrability would have nefarious epistemological consequences; compare ibid.
[316] see Dretske (2016), pp. 165 ff.

(e.g. language, drawings, etc.), an idea which has a venerable Wittgensteinian pedigree. This is meant to block the possibility that she avers to see quite extravagant things in a scene without being challenged. However, it is not entirely clear whether such a test also does justice to those features of vision which transcend the mere detection of details from a visual scene. Consider for example the case of Gestalt features. Dretske's Goldilocks test seems to prescribe that an exact copy of the rabbit-duck drawing would be the only genuine depiction of what one sees when looking at this dual-aspect picture. This is because A has reasons to complain when B simply draws a picture of, say, a rabbit: supposing that A has only spotted the duck aspect, B has drawn something that A does not see and failed to depict what A actually sees. One possible though somewhat unsatisfactory reaction is to point out that dual-aspect figures simply are not visual scenes: they are not the kind of thing we typically see in our environment (although we might sometimes be able to e.g. see the facial traits of famous people in clouds or trees). Nevertheless, it is undeniable that visual perception is characterised by features that are difficult to capture in an exact reproduction of the visual scene: for instance, we experience certain objects as belonging together, as being more salient than others, as looking familiar, and so on.

The example of Dretske's Goldilocks test illustrates that there is often an unholy interplay between one's favourite conception of perception and one's stance on the penetrability issue. For instance, if vision were essentially a sensory phenomenon that consists in the bottom-up transmission of information drawn from visual signals impinging on the retina, it would be impervious to cognition by definition. Similarly, if one takes a highly complex activity such as reading to be a process primarily driven by perception, the contention that the latter is immune to cognitive influence is all but unintelligible. Accordingly, the discussion about cognitive impenetrability is dependent on a thorough inquiry of the nature of both perception and cognition. And the main shortcoming of the whole debate is the fact that it presupposes that these two mental capacities are separable, without delving into the details as to why they are not identical and yet thoroughly interconnected.

4. Wittgenstein's remarks on aspect perception and their relation to the current debate

In *Philosophy of Psychology – A Fragment*, Wittgenstein discusses two related phenomena which, so he suggests, are subject to cognitive penetration: aspect perception on the one hand and cases of non-instantaneous visual recognition on the other. Concerning seeing-as, Wittgenstein avers that it unites a sensuous or strictly speaking perceptual with a cognitive dimension. The cognitive factors that influence aspect perception are variously described as 'thinking', 'interpreting', and 'imagining', to cite just the terms that he uses most frequently.[317] Moreover, in PPF §§141-4 he discusses cases in which a perceiver fails to immediately recognise what she is seeing, that is, cases of perception which, in contrast to more everyday instances of seeing, require conscious scrutiny and do not *ab initio* feature an identification of what is present in the visual scene. He suggests that the act of recognition which might eventually follow the episode of perceiving transforms the latter, as is evinced by the fact that the spectator would produce a different reproduction of the visual scene after recognising or identifying the object that is featured in it. Some participants in the debate on cognitive penetrability argue that perceptual recognition is a prime example of the phenomenon: recognition is not a cognitive act directed at an independently given percept, but rather a factor

[317] For a more thorough investigation of these cognitive factors, see the second section of the first chapter of Part 2 of the present thesis.

which influences which incoming stimuli are further processed, and how that processing is to take place.[318]

It is thus evident that Wittgenstein took some visual experiences to be cognitively penetrated. Nonetheless, it is a moot point whether he would accept that perception as such is thus penetrated, or could at least in principle be thus penetrated. There are two arguments which would commit Wittgenstein to an affirmative stance concerning cognitive *de facto* penetration, but there are exegetical and substantial reasons which cast doubt on both of these. The first argument runs as follows:

(P1) All seeing is seeing-as.
(P2) Seeing-as is cognitively penetrated.
(C) Seeing *per se* is also thus penetrated.

Obviously, the crucial major premise is identical to the one featured in the argument which purports to establish that all seeing is subject to state conceptualism. As has been rehearsed in the previous chapter, it is difficult to corroborate this claim. Moreover, from an exegetical point of view, it is unlikely that Wittgenstein subscribed to such a ubiquity thesis: it is a constitutive characteristic of seeing-as that the two or more aspects that can be spotted in the drawing are genuine and live options, i.e. that they can dawn upon a perceiver if she is sufficiently open-minded and perceptive. In cases where someone looks at, say, the cutlery on the table, it makes sense to say that she sees the cutlery as cutlery only under fairly extravagant and remote conditions, for instance if she just returned from an anthropological field trip where the natives used similar utensils as hunting tools. Although it is in principle possible to construct scenarios in which such liberal uses of the 'as'-locution make sense, it is hardly plausible that such a scenario is available for each and every ordinary object. In the aforementioned case, it is sensible to maintain that the anthropologist sees the cutlery as cutlery, but it is virtually nonsensical to affirm that she sees, say, her feet as feet.

The second and last attempt to corroborate the demanding thesis that ordinary visual perception is cognitively penetrated (rather than just penetrable under special circumstances) is also worth discussing. Rather than relying on the notion of seeing-as, this argument deploys the admittedly related notion of recognition (or recognising-as) and runs as follows:

(P1') All seeing involves a recognition of what is seen.
(P2') Such recognition is a cognitive achievement.
(C') Seeing *per se* is cognitively penetrated.

Whereas the minor premise (P2') is arguably a conceptual truism, the major premise (P1') is contentious. And indeed, Wittgenstein avers that seeing *tout court* does not require a separate act of recognition of what is seen. As a matter of fact, and just as in the case for aspect perception, talk about recognition is meaningful only in those fairly exceptional cases in which the perceiver actively pondered the question as to what kind of object it is that occupies her visual field. In most cases, what is seen is identified immediately, unhesitatingly, and almost gratuitously, without the need for close scrutiny of the *perceptibilium*. Since the unrestricted deployment of the notion of recognition that underpins (P1') is illicit, the premise itself is incorrect.

As was the case for state conceptualism, it is implausible to ascribe to Wittgenstein the view that seeing *tout court* is subject to cognitive penetration. Nonetheless, the more nuanced thesis that visual perception is in principle cognitively penetrable can be derived from some of his suggestions:

[318] Even advocates of this claim concede that this kind of cognitive penetration occurs towards the end of visual processing; compare Vetter and Newen (2014), p. 69.

(P1*) Under fairly exceptional circumstances, ordinary seeing amounts to seeing-as.
(P2*) Seeing-as is cognitively penetrated, and *ergo* cognitively penetrable.
(C*) Seeing *per se* is also thus penetrable.

Both (P1*) and (C*) are about potentialities rather than actual states of affairs, such that the argument does not feature any fallacious move from a potentiality to an actuality. Moreover, (P2*) trivially deduces a potentiality from an actuality and is thus sound. However, the conclusion is perhaps less substantial than most proponents of cognitive penetration would like it to be. For ordinary vision is *de facto* penetrated only in a few cases, namely when the circumstances dictate that the use of the 'as' locution is indeed warranted or when active recognitional efforts are called for. This restriction notwithstanding, the argument indicates that cognition and perception are not isolated from each other, but interact in complex ways (both causally and conceptually). It is highly likely that no precise position can be ascribed to Wittgenstein concerning the question as to whether modules in the mind or brain are informationally encapsulated, as he would deem the relevant terminology to be based upon serious philosophical misunderstandings. Nonetheless, it is safe to say that he would deny that the complex perceptual and cognitive abilities putatively manifesting the presence of such modules operate independently and in isolation from each other.

In summary, Wittgenstein did not contend that ordinary episodes of (visual) perception are in each and every case *de facto* penetrated by the deployment of cognitive resources. Nevertheless, he was largely sympathetic to the idea that cognition *can* influence perception. Animadversions from advocates of cognitive impenetrability notwithstanding, this conclusion does not bring any nefarious epistemological consequences in its wake. For firstly, both aspect perception and instances of seeing involving active recognition are rare phenomena that can be kept apart from everyday instances of seeing, especially since they are subject to a different set of behavioural criteria and typically give rise to avowals rather than mere perceptual reports. It is thus possible to isolate the epistemologically malign from the benign episodes of perception, if one should wish to do so. Secondly, it is dubious whether the cognitive penetration of aspect perception has indeed pernicious consequences inasmuch as the grounding of beliefs and knowledge claims is concerned. As has been shown in earlier chapters of the thesis, aspect perception is rarely in the business of substantiating knowledge claims, except perhaps in cases of aesthetic evaluation. Moreover, utterances which express that one has spotted an aspect are not purely arbitrary, since they are often subject to justification and grounded in intersubjective agreement.

In the context of contemporary discussions on conceptual content and cognitive penetration, the general thrust of Wittgenstein's remarks on aspect perception is mainly methodological. In fact, debates concerning the content of perceptual experience – e.g. whether it features concepts *ab initio*, whether it represents only basic properties such as colour and shape, whether it is penetrated or influenced by cognitive processes and biases – cannot be settled by metaphysical arguments and terminological stipulations, however subtle. Rather, these questions concerning the nature and content of perceptual experience become less pressing once one focusses on the use of terms such as 'to see' in everyday, pre-theoretical discourse. The notion of 'seeing-as' is interesting in this respect precisely because it is used sparingly and in fairly exceptional circumstances. In conjunction with terminological clarifications, empirical evidence can inform us as to the nature and scope of cognitive penetrability, or so it is to be hoped.

Concluding remarks and suggestions for further research

Inasmuch as exegesis is concerned, the present dissertation offers a contribution to the debate about how to interpret Wittgenstein's texts. In an effort of mediation between the immanent and the genetic approach, the aim of the commentary on the first half or so of *Philosophy of Psychology – A Fragment*, section xi is not doctrinal, that is, it does not purport to show which of the aforementioned exegetical stances is right in the abstract. Rather, it strives to do justice to the intricacies of Wittgenstein's text, be they philosophical or linguistic. Given the tentative and sometimes purely suggestive character of Wittgenstein's remarks in PPF, section xi, it would indeed be fruitful to complement the immanent approach advocated here with a scrupulous genetic interpretation. Firstly, this could lead to a deeper understanding of what motivated Wittgenstein to investigate seeing-as at such length. As such, it may also be instrumental in determining with more precision the place that the phenomenon occupies within the framework of the 'concepts of experience' (cp. PPF §115). Secondly, examining parallel passages and previous versions of a remark could shed light on passages that are almost unintelligible otherwise. To cite just one example, it is not clear what Wittgenstein had in mind when he alluded to the putative fact that the aspects of the double cross are related in another way to a 'possible illusion' ('mögliche Täuschung') than certain essentially spatial or three-dimensional aspects (see PPF §218). Combining the thorough immanent interpretation presented here with a study of the source material (when needed) would be a fruitful exercise. For reasons of space, the commentary only examines the succession of remarks from section xi that deals most explicitly with aspect perception. Providing a paragraph-by-paragraph commentary on the remainder of section xi, and especially on the more disorderly final remarks, is evidently a further *desideratum*.

With regards to the philosophy of art, a precise understanding of the features of aspect seeing also illuminates other concepts in the vicinity (such as that of seeing-in), and it might further our appreciation of the fact that specific subtypes of vision are permeated by specific modalities of thinking, such as e.g. imagining. In this context in particular, it is important to note that the applicability of the notion of aspect perception to sense modalities other than vision is only hinted at in the thesis, in the hope that it is *mutatis mutandis* manageable to provide such an account. Given its fundamental importance for the appreciation of music, a more systematic investigation of hearing-as is still called for.

In the dissertation, I have mainly focussed on the notions of 'seeing-as' and 'treating-as'. The relevance of the notions of imagination ('imagining to be') and recognition ('recognising-as') has also been noted, mainly *en passant*, in the last part of the thesis. But there is a wealth of further verbs which can be complemented by 'as', most notably 'regarding-as', 'conceiving-as', 'appreciating-as', and 'identifying-as'. Investigating the status of these verbs, e.g. whether they are factive or not and whether they are eventually reducible to one of the notions discussed at greater length in the thesis, could be philosophically illuminating.

The last two chapters of the dissertation in particular indicate that aspect seeing is a perceptual phenomenon that has hitherto been unduly neglected. The upshot is that careful empirical theory building is not the only thing needed for an accurate account of perception. Rather, a conspicuous survey of the various concepts used to describe visual experiences is an essential precondition for the success of a systematic theory of perception. One option to arrive at such an overview is traditional conceptual analysis as inspired by Wittgenstein, which is the approach that has served as orientation for the present dissertation. However, some of his perhaps more contestable claims

– concerning e.g. which locutions speakers typically use when they experience the dawning and shifting of aspects and how they react in general to puzzle pictures – could in principle be tested by conducting surveys and other empirical tests, that is, by engaging in experimental philosophy. Such work might rekindle the interest in aspect perception of more empirically oriented researchers.

The conceptual work of clarification achieved in the present thesis clears the ground for more empirical approaches. In exposing that an overly stark dichotomy between perception and cognition is dubious from a philosophical point of view, it offers grist to the mill of cognitive scientists who challenge the neat division of the mind into different faculties. For as such, Wittgenstein's mainly conceptual remarks are not incompatible with experimental work. In principle, the claim that aspect perception is relatively autonomous vis-à-vis both ordinary perception and certain cognitive (or rather intellectual) capacities could be buttressed by carefully and meticulously interpreted empirical evidence. Examining aspect perception from a more interdisciplinary perspective would be an important step towards bridging the gap between philosophers striving for conceptual clarity and cognitive scientists aiming to draw a systematic picture of the human mind.

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Brown Book	Idem, 77-185.
CV	*Culture and Value: A Selection from the Posthumous Remains*, edited by Georg Henrik von Wright and Heikki Nyman. Oxford: Blackwell, 1977.
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